sehen, wie weit Du selbst von der Denke der Amis entfernt bist...
kannste wahrscheinlich noch nicht mal in Millimetern messen.

Die Amis fragen Dich nämlich auch sofort: "Nach welchem Recht ..." und lachen sich dabei kaputt.

Nutze Google und lerne... da findest Du genug über Internationales Recht.

MfG
kiiwii

 

Zig postings mit Rechtfertigungen für Menschenrechtsverletzungen übelster Art.

Lass es löschen. Vor Gott kannst du es nicht löschen. Da kannst du nur auf seine Liebe und Gnade hoffen.

Grüße
ecki  

aus aktuellem Anlass:

CIA-Chef dementiert Existenz von Geheimgefängnissen nicht
Dienstag, 29. November 2005, 17.10 Uhr
Der Direktor des US-Geheimdienstes CIA, Porter Goss, hat die Existenz geheimer Gefängnisse seiner Behörde in verschiedenen Ländern nicht dementiert. Dem US-Fernsehsender ABC sagte Goss auf die Frage nach der Notwendigkeit von Geheimgefängnissen für Terrorverdächtige: „Wir führen einen Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, und wir schlagen uns ganz gut.“ Es sei unvermeidlich, daß es „gefangene Terroristen“ gebe und ebenso „unvermeidlich, daß sie nach den Regeln des Rechts“ behandelt würden. Vorwürfe, die CIA würde die Terrorverdächtigen foltern, wies Goss zurück. Die CIA „foltert nicht“, sagte er.

 

deine ausfälle zu löschen. jeder soll sie lesen können und sich selbst ein urteil bilden. jeder kann auch lesen, was ich vorher geschrieben habe (hingewiesen, dass es in wirklichkeit um nationales recht geht).

@börsenfüxlein: es gibt kein internationales recht, das festlegt, wo sich kriegsgefangenenlager befinden dürfen. auch ist es legal, dass kriegsgefangene zwischen koalitonären hin und hergeschoben werden. aber wie ich schon weiter oben erwähnte ist es eine umstrittene ansicht ob hier ein krieg oder polizeiaktionen vorliegen. bezüglich der verhörmethoden gibt es ein riesiges spekulationsfeld. sollten wirklich gefangene nach ägypten ausgeliefert worden sein, sind diese wahrscheinlich von dem dortigen personal gefoltert worden. jedem ist bekannt, dass in ägypten gefoltert wird. sollten sich dabei die usa die hände in unschuld waschen, ist das verlogen, bösartig und menschenverachtend. über die anderen gefängnisse gibt es momentan riesige spekulation. bei einem deratigen gebiet nicht verwunderlich. dass dort gefangenen durch überlange verhöre, der schlaf geraubt worden sein soll, ist auch schon bei unserer polizei vorgekommen. in meinen augen ist deshalb folter nicht gleich folter. wir brauchen allerdings keine angst zu haben, dass nicht wirklich raus kommt, was passiert. dazu ist unsere gesellschaft zu offen.


mfg 54reab
 

Angeblich Demokratische-Staaten die sich alle 2 Min. auf Gott berufen
sind das Allerletzte und haben den Demokraten die,die Menschenrechte
achten ,den Krieg erklärt und müssen an allen Fronten bekämpft werden
und geächtet.
Wer das in Abrede stellt macht sich selbst schuldig und hat aus der

Geschichte nichts gelernt

 

DIE ZEIT

 

47/2005 

Verdeckte Folter

Weltweit soll der amerikanische Geheimdienst CIA Al-Qaida-Verdächtige in geheimen Gefängnissen misshandeln

In der vergangenen Woche berichtete die Washington Post, die CIA halte im Ausland mehrere führende Al-Qaida-Extremisten in geheimen Gefängnissen fest. Solche Lager soll es bereits seit vier Jahren in insgesamt acht Ländern geben - auch in Osteuropa, und dort vermutlich in Polen und Rumänien. Die Regierungen beider Länder haben der EU-Kommission zwar versichert, dass die Vorwürfe nicht zuträfen. Dennoch zieht die Affäre nun ihre Kreise.

In einem Interview mit ZEIT online spricht die Direktorin von Human Rights Watch, Lotte Leicht, von ihr vorliegenden Beweisen - sowohl für die Existenz der Gefängnisse, als auch für Transporte der Gefangenen. Sie ruft alle europäischen Länder auf, das Ende der geheimen Inhaftierungen zu verlangen. Der Europarat hat bereits angekündigt, die Vorwürfe untersuchen zu wollen. Für die EU wären derartige Einrichtungen, falls es sie wirklich gibt, eine Blamage. Sie fordert von ihren Mitgliedern die Achtung der Menschenrechte und verbietet geheime Haftanstalten. Polen ist der EU im vorigen Jahr beigetreten, Rumänien will 2007 Mitglied werden.

Am Mittwoch leiteten die Regierungen Schwedens und Norwegens offizielle Nachforschungen zu angeblichen Zwischenlandungen von US-Flugzeugen mit geheimen Gefangenentransporten ein. Die schwedische Luftfahrtbehörde erklärte zwar, sie habe keine Kenntnis darüber, dass eines oder mehrere CIA-Flugzeuge in Schweden zwischengelandet seien. Die Regierung beauftragte die Behörde aber mit einer umfassenden Untersuchung.

Madrid hatte am Vortag ähnliche Untersuchungen angekündigt. Innenminister José Antonio Alonso sagte, solle sich der Verdacht auf geheime Gefangenentransporte bestätigen, wäre das ein »schwerwiegender Vorgang«.

Darüber hinaus haben ehemalige und noch aktive Agenten der CIA die brutalen Verhörmethoden des amerikanischen Geheimdienstes kritisiert. In mindestens einem Fall sei ein Verdächtiger nach seinem Verhör gestorben, berichtete der US-Fernsehsender ABC am Samstag. Die Verhörmethoden führten zu äußerst fragwürdigen Geständnissen: »Die Folter muss nur schwer genug sein, dann bekommt man von jedem jedes Geständnis«, sagte der ehemalige CIA-Vertreter Bob Bear.

ABC beschrieb unter Berufung auf mehrere CIA-Vertreter sechs fragwürdige Techniken: Sie reichen von Schlägen in die Magengrube über Stehfolter bis zur Scheinhinrichtung. Bei der Stehfolter müssten die Häftlinge nach Aussage der Informanten mit gefesselten Händen und Füßen mehr als vierzig Stunden lang aufrecht stehen. Eine Variante ist die »Kalte Zelle«: Der Häftling wird gezwungen, nackt in einer zehn Grad Celsius kalten Zelle zu stehen und wird regelmäßig mit kaltem Wasser übergossen. Besonders brutal erscheint das »Water Boarding«: Der Gefangene wird kopfüber auf ein Brett gefesselt und sein Kopf in Zellophan gewickelt. Sobald er dann mit Wasser übergossen wird, glaubt er nach Aussage der Zeugen, ertränkt zu werden - und gesteht.

Laut ABC wurden diese Verhörmethoden bei rund einem Dutzend Häftlingen angewendet, die nach Auffassung des CIA hochrangige Vertreter des Al-Qaida-Terrornetzes sind. Die von einem CIA-Agenten als »erweiterte Verhörtechniken« bezeichneten Methoden kamen demnach auch in den geheimen Gefängnissen in Asien und Osteuropa zum Einsatz. Die CIA verweigerte der ABC jeden Kommentar zu den Vorwürfen. Die US-Regierung hat bisher stets bestritten, mögliche Al-Qaida-Mitglieder zu foltern, um Informationen aus ihnen herauszupressen.

Am Donnerstagabend erhob ein ehemaliger Direktor der CIA zudem aber schwere Anschuldigungen gegen den amerikanischen Vizepräsidenten Dick Cheney. Admiral Stansfield Turner, Chef der CIA in den 70er Jahren, sagte, der Stellvertreter des Präsidenten beaufsichtige die Folter der Terrorverdächtigen. Cheney beschädige damit das Ansehen der USA. »Wir haben die Linie überschritten und ein gefährliches Gebiet betreten«, sagte Turner dem britischen Fernsehsender ITV. »Ich bin beschämt, dass die USA einen Vizepräsidenten für Folter haben. Das ist verwerflich. (...) Er befürwortet Folter, was sonst sollte es sein?«

(c) ZEIT online, axw, 20.11.2005

 

will mich ja verklagen.

103. Wie gesagt: die Amis dürfen alles u. die Regierung

kiiwii

29.11.05 15:33

usw.

Und noch vieles mehr. Es geht um schwerste Menschenrechtsverletzungen und FOltervorwürfe, dazu Kiiwiis kommentar, die Amis dürfen alles.

Nimm ruhig deine eigenen Folterfreigabe-postings zum Anwalt mit.

Grüße
ecki

 

danke für die Antwort; jetzt wird mir auch klar, warum die US-Regierung ständig betont "wir sind im Krieg" etc...somit können sie wohl diverse "rechtliche Schlupflöcher" ausnützen....

und um eines mal klarzustellen: ich habe hier niemals behauptet, dass ich ein Rechtsexperte oder so was ähnlich bin (bin ich ganz und gar nicht); Ausgangspunkt der ganzen Diskusion war Pos. 104, wo ich einfach meinen Ärger über diverse Dinge ausgedrückt habe, welche meiner Meinung nach eben nicht ok sind...und dabei bleibts auch (ganz gleich ob die Amis dabei gegen das Gesetz versossen und belangt werden können oder auch nicht...)

gruss
füx  

Mit P # 119 bist Du entschiedend zu
weit gegangen.
Eine perfiede Unterstellung.
Unterstellungen kommen bei Dir häufig vor, aber
für so primitiv hätte ich Dich nicht gehalten.

Ciao
BeMi  

auch in den USA geführt. Es sieht jedenfalls so aus, als ob die CIA auch selbst die Hände schmutzig macht - und das durchaus von ganz oben gedeckt wird:

A DEADLY INTERROGATION
Can the C.I.A. legally kill a prisoner?
by JANE MAYER
Issue of 2005-11-14
Posted 2005-11-07


At the end of a secluded cul-de-sac, in a fast-growing Virginia suburb favored by employees of the Central Intelligence Agency, is a handsome replica of an old-fashioned farmhouse, with a white-railed front porch. The large back yard has a swimming pool, which, on a recent October afternoon, was neatly covered. In the driveway were two cars, a late-model truck, and an all-terrain vehicle. The sole discordant note was struck by a faded American flag on the porch; instead of fluttering in the autumn breeze, it was folded on a heap of old Christmas ornaments.

The house belongs to Mark Swanner, a forty-six-year-old C.I.A. officer who has performed interrogations and polygraph tests for the agency, which has employed him at least since the nineteen-nineties. (He is not a covert operative.) Two years ago, at Abu Ghraib prison, outside Baghdad, an Iraqi prisoner in Swanner’s custody, Manadel al-Jamadi, died during an interrogation. His head had been covered with a plastic bag, and he was shackled in a crucifixion-like pose that inhibited his ability to breathe; according to forensic pathologists who have examined the case, he asphyxiated. In a subsequent internal investigation, United States government authorities classified Jamadi’s death as a “homicide,” meaning that it resulted from unnatural causes. Swanner has not been charged with a crime and continues to work for the agency.

After September 11th, the Justice Department fashioned secret legal guidelines that appear to indemnify C.I.A. officials who perform aggressive, even violent interrogations outside the United States. Techniques such as waterboarding—the near-drowning of a suspect—have been implicitly authorized by an Administration that feels that such methods may be necessary to win the war on terrorism. (In 2001, Vice-President Dick Cheney, in an interview on “Meet the Press,” said that the government might have to go to “the dark side” in handling terrorist suspects, adding, “It’s going to be vital for us to use any means at our disposal.”) The harsh treatment of Jamadi and other prisoners in C.I.A. custody, however, has inspired an emotional debate in Washington, raising questions about what limits should be placed on agency officials who interrogate foreign terrorist suspects outside U.S. territory.

This fall, in response to the exposure of widespread prisoner abuse at American detention facilities abroad—among them Abu Ghraib; Guantánamo Bay, in Cuba; and Bagram Air Base, in Afghanistan—John McCain, the Republican senator from Arizona, introduced a bill in Congress that would require Americans holding prisoners abroad to follow the same standards of humane treatment required at home by the U.S. Constitution. Prisoners must not be brutalized, the bill states, regardless of their “nationality or physical location.” On October 5th, in a rebuke to President Bush, who strongly opposed McCain’s proposal, the Senate voted 90–9 in favor of it.

Senior Administration officials have led a fierce, and increasingly visible, fight to protect the C.I.A.’s classified interrogation protocol. Late last month, Cheney and Porter Goss, the C.I.A. director, had an unusual forty-five-minute private meeting on Capitol Hill with Senator McCain, who was tortured as a P.O.W. during the Vietnam War. They argued that the C.I.A. sometimes needs the “flexibility” to treat detainees in the war on terrorism in “cruel, inhuman, and degrading” ways. Cheney sought to add an exemption to McCain’s bill, permitting brutal methods when “such operations are vital to the protection of the United States or its citizens from terrorist attack.” A Washington Post editorial decried Cheney’s visit, calling him the “Vice-President for Torture.” In the coming weeks, a conference committee of the House and the Senate will decide whether McCain’s proposal becomes law; three of the nine senators who voted against the measure are on the committee.

The outcome of this wider political debate may play a role in determining the fate of Swanner, whose name has not been publicly disclosed before, and who declined several requests to be interviewed. Passage of the McCain legislation by both Houses of Congress would mean that there is strong political opposition to the abusive treatment of prisoners, and would put increased pressure on the Justice Department to prosecute interrogators like Swanner—who could conceivably be charged with assault, negligent manslaughter, or torture. Swanner’s lawyer, Nina Ginsberg, declined to discuss his case on the record. But he has been under investigation by the Justice Department for more than a year.

Manadel al-Jamadi was captured by Navy SEALs at 2 a.m. on November 4, 2003, after a violent struggle at his house, outside Baghdad. Jamadi savagely fought one of the SEALs before being subdued in his kitchen; during the altercation, his stove fell on them. The C.I.A. had identified him as a “high-value” target, because he had allegedly supplied the explosives used in several atrocities perpetrated by insurgents, including the bombing of the Baghdad headquarters of the International Committee of the Red Cross, in October, 2003. After being removed from his house, Jamadi was manhandled by several of the SEALs, who gave him a black eye and a cut on his face; he was then transferred to C.I.A. custody, for interrogation at Abu Ghraib. According to witnesses, Jamadi was walking and speaking when he arrived at the prison. He was taken to a shower room for interrogation. Some forty-five minutes later, he was dead.

For most of the time that Jamadi was being interrogated at Abu Ghraib, there were only two people in the room with him. One was an Arabic-speaking translator for the C.I.A. working on a private contract, who has been identified in military-court papers only as “Clint C.” He was given immunity against criminal prosecution in exchange for his coöperation. The other person was Mark Swanner.

In the spring of 2004, the fact of pervasive prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib became public, on “60 Minutes II” and in a series of articles in these pages by Seymour M. Hersh. Photographs, taken by U.S. soldiers, that showed Iraqi prisoners being hooded, sexually humiliated, and threatened with dogs were published around the world. One of the most harrowing images was of Jamadi’s severely battered corpse, which had been wrapped in plastic and put on ice; he became known in the media as the Ice Man.

Around this time, John Helgerson, the C.I.A.’s inspector general, sent investigators to Iraq and San Diego to interview witnesses about the agency’s role in Jamadi’s death. These investigators determined that there was the possibility of criminality—the threshold level required by the intelligence agency in order for the case to be referred to the Justice Department. The agency did so, and officials in the Justice Department then forwarded the case to the office of Paul McNulty, the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, which has jurisdiction over C.I.A. headquarters. The dossier has been there for more than a year. A lawyer familiar with the case, who asked not to be named, said that the Swanner file seemed to be “lying kind of fallow.”

A spokeswoman for McNulty said that he would have no comment on the case, because it was still under investigation. (Last month, President Bush nominated McNulty to the position of Deputy Attorney General, the second most powerful job in the Justice Department.) No other official in the Justice Department would discuss on the record why, more than two years after Jamadi’s death, no decision has been made about pressing charges against anyone.

A government official familiar with the case, who declined to be named, indicated that establishing guilt in the case might be complicated, because of Jamadi’s rough handling by the SEALs before he entered the custody of the C.I.A. Yet, in the past two years, several of the Navy SEALs who captured Jamadi and delivered him to C.I.A. officials have faced abuse charges in military-justice proceedings, and have been exonerated. Moreover, three medical experts who have examined Jamadi’s case told me that the injuries he sustained from the SEALs could not have caused his death.

Fred Hitz, who served as the C.I.A.’s inspector general from 1990 to 1998, and who is now a lecturer in public and international affairs at Princeton University, said of Bush Administration officials, “I just think they’re playing stall ball.” He told me that he had no inside knowledge of the Swanner case, but he believes that, for numerous reasons, ranging from protecting national security to avoiding political embarrassment, Administration officials “would be opposed to any accountability in this case. They want it to disappear off the screen.” (A spokesman for the C.I.A. said that its internal investigation into Jamadi’s death was “nearly complete,” making it “inappropriate to discuss any of the details.”)

John Radsan, a lawyer formerly in the C.I.A’s Office of General Counsel, says, “Along with the usual problems of dealing with classified information in a criminal case, this could open a can of worms if a C.I.A. official in this case got indicted—a big fat can of worms about what set of rules apply to people like Jamadi. The sixty-four-thousand-dollar question is: What has been authorized? Can the C.I.A. torture people? A case like this opens up Pandora’s box.”



Since September 11, 2001, the C.I.A.’s treatment and interrogation of terrorist suspects has remained almost entirely hidden from public view. Human-rights groups estimate that some ten thousand foreign suspects are being held in U.S. detention facilities in Afghanistan, Iraq, Cuba, and other countries. A small but unknown part of this population is in the custody of the C.I.A., which, as Dana Priest reported recently in the Washington Post, has operated secret prisons in Thailand and in Eastern Europe. It is also unclear how seriously the agency deals with allegations of prisoner abuse. The C.I.A. tends to be careful about following strict legal procedures, including the briefing of the top-ranking members of the congressional intelligence committees on its covert activities. But experts could recall no instance of a C.I.A. officer being tried in a public courtroom for manslaughter or murder. Thomas Powers, the author of two books about the C.I.A., told me, “I’ve never heard of anyone at the C.I.A. being convicted of a killing.” He added that a case such as Jamadi’s had awkward political implications. “Is the C.I.A. capable of addressing an illegal killing by its own hands?” he asked. “My guess is not.” Whereas the military has subjected itself to a dozen internal investigations in the aftermath of the Abu Ghraib scandal, and has punished more than two hundred soldiers for wrongdoing, the agency has undertaken almost no public self-examination.

The C.I.A. has reportedly been implicated in at least four deaths of detainees in Afghanistan and Iraq, including that of Jamadi, and has referred eight potentially criminal cases involving abuse and misconduct to the Justice Department. In March, Goss, the C.I.A.’s director, testified before Congress that “we don’t do torture,” and the agency’s press office issued a release stating, “All approved interrogation techniques, both past and present, are lawful and do not constitute torture. . . . C.I.A. policies on interrogation have always followed legal guidance from the Department of Justice. If an individual violates the policy, then he or she will be held accountable.”

Yet the government has brought charges against only one person affiliated with the agency: David Passaro, a low-level contract employee, not a full-fledged C.I.A. officer. In 2003, Passaro, while interrogating an Afghan prisoner, allegedly beat him with a flashlight so severely that he eventually died from his injuries. In two other incidents of prisoner abuse, the Times reported last month, charges probably will not be brought against C.I.A. personnel: the 2003 case of an Iraqi prisoner who was forced head first into a sleeping bag, then beaten; and the 2002 abuse of an Afghan prisoner who froze to death after being stripped and chained to the floor of a concrete cell. (The C.I.A. supervisor involved in the latter case was subsequently promoted.)

One reason these C.I.A. officials may not be facing charges is that, in recent years, the Justice Department has established a strikingly narrow definition of torture. In August, 2002, the department’s Office of Legal Counsel sent a memo on interrogations to the White House, which argued that a coercive technique was torture only when it induced pain equivalent to what a person experiencing death or organ failure might suffer. By implication, all lesser forms of physical and psychological mistreatment—what critics have called “torture lite”—were legal. The memo also said that torture was illegal only when it could be proved that the interrogator intended to cause the required level of pain. And it provided interrogators with another large exemption: torture might be acceptable if an interrogator was acting in accordance with military “necessity.” A source familiar with the memo’s origins, who declined to speak on the record, said that it “was written as an immunity, a blank check.” In 2004, the “torture memo,” as it became known, was leaked, complicating the nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General; as White House counsel, Gonzales had approved the memo. The Administration subsequently revised the guidelines, using language that seemed more restrictive. But a little-noticed footnote protected the coercive methods permitted by the “torture memo,” stating that they did not violate the “standards set forth in this memorandum.”

The Bush Administration has resisted disclosing the contents of two Justice Department memos that established a detailed interrogation policy for the Pentagon and the C.I.A. A March, 2003, classified memo was “breathtaking,” the same source said. The document dismissed virtually all national and international laws regulating the treatment of prisoners, including war-crimes and assault statutes, and it was radical in its view that in wartime the President can fight enemies by whatever means he sees fit. According to the memo, Congress has no constitutional right to interfere with the President in his role as Commander-in-Chief, including making laws that limit the ways in which prisoners may be interrogated. Another classified Justice Department memo, issued in August, 2002, is said to authorize numerous “enhanced” interrogation techniques for the C.I.A. These two memos sanction such extreme measures that, even if the agency wanted to discipline or prosecute agents who stray beyond its own comfort level, the legal tools to do so may no longer exist. Like the torture memo, these documents are believed to have been signed by Jay Bybee, the former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, but written by a Justice Department lawyer, John Yoo, who is now a professor of law at Berkeley.

For nearly a year, Democratic senators critical of alleged abuses have been demanding to see these memos. “We need to know what was authorized,” Carl Levin, a Democrat from Michigan, told me. “Was it waterboarding? The use of dogs? Stripping detainees? . . . The refusal to give us these documents is totally inexcusable.” Levin is a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, which is supposed to have an oversight role in relation to the C.I.A. “The Administration is getting away with just saying no,” he went on. “There’s no claim of executive privilege. There’s no claim of national security—we’ve offered to keep it classified. It’s just bullshit. They just don’t want us to know what they’re doing, or have done.”



By the summer of 2003, the insurgency against the U.S. occupation of Iraq had grown into a confounding and lethal insurrection, and the Pentagon and the White House were pressing C.I.A. agents and members of the Special Forces to get the kind of intelligence needed to crush it. On orders from Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, General Geoffrey Miller, who had overseen coercive interrogations of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo, imposed similar methods at Abu Ghraib. In October of that year, however—a month before Jamadi’s death—the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel issued an opinion stating that Iraqi insurgents were covered by the Geneva Conventions, which require the humane treatment of prisoners and forbid coercive interrogations. The ruling reversed an earlier interpretation, which had concluded, erroneously, that Iraqi insurgents were not protected by international law.

As a result of these contradictory mandates from Washington, the rules of engagement at Abu Ghraib became muddy, and the tactics grew increasingly ad hoc. Jeffrey H. Smith, a former general counsel of the C.I.A., told me, “Abu Ghraib has its roots at the top. I think this uncertainty about who was and who was not covered by the Geneva Conventions, and all this talk that they’re all terrorists, bred the climate in which this kind of abuse takes place.”

At Abu Ghraib, the confusion over interrogation and detention methods was compounded by the fact that C.I.A. officials worked side by side with U.S. military people. Colonel Janis Karpinski, a former commander of the 800th Military Police Brigade, which oversaw the administration of Abu Ghraib during the period of widespread abuse, has said that C.I.A. officers, along with contract interpreters and some military-intelligence officers, did not wear uniforms when they visited the prison, and it was not clear, even to her, what they were doing there. “I thought most of the civilians there were interpreters, but there were some civilians I didn’t know,” she told Seymour Hersh. “I called them disappearing ghosts. . . . They were always bringing in somebody for interrogation, or waiting to collect somebody going out.” C.I.A. officials, unlike members of the Army and the Navy, are not bound by the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which prohibits “cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of” prisoners.

Walter Diaz, a military policeman, was on guard duty at Abu Ghraib the morning that Jamadi was delivered to the prison. He told me, “The O.G.A.”— “other government agencies,” initials commonly used to protect the identity of the C.I.A.—“would bring in people all the time to interview them. We had one wing, Tier One Alpha, reserved for the O.G.A. They’d have maybe twenty people there at a time.” He went on, “They were their prisoners. They’d get into a room and lock it up. We, as soldiers, didn’t get involved. We’d lock the door for them and leave. We didn’t know what they were doing.” But, he recalled, “we heard a lot of screaming.”

Considering this level of secrecy, it’s doubtful that any details would have emerged about the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death had it not been for a strange and tangential chain of events. Three months after Jamadi died, Jeffrey Hopper, a Navy SEAL who had been assigned to carry out joint operations with the C.I.A. in Baghdad, was accused of stealing another SEAL’s body armor. Hopper, who had been nicknamed Klepto by the unit, was expelled from the Special Forces. When he was dismissed, he told authorities that he knew of far worse offenses committed by other SEALs, and he cited the abuse of several prisoners, including Jamadi. His accusations formed the basis of multiple charges against several SEALs, which led to the court-martial of Lieutenant Andrew Ledford, the commander of the platoon that captured Jamadi, for, among other things, allowing his troops to assault the prisoner. Last May, Ledford was acquitted of any wrongdoing; but during the hearings, which were open, a number of troubling facts spilled out, hinting at the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death.

Seth Hettena, an Associated Press reporter based in San Diego, California, attended the hearings. The courtroom testimony, he reported, indicated that Jamadi, before arriving at Abu Ghraib, was interrogated “in a rough manner” by a combination of SEALs and C.I.A. personnel in “the Romper Room,” a tiny space in the Navy camp at Baghdad International Airport. Swanner was among those present. One of the SEALs testified that after Jamadi was handcuffed a C.I.A. interrogator rammed “his arm up against the detainee’s chest, pressing on him with all his weight.” According to a recent report by John McChesney on National Public Radio, a C.I.A. guard who witnessed the scene later told investigators that, after stripping Jamadi and dousing him in cold water, a C.I.A. interrogator threatened to “barbecue” him if he didn’t talk. Jamadi reportedly moaned, “I’m dying, I’m dying.” The interrogator replied, “You’ll be wishing you were dying.”

Court testimony also established that Jamadi was “body-slammed” by the SEALs into the back of a Humvee before being delivered to Abu Ghraib. During this time, he was handcuffed. “Was he a threat?” a Navy prosecutor asked one of the SEALs on trial. “No, ma’am,” the SEAL conceded.

Soon after the Associated Press published Hettena’s Romper Room story, two unidentified officials, evidently from the C.I.A., appeared in the courtroom. From that point on, Hettena told me, the officials, who did not give their names, protested when the testimony touched on matters sensitive to the C.I.A. In many instances, reporters and other members of the public were required to leave the courtroom. On another occasion, an unidentified C.I.A. witness testified from behind a blue curtain. Several areas of questioning by defense lawyers for the SEALs were ruled off limits. When one of the defense lawyers, Matthew Freedus, asked a witness, “What position was Jamadi in when he died?,” the C.I.A. representatives protested, saying that the answer was classified. The same objection was made when a question was asked about the role that water had played in Jamadi’s interrogation.

By late last spring, the SEALs’ reputations had been tarnished by the exposure of their rough treatment of Jamadi, but they were cleared of the gravest abuse charges. The question of who was responsible for Jamadi’s death remained unanswered. Milt Silverman, one of the defense attorneys, told me, “Who killed Jamadi? I know it wasn’t any of the SEALs. . . . That’s why their cases got dismissed.” Frank Spinner, a civilian lawyer who represented Ledford, said, “There’s a stronger case against the C.I.A. than there is against Ledford. But the military’s being hung out to dry while the C.I.A. skates. I want a public accounting, whether in a trial, a hearing before a congressional committee, or a public report. There’s got to be something more meaningful than sticking the case in a Justice Department drawer.”

Spinner and several of the other defense lawyers learned more about the C.I.A.’s role in Jamadi’s death than they were supposed to know, owing to a classification error made by the agency. The C.I.A. sent hundreds of pages of material on Jamadi’s death to the Navy; much of it was classified, and all of it was marked unclassified. The pages were passed on to the civilian lawyers, who read them carefully. The agency, after realizing its mistake, demanded that the lawyers return the classified material, and subsequently sealed virtually all the court records relating to the case. Some of the C.I.A. documents, however, were seen by a source familiar with the case, who shared their contents with me.



Manadel al-Jamadi arrived at Abu Ghraib naked from the waist down, according to an eyewitness, Jason Kenner, an M.P. with the 372nd Military Police Company. In a statement to C.I.A. investigators, Kenner recalled that Jamadi had been stripped of his pants, underpants, socks, and shoes, arriving in only a purple T-shirt and a purple jacket, and with a green plastic sandbag completely covering his head. Nevertheless, Kenner told C.I.A. investigators, “the prisoner did not appear to be in distress. He was walking fine, and his speech was normal.” The plastic “flex cuffs” on Jamadi’s wrists were so tight, however, that Kenner had trouble cutting them off when they were replaced with steel handcuffs and Jamadi’s hands were secured behind his back.

Staff Sergeant Mark Nagy, a reservist in the 372nd Military Police Company, was also on duty at Abu Ghraib when Jamadi arrived. According to the classified internal documents, he told C.I.A. investigators that Jamadi seemed “lucid,” noting that he was “talking during intake.” Nagy said that Jamadi was “not combative” when he was placed in a holding cell, and that he “responded to commands.” In Nagy’s opinion, there was “no need to get physical with him.”

Kenner told the investigators that, “minutes” after Jamadi was placed in the holding cell, an “interrogator”—later identified as Swanner—began “yelling at him, trying to find where some weapons were.” Kenner said that he could see Jamadi through the open door of the holding cell, “in a seated position like a scared child.” The yelling went on, he said, for five or ten minutes. At some point, Kenner said, Swanner and his translator “removed the prisoner’s jacket and shirt,” leaving him naked. He added that he saw no injuries or bruises. Soon afterward, the M.P.s were told by Swanner and the translator to “take the prisoner to Tier One,” the agency’s interrogation wing. The M.P.s dressed Jamadi in a standard-issue orange jumpsuit, keeping the sandbag over his head, and walked him to the shower room there for interrogation. Kenner said that Jamadi put up “no resistance.”

On the way, Nagy noticed that Jamadi was “groaning and breathing heavily, as if he was out of breath.” Walter Diaz, the M.P. who had been on guard duty at the prison, told C.I.A. investigators that Jamadi showed “no distress or complaints on the way to the shower room.” But he told me that he, too, noticed that Jamadi was having “breathing problems.” An autopsy showed that Jamadi had six fractured ribs; it is unclear when they were broken. The C.I.A. officials in charge of Jamadi did not give him even a cursory medical exam, although the Geneva Conventions require that prisoners receive “medical attention.”

“Jamadi was basically a ‘ghost prisoner,’ ” a former investigator on the case, who declined to be named, told me. “He wasn’t checked into the facility. People like this, they just bring ’em in, and use the facility for interrogations. The lower-ranking enlisted guys there just followed the orders from O.G.A. There was no booking process.”

According to Kenner’s testimony, when the group reached the shower room Swanner told the M.P.s that “he did not want the prisoner to sit and he wanted him shackled to the wall.” (No explanation for this decision is recorded.) There was a barred window on one wall. Kenner and Nagy, using a pair of leg shackles, attached Jamadi’s arms, which had been placed behind his back, to the bars on the window.

The Associated Press quoted an expert who described the position in which Jamadi died as a form of torture known as “Palestinian hanging,” in which a prisoner whose hands are secured behind his back is suspended by his arms. (The technique has allegedly been used in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.) The M.P.s’ sworn accounts to investigators suggest that, at least at first, Jamadi was able to stand up, without pain: autopsy records show that he was five feet ten, and, as Diaz explained to me, the window was about five feet off the ground. The accounts concur that, while Jamadi was able to stand without discomfort, he couldn’t kneel or sit without hanging painfully from his arms. Once he was secured, the M.P.s left him alone in the room with Swanner and the translator.

Less than an hour later, Diaz said, he was walking past the shower room when Swanner came out and asked for help, reportedly saying, “This guy doesn’t want to coöperate.” According to the NPR report, one of the C.I.A. men told investigators that he called for medical help, but there is no available record of a doctor having been summoned. When Diaz entered the shower room, he said, he was surprised to see that Jamadi’s knees had buckled, and that he was almost kneeling. Swanner, he said, wanted the soldiers to reposition Jamadi, so that he would have to stand more erectly. Diaz called for additional help from two other soldiers in his company, Sergeant Jeffery Frost and Dennis Stevanus. But after they had succeeded in making Jamadi stand for a moment, as requested, by hitching his handcuffs higher up the window, Jamadi collapsed again. Diaz told me, “At first I was, like, ‘This guy’s drunk.’ He just dropped down to where his hands were, like, coming out of his handcuffs. He looked weird. I was thinking, He’s got to be hurting. All of his weight was on his hands and wrists—it looked like he was about to mess up his sockets.”

Swanner, whom Diaz described as a “kind of shabby-looking, overweight white guy,” who was wearing black clothing, was apparently less concerned. “He was saying, ‘He’s just playing dead,’ ” Diaz recalled. “He thought he was faking. He wasn’t worried at all.” While Jamadi hung from his arms, Diaz told me, Swanner “just kept talking and talking at him. But there was no answer.”

Frost told C.I.A. investigators that the interrogator had said that Jamadi was just “playing possum.” But, as Frost lifted Jamadi upright by his jumpsuit, noticing that it was digging into his crotch, he thought, This prisoner is pretty good at playing possum. When Jamadi’s body went slack again, Frost recalled commenting that he “had never seen anyone’s arms positioned like that, and he was surprised they didn’t just pop out of their sockets.”

Diaz, sensing that something was wrong, lifted Jamadi’s hood. His face was badly bruised. Diaz placed a finger in front of Jamadi’s open eyes, which didn’t move or blink, and deduced that he was dead. When the men lowered Jamadi to the floor, Frost told investigators, “blood came gushing out of his nose and mouth, as if a faucet had been turned on.”

Swanner, who had seemed so unperturbed, suddenly appeared “surprised” and “dumbfounded,” according to Frost. He began talking about how Jamadi had fought and resisted the entire way to the prison. He also made calls on his cell phone. Within minutes, Diaz said, four or five additional O.G.A. officers, also dressed in black, arrived on the scene.

Dr. Steven Miles, a medical ethicist at the University of Minnesota, who is writing a study of U.S. medical practices during the war on terrorism, has examined the Jamadi incident extensively. He recently recounted to me what happened that morning: “An Iraqi medical doctor working with the C.I.A. confirmed Jamadi’s death. Captain Donald Reese, the commander of Abu Ghraib M.P.s, came to the shower room and heard Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, the commander of military intelligence at the prison, say, ‘I am not going down for this alone.’ ”

C.I.A. personnel ordered that Jamadi’s body be kept in the shower room until the next morning. The corpse was packed in ice and bound with tape, apparently in an attempt to slow its decomposition and, Miles believes, to try to alter the perceived time of death. The ice was already melting when Specialist Sabrina Harman posed for pictures while stooping over Jamadi’s body, smiling and giving the thumbs-up sign. The next day, a medic inserted an I.V. in Jamadi’s arm, put the body on a stretcher, and took it out of the prison as if Jamadi were merely ill, so as to “not upset the other detainees.” Other interrogators, Miles said, “were told that Jamadi had died of a heart attack.” (There is no medical evidence that Jamadi experienced heart failure.) A military-intelligence officer later recounted that a local taxi-driver was paid to take away Jamadi’s body.

Before leaving, Frost told investigators, Swanner confided that he “did not get any information out of the prisoner.” C.I.A. officials took with them the bloodied hood that had covered Jamadi’s head; it was later thrown away. “They destroyed evidence, and failed to preserve the scene of the crime,” Spinner, the lawyer for one of the Navy SEALs, said.

The next day, Swanner gave a statement to Army investigators, stressing that he hadn’t laid a hand on Jamadi, and hadn’t done anything wrong. “Clint C.,” the translator, also said that Swanner hadn’t beaten Jamadi. “I don’t think anybody intended the guy to die,” a former investigator on the case, who asked not to be identified, told me. But he believes that the decision to shackle Jamadi to the window reflected an intent to cause suffering. (Under American and international law, intent is central to assessing criminality in war-crimes and torture cases.) The C.I.A., he said, “put him in that position to get him to talk. They took it that pain equals coöperation.”



The autopsy, performed by military pathologists five days later, classified Jamadi’s death as a homicide, saying that the cause of death was “compromised respiration” and “blunt force injuries” to Jamadi’s head and torso. But it appears that the pathologists who performed the autopsy were unaware that Jamadi had been shackled to a high window. When a description of Jamadi’s position was shared with two of the country’s most prominent medical examiners—both of whom volunteered to review the autopsy report free, at the request of a lawyer representing one of the SEALs—their conclusion was different. Miles, independently, concurred.

One of those examiners, Dr. Michael Baden, who is the chief forensic pathologist for the New York State Police, told me, “What struck me was that Jamadi was alive and well when he walked into the prison. The SEALs were accused of causing head injuries before he arrived, but he had no significant head injuries—certainly no brain injuries that would have caused death.” Jamadi’s bruises, he said, were no doubt painful, but they were not life-threatening. Baden went on, “He also had injuries to his ribs. You don’t die from broken ribs. But if he had been hung up in this way and had broken ribs, that’s different.” In his judgment, “asphyxia is what he died from—as in a crucifixion.” Baden, who had inspected a plastic bag of the type that was placed over Jamadi’s head, said that the bag “could have impaired his breath, but he couldn’t have died from that alone.” Of greater concern, he thought, was Jamadi’s position. “If his hands were pulled up five feet—that’s to his neck. That’s pretty tough. That would put a lot of tension on his rib muscles, which are needed for breathing. It’s not only painful—it can hinder the diaphragm from going up and down, and the rib cage from expanding. The muscles tire, and the breathing function is impaired, so there’s less oxygen entering the bloodstream.” A person in such a state would first lose consciousness, he said, and eventually would die. The hood, he suggested, would likely have compounded the problem, because the interrogators “can’t see his face if he’s turning blue. We see a lot about a patient’s condition by looking at his face. By putting that goddam hood on, they can’t see if he’s conscious.” It also “doesn’t permit them to know when he died.” The bottom line, Baden said, is that Jamadi “didn’t die as a result of any injury he got before getting to the prison.”

Dr. Cyril Wecht, a medical doctor and a lawyer who is the coroner of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, and a former president of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, independently reached the same conclusion. The interpretation put forward by the military pathologists, he said, “didn’t fit with their own report. They said he died of blunt-force trauma, yet there was no significant evidence of trauma to the head.” Instead, Wecht believes that Jamadi “died of compromised respiration,” and that “the position the body was in would have been the cause of death.” He added, “Mind you, I’m not a critic of the Iraq war. But I don’t think we should reduce ourselves to the insurgents’ barbaric levels.”

Walter Diaz told me, “Someone should be charged. If Jamadi was already handcuffed, there was no reason to treat the guy the way they did—the way they hung him.” Diaz said he didn’t know if Swanner had intended to torture Jamadi, or whether the death was accidental. But he was troubled by the government’s inaction, and by what he saw as the agency’s attempt at a coverup. “They tried to blame the SEALs. The C.I.A. had a big role in this. But you know the C.I.A.—who’s going to go against them?”



According to Jeffrey Smith, the former general counsel of the C.I.A., now a private-practice lawyer who handles national-security cases, a decision to prosecute Swanner “would probably go all the way up to the Attorney General.” Critics of the Administration, such as John Sifton, a lawyer for Human Rights Watch, question whether Alberto Gonzales, who became Attorney General last year, has too many conflicts of interest to weigh the case against Swanner fairly. Sifton said, “It’s hard to imagine the current leadership pursuing these guys, because the head of the Justice Department, Alberto Gonzales, is centrally implicated in crafting the policies that led to the abuse.” He suggested that the prudent thing for Gonzales to do would be to “recuse himself from such a decision, and leave it to a deputy, or a career officer.”

But there are political conflicts here, too. It is in the office of Paul McNulty—whose nomination to become Gonzales’s deputy will soon be presented to Congress, and who was a Republican congressional staff member before being named a U.S. Attorney—that the Jamadi case has stalled. And Alice Fisher, the new head of the Justice Department’s criminal division, got that job only under a recess appointment; during her confirmation hearings, Fisher, who previously handled counter-terrorism cases for the department, refused to provide all the information requested about her knowledge of C.I.A. prisoner abuse, and Congress did not approve her nomination.

Even more troubling is the possibility that, under the Bush Administration’s secret interrogation guidelines, the killing of Jamadi might not have broken any laws. Jeffrey Smith says it’s possible that the Office of Legal Counsel’s memos may have opened too many loopholes for interrogators like Swanner, “making prosecution somehow too hard to do.” Smith added, “But, even under the expanded definition of torture, I don’t see how someone beaten with his hands bound, who then died while hanging—how that could be legal. I’d be embarrassed if anyone argued that it was.”

Senator Richard Durbin, a Democrat from Illinois, served on the Senate Intelligence Committee until January. Before his tenure ended, he looked at the full, classified set of photographs from Abu Ghraib. In a recent interview at his office in the Capitol, he said, “You can’t imagine what it’s like to go to a closed room where you have a classified briefing, and stand shoulder to shoulder with your colleagues in the Senate, and see hundreds and hundreds of slides like those of Abu Ghraib, most of which have never been publicly disclosed. I had a sick feeling when I left.” He went on, “It was then that I began to have suspicions that something significant was happening at the highest levels of the government when it came to torture policy.”

Since then, Durbin has been trying to close the loopholes that allow government personnel to engage in brutal interrogations. Last year, he introduced an amendment to the defense-authorization bill affirming that the C.I.A. was covered by U.S. laws forbidding torture and the cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of prisoners. But his effort met intense resistance from the Bush Administration, and the amendment did not pass. Durbin tried other legislative stratagems, without much success. Eventually, John McCain took up Durbin’s cause—which led to last month’s confrontation with Cheney and Goss. The Abu Ghraib scandal seems not to have chastened Cheney or any other Administration officials; in fact, they are for the first time arguing openly and explicitly that C.I.A. personnel should be exempt from standards that apply to every other American.

“I’m concerned that the government isn’t going forward on these prosecutions,” Durbin said of the C.I.A. cases. “It’s really hard to follow the Administration’s policies here. I think the world was very simple before 9/11. We knew what the law was, and I understood it to apply to everyone in the government. Now there’s real uncertainty. There’s a shadow over our nation that needs lifting.”

http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/051114fa_fact

 

Gruß BarCode

 

 

 

Gruß BarCode

 

Ist mir auch erst hier aufgefallen, wie lang der Artikel ist!

 

Gruß BarCode

 

alle 3 Minuten mit dem Staatsanwalt - den schweizer Banken- Der CDU
und der Mafia - Ich bin immer noch fröhlich- Und gebe  dir recht.

Mit freundlichen Grüssen Satyr

 

eben...

füx  

ob man die folter selbst durchführt oder ausführen läßt, auch wenn dabei die juristische lage eine andere ist.

mfg 54reab  

mit "eben" meinte ich Posting 130

füx  

killing with kindness



Never argue with an idiot -- they drag you down to their level, then beat you with experience.  

da sollte die CIA mal gaaaanz gründlich drüber nachdenken.
denn der spruch bewahrheitet sich immer wieder...
 

Wo ist die perfide Unterstellung?

Er findet es gut und toleriert das jemand alles darf und sich jedes Recht rausnimmt. Das muß so sein und pacta sunt servanda (?). Der funktioniert eben als Befehlsempfänger. Meine Einschätzung.

Auch die USA dürfen nicht alles, und das was die Bush-Regierung so treibt wird aktuell angeblich von der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung auch nicht so toll beurteilt.

Grüße
ecki  

Du solltest einmal tief Luft holen, dich beruhigen und dir die Sache nochmal in Ruhe angucken. Nichts von dem stimmt, was du da gerade unterstellt hast. Er nimmt es halt etwas genauer mit den jeweiligen Zuständigkeiten und Rechtspositionen - und neigt ein kleinwenig auch zum Verharmlosen dabei. Aber deine Unterstellungen sind jenseits der Tatsachen.
Also tief durchatmen und ganz ruhig und ohne Brille nochmal durchlesen.

 

Gruß BarCode

 

kein Kommentar, und bezieht sich auf die vertraglichen Vereinbarungen zwischen Deutschland und den USA, die zum Teil noch auf die Besatzungszeit zurückgehen.

Dem füge ich gerne den SPIEGEL-Artikel bei, in welchem diese Fakten (ausführlicher) ausgeführt werden:



Verfangen im Netz der Verträge


Von Carsten Volkery

Außenminister Steinmeier will Aufklärung über CIA-Flüge, die über deutsche Flughäfen abgewickelt wurden. Doch selbst wenn sich die US-Regierung dialogbereit gäbe - rechtliche Handhabe hätten die Deutschen kaum. Zahlreiche Verträge regeln den Sonderstatus der USA in der Bundesrepublik.


Berlin - So hat sich Frank-Walter Steinmeier den Antrittsbesuch bei seiner Kollegin Condoleezza Rice nicht vorgestellt. Statt eines netten Plauschs über transatlantische Gemeinsamkeiten steht dem deutschen Außenminister heute seine erste diplomatische Bewährungsprobe bevor. Bedrängt von der deutschen und der europäischen Öffentlichkeit soll Steinmeier die Amerikaner auf die CIA-Gefangenentransporter ansprechen, die auf mehreren deutschen Flughäfen zwischengelandet sein sollen, um Terrorverdächtige zu angeblichen Foltergefängnissen zu fliegen.

Frank-Walter Steinmeier: Bewährungsprobe in Washington
Großbildansicht
DPA
Frank-Walter Steinmeier: Bewährungsprobe in Washington
Die Mission gilt schon deshalb als heikel, weil die US-Regierung auf ausländische Einmischung in ihren Krieg gegen den Terror eher ungnädig reagiert. Für Steinmeier ergibt sich ein zusätzliches Problem: Worüber und mit welchem Recht soll er sich eigentlich beschweren?

Da sind zunächst die ungesicherten Fakten. Unstrittig ist, dass Flugzeuge im Auftrag der CIA auf deutschen Flughäfen zwischengelandet sind. Ob sie aber tatsächlich zu einer der geheimen "Black Sites", an denen angeblich gefoltert wird, unterwegs waren, wird nur gemutmaßt. Auch ist nicht auszuschließen, dass deutsche Behörden von den Flügen gewusst und weggesehen haben - was die Forderung nach Aufklärung unglaubwürdig machen würde.

Die offizielle Linie der Bundesregierung lautet bisher, nicht Bescheid gewusst zu haben. "Wir kennen ja auch nur Presseberichte und Gerüchte", erklärt der neue Staatssekretär im Auswärtigen Amt, Gernot Erler, gegenüber SPIEGEL ONLINE. Der Besuch in Washington biete nun die Möglichkeit, etwas "aus erster Hand zu erfahren". Steinmeier werde aber keine Forderungen stellen. Man gehe davon aus, dass Rice das Thema von sich aus anspreche. "Wir hoffen, dass die amerikanische Regierung die Signale aus Europa verstanden hat", so Erler.

Auch rechtlich ist die Lage kompliziert. Die CIA-Flüge haben eine Frage aufgeworfen, die bisher selten gestellt wurde: Was dürfen die Amerikaner in Deutschland? Auf den ersten Blick scheint die Antwort einfach: Auf keinen Fall dürfen sie Menschenrechte verletzen oder gegen das Völkerrecht verstoßen. Jenseits dieses Konsenses werden auch Experten vage. Die USA genössen in Deutschland eine "privilegierte Sonderstellung", erklärte der rechtspolitische Sprecher der SPD-Fraktion, Dieter Wiefelspütz, gegenüber SPIEGEL ONLINE. Die Supermacht habe sich durch ein "ganzes Netz von Verträgen" Sonderrechte gesichert, so der Völkerrechtsexperte Bardo Fassbender von der Humboldt-Universität in Berlin.

Zwar hat Deutschland in den Zwei-Plus-Vier-Verträgen nach der Wiedervereinigung die volle Souveränität erlangt. Aber die einstige Besatzungsmacht USA, so Fassbender, werde auch weiterhin "sehr großzügig" behandelt. Neben dem Nato-Truppenstatut gebe es noch etliche bilaterale Vereinbarungen. "Denen hat man die größte Freiheit gelassen." Die Militärbasen in Frankfurt am Main (seit Oktober geschlossen) und Ramstein hätten ihre eigene Flugüberwachung. Eine Informationspflicht gegenüber der Bundesregierung über bestimmte Flüge gebe es zumindest rechtlich nicht. Allenfalls der politische Anstand geböte Transparenz in heiklen Fragen.

Dies führt dazu, dass Verstöße gegen das Völkerrecht, sollten sie vorliegen, nur mit Hilfe der Amerikaner selbst nachzuweisen wären. Falle die Beweiserhebung mangels Kooperation der USA aus, könne es auch kein Urteil geben, so Fassbender. Es handele sich um eine "Tatsachenfrage". Sollten tatsächlich Maschinen mit "Staatsentführten" an Bord in Deutschland gelandet seien, wäre das "fragwürdig". Wenn die Landungen zudem mit "Wissen und Billigung" der deutschen Regierung stattgefunden hätten, "könnte man von einer Verantwortlichkeit sprechen".

Der SPD-Politiker Wiefelspütz hatte am Freitag SPIEGEL ONLINE gesagt, die USA könnten auf ihren Militärbasen in Deutschland weitgehend machen, was sie wollten. Deutsche Kontrolle sei weder möglich noch politisch wünschenswert. Gestern fügte er hinzu, die Bundesregierung dürfe nicht zulassen, dass Menschenrechtsverletzungen passierten, wenn Deutschland als Transitland benutzt werde. "Auch in einer amerikanischen Maschine auf deutschem Boden gelten die Prinzipien des Grundgesetzes", betonte Wiefelspütz. Die Regierung dürfe da nicht "wegsehen".

Mit dem Hinsehen ist das allerdings so eine Sache. Wie schwer es die Strafverfolgung hat, zeigt das Beispiel des deutschen US-Stützpunkts Ramstein. Der in Italien lebende Ägypter Nasr Osama Mustafa Hass war im Februar 2003 in Mailand von CIA-Agenten gekidnappt und über das pfälzische Ramstein nach Kairo ausgeflogen worden. Alarmiert durch Medienberichte über das Manöver leitete die Staatsanwaltschaft Zweibrücken ein Ermittlungsverfahren gegen Unbekannt ein - das bisher einzige in Deutschland, welches sich mit den CIA-Flügen beschäftigt.

Für den leitenden Oberstaatsanwalt Wolfgang Bayer liegt ein Verbrechen vor. "Wenn in dem Flugzeug Leute sitzen, die entführt wurden, ist das eine Straftat", so Bayer zu SPIEGEL ONLINE. Allerdings, räumt er ein, könne er nur ermitteln, weil der unbekannte CIA-Agent beim Umsteigen deutschen Boden betreten habe. Wäre er in der Maschine sitzen geblieben, hätte das deutsche Recht nicht gegolten. Dass die Ermittlungen zu einer Strafanzeige führen, glaubt allerdings nicht einmal Bayer. Denn dafür müsste er die Identität des CIA-Mannes kennen, und die verraten die Amerikaner nicht.

Die Staatsanwaltschaft Frankfurt, in deren Zuständigkeitsbereich die Rhein-Main-Airbase fällt, sieht sich bisher außerstande, ein Ermittlungsverfahren wegen der Flüge einzuleiten. "Dafür bräuchten wir einen Anfangsverdacht", sagte eine Sprecherin SPIEGEL ONLINE. "Den haben wir nicht".

Letztlich bricht durch die CIA-Landungen der alte Konflikt über die Behandlung von Terrorverdächtigen wieder auf. Die Europäer haben seit langem Bauchschmerzen mit der Definition der "feindlichen Kämpfer", mittels derer die USA die Rechte von Terrorverdächtigen einschränken. "Schon der Status der Gefangenen ist völkerrechtswidrig", sagt Fassbender. "Für mich sind das Entführte", so Staatsanwalt Bayer.

Die US-Regierung scheint die Diskussion führen zu wollen. Man werde noch einmal darüber zu reden haben, wie mit Leuten umzugehen sei, die keinerlei Recht respektierten und keinen Regeln folgten, sagte Regierungssprecher Scott McClellan. Außenministerin Rice verteidigte erneut die vorbeugende Inhaftierung von Terrorverdächtigen. "Wir haben niemals zuvor einen Krieg wie diesen geführt", sagte sie der Zeitung "USA Today". "Man kann es dabei nicht zulassen, dass jemand erst ein Verbrechen verübt, bevor er festgenommen wird, denn wenn diese Leute ein Verbrechen verüben, müssen Tausende unschuldige Menschen sterben."



MfG
kiiwii

 

Es ging mir nur um Deine "Aussage" zu
reab und kiiwii über die potentiellen KZ-Wächter
in P # 119.
Mehr nicht!
Das ist eindeutig eine strafrechtlich relevante
Unterstellung.

Ciao
BeMi  

das stimmt aber wirklich.

soll ich aufzählen?

lieber nicht, wird zu lang.

oder wurde irgendein krieg der letzten 30 jahre schon mal von einem andren sttat verhindert?  

einer verklagt wird.

bei mir wollten das auch schon soo viele.

die verhandlung wird dann live bei salesch übertragen, hahahaha.

 

unterscheiden zwischen einem
persönlichen Kommentar z.B.
"Folter ist generell abzulehnen, strafrechtlich
zu verfolgen und zu ächten"
und einer Tatsachenfeststellung
z.B.
"aufgrund bilateraler Verträge dürfen die
USA als Staat alles".

Ist das denn so schwer zu begreifen?