WMIH + Cooper Info
ZItat dixdeau:
Say what?
"JPMorgan Chase purchased the debt in September 2008 from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. when WAMU was in receivership, "
Then sold it?
"That proved to be a misstep after the witness testified JPMorgan Chase was the previous servicer and PennyMac Loan serviced the loan on behalf of the current owner, PennyMac Corp."
But cannot prove JPMC ever owned it ?
"The bottom line, however, is JPMorgan Chase Bank National Association's failure to prove standing requires a reversal of the final judgment of foreclosure."
What's the saying- "Whoever sells what isn't his'n, must make it good or go to pris'n"?
Um, you'd think that FDIC=R would have some kind of record wouldn't you? Why JPMC didn't ask FDIC for supporting documentation?
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ZItat deekshant:
Thanks Bob. Dix, imo, what was needed was a proof of standing that couldn't be established retroactively through an executed assignment. Court rejected the blank endorsement through PAA under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) because that same PAA gave JPMorgan the right to pick and choose. Therefore, an executed assignment was necessary that didn't have standing after the fact.
"On February 21, 3 2014, the FDIC executed an assignment of the mortgage to JPMorgan. The assignment read, in part, “This Assignment is intended to further memorialize the transfer that occurred by operation of law on September 25, 2008 as authorized by Section 11(d)(2)(G)(i)(II) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II).”
Quote
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(G)(i)(II)
(d)Powers and duties of Corporation as conservator or receiver
(2)General powers
(G)Merger; transfer of assets and liabilities
(i)In generalThe Corporation may, as conservator or receiver—
(II)
subject to clause (ii), transfer any asset or liability of the institution in default (including assets and liabilities associated with any trust business) without any approval, assignment, or consent with respect to such transfer.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/12/1821
Id. at 353 (internal citations omitted). “A plaintiff’s lack of standing at the inception of the case is not a defect that may be cured by the acquisition of standing after the case is filed and cannot be established retroactively by acquiring standing to file a lawsuit after the fact.” LaFrance v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 141 So. 3d 754, 756 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Although JPMorgan does not meet any of the requirements of a holder— and does not attempt to prove it did—it argues it proved standing because it owned the note and mortgage when it initiated the foreclosure action. It (JPMorgan) argues the 2008 PAA and a 2014 assignment of mortgage proved ownership. We disagree.
The PAA has caveats where JPMorgan could refuse to acquire assets and there is no record evidence that the FDIC transferred the note
to JPMorgan before the complaint was filed. Id. We reverse the final judgment of foreclosure based on JPMorgan’s failure to prove standing.
http://cases.justia.com/florida/...l/2016-4d14-3799.pdf?ts=1458745637
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat Mr_Simpson:
What does JPM need all this money for?
$173.6 Billion
http://secfilings.nasdaq.com/...2FA&RcvdDate=4%2F4%2F2016&pdf
Another one: $1.78 Billion
http://secfilings.nasdaq.com/...2FA&RcvdDate=4%2F4%2F2016&pdf
Dated April 4th 2016
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ZItat Scott Fox:
"USE OF PROCEEDS"
" Unless otherwise described in the applicable prospectus supplement, we will use the net proceeds we receive from the sale of the securities offered by this prospectus and the applicable prospectus supplement for general corporate purposes. General corporate purposes may include the repayment of debt, investments in or extensions of credit to our subsidiaries, redemption of our securities or the financing of possible acquisitions or business expansion. We may invest the net proceeds temporarily or apply them to repay debt until we are ready to use them for their stated purpose."
10
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Zitat CSNY:
I took a look at the short term debt and current payments on long term debt. I expect some (possibly a good chunk) of this money will head in those directions. Why not pay off debt with cheaper debt if you can?
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Zitat bgriffinokc:
No soup for me?
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Zitat Sgtofarmsone:
Perhaps a spoon full after the employee claims are worked through. Best you ration your expectations. Scott's doing a hell of a job looking for those $Rillions though.
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Zitat Scott Fox:
Scott just copied the info on page 10. Draw your own conclusions from it and the numbers and filings in the BK. Looks like you have. No problems.
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MfG.L:)
Zitatende
Zitat TRADERDANTI:
Has anyone posted or seen this? https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/corporate/...0915_cfo_report.pdf
Someone posted on FB ...page 7 the graph indicated Wamu total assets of $299 billion...
What does this mean? Tia
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Zitat Scott Fox dazu:
TRADERDANTI, Govinsider posted a copy of the FDIC info long ago stating that WAMU cost them nothing and gave a LONG list of failures and how much they cost. WAMU is the only bankruptcy that didn't cost the FDIC a penny. I, along with many other people, have my own conclusions about this as I have tried to convey here. JPM got only the servicing rights, not the assets. Someone owns the assets and will be compensated for them, it's the law. Who will it be ? If the FDIC didn't have to pay any insurance on a 'failed' bank then why was it seized? No losses and hundreds of millions held in the bank. A reconciling must be done at some point.
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MfG.L:)
Goldman Sachs Agrees to Pay More than $5 Billion in Connection with Its Sale of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/...ts-sale-residential-mortgage-backed
ZItat
The Justice Department, along with federal and state partners, announced today a $5.06 billion settlement with Goldman Sachs related to Goldman’s conduct in the packaging, securitization, marketing, sale and issuance of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) between 2005 and 2007. The resolution announced today requires Goldman to pay $2.385 billion in a civil penalty under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) and also requires the bank to provide $1.8 billion in other relief, including relief to underwater homeowners, distressed borrowers and affected communities, in the form of loan forgiveness and financing for affordable housing. Goldman will also pay $875 million to resolve claims by other federal entities and state claims. Investors, including federally-insured financial institutions, suffered billions of dollars in losses from investing in RMBS issued and underwritten by Goldman between 2005 and 2007.
“This resolution holds Goldman Sachs accountable for its serious misconduct in falsely assuring investors that securities it sold were backed by sound mortgages, when it knew that they were full of mortgages that were likely to fail,” said Acting Associate Attorney General Stuart F. Delery. “This $5 billion settlement includes a $1.8 billion commitment to help repair the damage to homeowners and communities that Goldman acknowledges resulted from its conduct, and it makes clear that no institution may inflict this type of harm on investors and the American public without serious consequences.”
“Today’s settlement is another example of the department’s resolve to hold accountable those whose illegal conduct resulted in the financial crisis of 2008,” said Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Benjamin C. Mizer, head of the Justice Department’s Civil Division. “Viewed in conjunction with the previous multibillion-dollar recoveries that the department has obtained for similar conduct, this settlement demonstrates the pervasiveness of the banking industry’s fraudulent practices in selling RMBS, and the power of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act as a tool for combatting this type of wrongdoing.”
“Today’s settlement is yet another acknowledgment by one of our leading financial institutions that it did not live up to the representations it made to investors about the products it was selling,” said U.S. Attorney Benjamin B. Wagner of the Eastern District of California. “Goldman’s conduct in exploiting the RMBS market contributed to an international financial crisis that people across the country, including many in the Eastern District of California, continue to struggle to recover from. I am gratified that this office has developed investigations, first against JPMorgan Chase and now against Goldman Sachs, that have led to significant civil settlements that hold bad actors in this market accountable. The results obtained by this office and other members of the RMBS Working Group continue to send a message to Wall Street that we remain committed to pursuing those responsible for the financial crisis.”
The $2.385 billion civil monetary penalty resolves claims under FIRREA, which authorizes the federal government to impose civil penalties against financial institutions that violate various predicate offenses, including wire and mail fraud. The settlement expressly preserves the government’s ability to bring criminal charges against Goldman, and does not release any individuals from potential criminal or civil liability. In addition, as part of the settlement, Goldman agreed to fully cooperate with any ongoing investigations related to the conduct covered by the agreement.
Of the $875 million Goldman has agreed to pay to settle claims by various other federal and state entities: Goldman will pay $575 million to settle claims by the National Credit Union Administration, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Des Moines as successor to the Federal Home Loan Bank of Seattle, $37.5 million to settle claims by the Federal Home Loan Bank of Chicago, $190 million to settle claims by the state of New York, $25 million to settle claims by the state of Illinois and $10 million to settle claims by the state of California.
Goldman will pay out the remaining $1.8 billion in the form of relief to aid consumers harmed by its unlawful conduct. $1.52 billion of that relief will be paid out pursuant to an agreement with the United States that Goldman will provide loan modifications, including loan forgiveness and forbearance, to distressed and underwater homeowners throughout the country, as well as financing for affordable rental and for-sale housing throughout the country. This agreement represents the largest commitment in any RMBS agreement to provide financing for affordable housing—a crucial need following the turmoil of the financial crisis. $280 million will be paid out by Goldman pursuant to an agreement separately negotiated with the state of New York.
The settlement includes a statement of facts to which Goldman has agreed. That statement of facts describes how Goldman made false and misleading representations to prospective investors about the characteristics of the loans it securitized and the ways in which Goldman would protect investors in its RMBS from harm (the quotes in the following paragraphs are from that agreed-upon statement of facts, unless otherwise noted):
Goldman told investors in offering documents that “[l]oans in the securitized pools were originated generally in accordance with the loan originator’s underwriting guidelines,” other than possible situations where “when the originator identified ‘compensating factors’ at the time of origination.” But Goldman has today acknowledged that, “Goldman received information indicating that, for certain loan pools, significant percentages of the loans reviewed did not conform to the representations made to investors about the pools of loans to be securitized.”
Specifically, Goldman has now acknowledged that, even when the results of its due diligence on samples of loans from those pools “indicated that the unsampled portions of the pools likely contained additional loans with credit exceptions, Goldman typically did not . . . identify and eliminate any additional loans with credit exceptions.”
Goldman has acknowledged that it “failed to do this even when the samples included significant numbers of loans with credit exceptions.”
Goldman’s Mortgage Capital Committee, which included senior mortgage department personnel and employees from Goldman’s credit and legal departments, was required to approve every RMBS issued by Goldman. Goldman has now acknowledged that “[t]he Mortgage Capital Committee typically received . . . summaries of Goldman’s due diligence results for certain of the loan pools backing the securitization,” but that “[d]espite the high numbers of loans that Goldman had dropped from the loan pools, the Mortgage Capital Committee approved every RMBS that was presented to it between December 2005 and 2007.” As one example, in early 2007, Goldman approved and issued a subprime RMBS backed by loans originated by New Century Mortgage Corporation, after Goldman’s due diligence process found that one of the loan pools to be securitized included loans originated with “[e]xtremely aggressive underwriting,” and where Goldman dropped 25 percent of the loans from the due diligence sample on that pool without reviewing the unsampled 70 percent of the pool to determine whether those loans had similar problems.
Goldman has acknowledged that, for one August 2006 RMBS, the due diligence results for some of the loan pools resulted in an “unusually high” percentage of loans with credit and compliance defects. The Mortgage Capital Committee was presented with a summary of these results and asked “How do we know that we caught everything?” One transaction manager responded “we don’t.” Another transaction manager responded, “Depends on what you mean by everything? Because of the limited sampling . . . we don’t catch everything . . .” Goldman has now acknowledged that the Mortgage Capital Committee approved this RMBS for securitization without requiring any further due diligence.
Goldman made detailed representations to investors about its “counterparty qualification process” for vetting loan originators, and told investors and one rating agency that Goldman would engage in ongoing monitoring of loan sellers. Goldman has now acknowledged, however, that it “received certain negative information regarding the originators’ business practices” and that much of this information was not disclosed to investors.
For example, Goldman has now acknowledged that in late 2006 it conducted an internal analysis of the underwriting guidelines of Fremont Investment & Loan (an originator), which found many of Fremont’s guidelines to be “off market” or “at the aggressive end of market standards.” Instead of disclosing its view of Fremont’s underwriting, Goldman has acknowledged that it “ndertook a significant marketing effort” to tell investors about what Goldman called Fremont’s “commitment to loan quality over volume” and “significant enhancements to Fremont underwriting guidelines.” Fremont was shut down by federal regulators within several months of these statements.
In another example, Goldman was aware in early-mid 2006 of certain issues with Countrywide Financial Corporation’s origination process, including a pattern of non-responsiveness and inability to provide sufficient staff to handle the numerous loan pools Countrywide was selling. In April 2006, while Goldman was preparing an RMBS backed by Countrywide loans for securitization, a Goldman mortgage department manager circulated a “very bullish” equity research report that recommended the purchase of Countrywide stock. Goldman’s head of due diligence, who had just overseen the due diligence on six Countrywide pools, responded “If they only knew . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meanwhile, as Goldman has acknowledged in this statement of facts, “[Around the end of 2006], Goldman employees observed signs of uncertainty in the residential mortgage market [and] by March 2007, Goldman had largely halted new purchases of subprime loan pools.”
Assistant U.S. Attorneys Colleen Kennedy and Kelli Taylor of the Eastern District of California investigated Goldman’s conduct in connection with RMBS, with the support of the Federal Housing Finance Agency’s Office of the Inspector General (FHFA-OIG) and the Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP).
“Goldman Sachs had a fiduciary responsibility to investors, which they blatantly side stepped,” said Deputy Inspector General for Investigation Rene Febles of FHFA-OIG. “They knowingly put investors at risk and in so doing contributed significantly to the financial crisis. The losses caused by this irresponsible behavior deeply affected not only financial institutions but also taxpayers and one can only hope that Goldman Sachs has learned the difference between risk and deceit. Two Federal Home Loan Banks suffered significant losses so we are pleased to see both entities receive a portion of this settlement. We will continue to work with our law enforcement partners to hold those accountable who have engaged in misconduct.”
“Goldman took $10 billion in TARP bailout funds knowing that it had fraudulently misrepresented to investors the quality of residential mortgages bundled into mortgage backed securities,” said Special Inspector General Christy Goldsmith Romero for TARP. “Many of these toxic securities were traded in a taxpayer funded bailout program that was designed to unlock frozen credit markets during the crisis. While crisis investigations take time, SIGTARP is committed to working with our law enforcement partners to protect taxpayers and bring accountability and justice.”
The settlement is part of the ongoing efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force’s RMBS Working Group, which has recovered tens of billions of dollars on behalf of American consumers and investors for claims against large financial institutions arising from misconduct related to the financial crisis. The RMBS Working Group brings together attorneys, investigators, analysts and staff from multiple state and federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, the FBI, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), HUD’s Office of Inspector General, the FHFA-OIG, SIGTARP, the Federal Reserve Board’s OIG, the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network and multiple state Attorneys General offices around the country. The RMBS Working Group is led by Director Joshua Wilkenfeld and five co-chairs: Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Mizer, Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division, Director Andrew Ceresney of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, U.S. Attorney John Walsh of the District of Colorado and New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman. This settlement is the fifth multibillion-dollar RMBS settlement announced by the working group.
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/...ts-sale-residential-mortgage-backed
Learn more about the RMBS Working Group and the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force at
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MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=9380.msg136463#msg136463
Zitat deekshant:
GS Statement of Facts
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/839901/download
Statement of Facts dated April 8, 2016
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/839921/download
fyi
"...WHEREAS, the Goldman Lawsuit alleges claims in connection with the offering and sale of certain United States mortgage-related securities issued, underwritten, and/or sold by Defendants as listed in Exhibit A attached hereto (the “RMBS”)2
;"
2 By order dated July 3 1, 2015, the Court dismissed with prejudice FHLB Seattle’s Third Claim for Relief
(pertaining to WaMu Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-AR9) and Fifth Claim for Relief (pertaining to G$R Mortgage Loan Trust, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2004-8F).
Ticker: WAMU 2005-AR9 AlA CUSIP: 92922FU48
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MfG.L:)
Joint Release
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
For Immediate ReleaseApril 13, 2016
Agencies Announce Determinations and Provide Feedback on Resolution Plans of Eight Systemically Important, Domestic Banking Institutions
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Federal Reserve Board on Wednesday jointly announced determinations and provided firm-specific feedback on the 2015 resolution plans of eight systemically important, domestic banking institutions.
The agencies have jointly determined that each of the 2015 resolution plans of Bank of America, Bank of New York Mellon, JP Morgan Chase, State Street, and Wells Fargo was not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the statutory standard established in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The agencies have issued joint notices of deficiencies to these five firms detailing the deficiencies in their plans and the actions the firms must take to address them. Each firm must remediate its deficiencies by October 1, 2016. If a firm has not done so, it may be subject to more stringent prudential requirements.
The agencies jointly identified weaknesses in the 2015 resolution plans of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley that the firms must address, but did not make joint determinations regarding the plans and their deficiencies. The FDIC determined that the plan submitted by Goldman Sachs was not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, and identified deficiencies. The Federal Reserve Board identified a deficiency in Morgan Stanley's plan and found that the plan was not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
Neither agency found that Citigroup's 2015 resolution plan was not credible or would not facilitate an orderly resolution under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, although the agencies did identify shortcomings that the firm must address.
The deadline for the next full plan submission for all eight domestic, systemically important financial institutions is July 1, 2017. The agencies will evaluate all eight of the full plans submitted in 2017 under the statutory standard.
The agencies are issuing Resolution Plan Assessment Framework and Firm Determinations (2016), which explains the resolution planning requirement, and provides further information on the determinations and the agencies' processes for reviewing the plans. Further, the Federal Reserve Board is releasing the feedback letters issued to each firm. Each letter details the deficiencies and shortcomings of each firm's plan, as well as the specific remediation required of each firm. Additionally, the agencies are releasing new guidance for the July 2017 submission of all firms.
Section 165(d) of the Dodd-Frank Act requires bank holding companies with total consolidated assets of $50 billion or more and nonbank financial companies designated by the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) for supervision by the Federal Reserve periodically submit resolution plans to the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Each plan, commonly known as a living will, must describe the company's strategy for rapid and orderly resolution under bankruptcy in the event of material financial distress or failure of the company.
Under the authority granted to the agencies in Section 165(d), if any of the five firms receiving a joint notice of deficiencies does not adequately remediate those deficiencies by October 1, the agencies, acting jointly, may impose more stringent prudential requirements on the firm until it remediates them. The prudential requirements may include more stringent capital, leverage, or liquidity requirements, as well as restrictions on growth, activities, or operations of the firm, or its subsidiaries. If, following a two-year period beginning on the date of the imposition of such requirements, a firm still has failed to adequately remediate any deficiencies, the agencies, in consultation with the FSOC, may jointly require the firm to divest certain assets or operations to facilitate an orderly resolution of the firm in bankruptcy.
The agencies also announced that they are continuing to assess the plans for the four foreign banking organizations that filed resolution plans on July 1, 2015--Barclays PLC, Credit Suisse Group, Deutsche Bank AG, and UBS.
The decisions announced on Wednesday received unanimous support, respectively, from the FDIC and Federal Reserve boards.
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MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=9405.msg136698#msg136698
Zitat Nightdaytrader9:
Long letter from FDIC to JPM Chase talking about their (FDIC) review of JPM Chase's 2015 resolution plan.
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/...etter-20160413.pdf
Interesting, JPM Chase is raising money when Fed is telling them (i.e., JPM Chase) they are too big.
++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Massive Chase mortgage bond first to meet FDIC Safe Harbor rule
$1.88 billion deal is one of largest post-crisis RMBS deals
A new, massive mortgage bond being brought to market by JPMorgan Chase Bank is a record breaker on several fronts.
Not only is the $1.88 billion residential mortgage-backed securitization one of the largest RMBS deals since the housing crisis, Chase Mortgage Trust 2016-1 is also the first RMBS deal that qualifies for the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Safe Harbor rule, which took effect in 2010.
Under the FDIC’s Safe Harbor rule, assets being transferred for securitization cannot be seized by the FDIC if the issuing firm fails or is taken over in receivership.
According to sale documentation from Moody’s Investors Service, the securitized loans backing Chase 2016-1 are“isolated from consolidation risk in the unlikely event that the sponsor, JPMorgan Chase Bank, becomes insolvent.”
And according to Moody’s and Fitch Ratings, which also rated the Chase deal, the deal’s adherence to the FDIC’s Safe Harbor rule makes it attractive to investors.
Part of what sets this deal apart is the “alignment of interests” that will exist between Chase and the deal’s investors.
According to Fitch, the FDIC rule requires the sponsor, Chase, to retain an economic interest of at least 5% of the credit risk of the securitized assets, which Fitch believes will benefit the deal because of a strong alignment of interest in the credit risk of the underlying collateral.
Moody’s agrees with that characterization, stating that Chase’s retention of 5% of each class effectively provides some risk retention and aligns its incentive with investors in the transaction.
Moody’s adds that there are several features of the deal that make it “unique” to the post-crisis securitzation environment, including:
Pro-rata payment structure with multiple and more stringent performance triggers than other post-crisis transactions; these triggers redirect to the more senior notes cash that would otherwise go to the junior notes in the event of performance deterioration
Lack of principal and interest servicer advancing that will boost ultimate liquidation recoveries on delinquent loans available for senior bondholders. The lack of P&I advancing will also reduce the unpredictability of cash flows driven by servicer stop-advance policies or practices
Immediate recognition of modification losses that allocates more cash to senior bonds because written-down junior bonds accrue less interest
According to Moody’s, these features will result in new protections for the senior bonds and ensure better alignment with senior investors' interest.
Fitch and Moody’s also both noted the “high quality” of the underlying mortgages.
According to Moody’s report, Chase 2016-1 is a securitization of a pool of 6,111 fixed-rate prime conforming and non-conforming fully amortizing loans with a total balance of $1,887,187,001 and a remaining term to maturity of 343 months.
According to both ratings agencies, roughly 75% of the underlying loans are conforming, while the remaining 25% are non-conforming.
The loans carry a weighted average seasoning of 14 months.
Moody’s noted that the borrowers in this transaction have high FICO scores and "sizeable" equity in their properties. The WA original FICO score is 768 and the WA combined original loan-to-value ratio is 79.6%.
“Although the majority of the loans were originated through a correspondent lender (65.7%), this is offset by the stronger property types (56.5% single-family), occupancy (99.4% owner-occupied) and purpose (67.3% purchase) of the loans,” Moody’s stated in its report
Additionally, the pool is “geographically diverse” with 25.4% of the loans coming from California, 9.6% from New York and 8.9% from Texas.
For those reasons, and more, both Fitch and Moody’s awarded triple-A ratings to the $1.656 billion Class A tranche.
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/36695
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MfG.L:)
Zitat Mr_Simpson:
JPM S-3 for another $21 Billion this past week. One can only hope one of these days we are in for a big surprise.
Does anyone know who is tranche 5 & how-when could they be liquidated so equity tranche 6 can start receiving whatever comes next... If anything?
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Zitat doo_dilettante:
Interesting ! $21Billion and it goes unnoticed in the news - seems like business as usual....
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/19617/...2623/dp64932_s3a2.htm
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Zitat Scott Fox:
The information in this prospectus is not complete and may be changed. We may not sell these securities until the registration statement filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission is effective. This prospectus is not an offer to sell these securities and it is not soliciting an offer to buy these securities in any jurisdiction where the offer or sale is not permitted.
SUBJECT TO COMPLETION, DATED APRIL 15 , 2016
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Zitat bgriffinokc:
Doo,
On the surface it would appear that JPM had no problem raising the initial amount plus whatever was stated in Amendment No. 1.
That's a lot of Mooola...then we have an additional $21 Billion in Amendment No. 2. That can refinance a lot of debt or buy a substantial amount of assets.
Pre-Effective Amendment No. 2 to
FORM S-3
REGISTRATION STATEMENT UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933
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Zitat deekshant:
Now, that $200 billion seems to be a F&R recovery, hopefully reaching LT
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Zitat CSNY:
It's less than 1% of a $2.5T entity. Obviously in '08 it was envisioned that JPM would grow to a size that would render a payout insignificant.
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Zitat doo_dilettante:
And this entity was founded in 2015...
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/...ivcapId=319596383
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Zitat jmp105:
And in 2015 we were in negotiations to buy a division of a public traded company, hmmmm
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Zitat mdavis9439:
It may be me. But, as I read thru all the threads, there seems to be a lot of activity going on at the same time. Is it a coincidence or what?
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Zitat myplace:
Nothing to back this up with , but have had the thought for a while the Operating division of a public company was a JPM mortgage servicer.
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Zitat oilman1012000:
I don't think this is anything related to us. It could very well be towards the preparation for Saudi govt. threat to sell US securities/ assets to the tune of 750 Bil in light of bill in congress related to 911. I won't be surprised if most major banks start issuing similar debts.
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Zitat Uncle_Bo:
Oil,
To make sure I understand this correctly, so the big banks will issue the debt and use it to purchase the government debt then to provide support for the market and suppress interest rate rise, since this is going to create a big impediment for financing the deficit spending ?
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Zitat Nightdaytrader9:
Washington Mutual Mortgage Securities Corp. (WMMSC), a wholly owned subsidiary of JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association.
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ZItat jmp105:
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/wamu_amended_complaint.pdf
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Zitat oilman1012000:
I don't believe they would be selling Treasury because that will hurt Saudis more than us. Rinse. Repeat of 2008 as Saudis will sell Assets (stocks), markets will crash and as usual JPM and others will swallow more competitors like Citi.
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MfG.L:)
Key Dates (3 months)
April 15: Judge dismisses $62M in employee claims.
April 15: Judge Holds in abeyance for Settlement JPM-DB-FDIC (Class 18)
April 25-29th: Proxy 2016
April 25-29th: WMILT report for potential payments
May 1st: WMILT Distribution
May 16: 13Fs for 1Q Hedge movements in WMIH
June 1st: Shareholders Meeting (New York)
July 15: FDIC-JPM-DB Settlement max date (3 months) Class 18
Aug 1st: WMILT Distribution
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Zitat Joe513:
First entry is a little bit of a reach. More realistic is:
April 15 In one of the many suits generated so far by the trust agaijnst the FDIC, a Judge in DC court finds the FDIC did not act arbitrarily when denying the application for some employee claims settlements. That decision did not dismiss $62 million in claims. Only the BK court can disallow claims and so far Judge Walrath has not.
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ZItat Mr_Simpson:
Dont worry Joe she will!
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Zitat bgriffinokc:
Joe,
Do you believe a request for dismissal will be forthcoming before the Shareholders meeting?
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Zitat kenwalker:
Legalities, golden parachute, and quasi governmental rules aside .................. IMHO this will get settled according to why that 500 million that was downstreamed just day ahead of the seizure. This was a "mistake" made by a committee of WaMu brightest and best ................ was it because of some OTS promise / pressure or was it a case of group stupidity? Stupidity gets ( nor deserves ) nothing but anything else gets some compensation regardless of "where" the money comes from or the reason given.
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Zitat Joe513 zu bgriffinokc:
No. The court action Walrath asked for years ago is still pending in Delaware court. This recent DC summary judgement was a sideshow. She will do nothing with the claims at least until that decision has been rendered.
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Zitat mdavis9439:
I believe the DC action makes the Delaware decision a moot issue. Judge Walrath will have to disallow the employee claims because the employee claims can't be paid. April 28 is an important date because objections to the supplemental objections are due on that date. We will see who, if any claimants, are staying in the fight. But, at any rate, Judge Walrath must disallow the claims. She has no other choice.
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MfG.L:)
Zitat vodkadejour:
Am I the only one here without a legal degree???
I had to look up "abeyance" and "proxy" and I still don't really understand everything you wrote. But the first part that got me is that this is a predictive list of actions- things you predict will occur in the future- though oddly you wrote yesterday on April 17th that you predicted the judge would dismiss claims on the 15th- a date that has already passed...so what am I not understanding?
2nd, "the judge holds in abeyance"... I looked up abeyance and found it to mean when there is a period that no one holds ownership. My question is the judge holds WHAT in abeyance"?
3rd, I looked up proxy, it means to vote on behalf and on authority of someone else. Are you saying on 25-29th there will be a vote held of some sort in which every person voting has someone else representing their vote for them?
4th, on May 16th there are 13F's...what is a 13F and where are you learning this information.
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Zitat vitellom:
vodka, I don't know about most of that, but..
13F is: The 13F is an SEC requirement that makes public all the positions fund managers take in their respective funds.
We get to see more of who owns, bought/sold WMIH stock.
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Zitat Mr_Simpson:
1. Yes is a prediction based on FDIC not wanting to pay golden parachutes
2. Suspension of Judge for a period of 90 days. Settlement by July 15th
3. Proxy is The document WMIH will show to their shareholders prior to 2016 Annual Meeting which will be in NY June 1st
http://wmih-corp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/...roxy-Statement.pdf
4. A 13F is a list of investments in WMIH or any stock that Hedge Funds or Institutions with more than 100 million $ have to show by The end of each quarter but they have up to 45 days to file.
Hope that helped you!
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Zitat Joe513:
I wish for us it was that simple. However, Walrath will not dismiss the claims until the real issue of jurisdiction has been settled. That issue of whether the Golden Parachute Regulations even apply to WMILT and whether WMILT is a “covered company” under the regs has not been litigated. The issues litigated in Judge Walton court were very narrow and are very different from the issues before the Delaware District Court. I doubt this ruling can be used (under the legal theory of collateral estoppel) to bar a ruling on the very issue that is before the Delaware District Court which is whether the Golden Parachute Regulations even apply to WMILT.
This one is not done no matter how much we all hope it is.
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Zitat mdavis9439:
I may be wrong. But, I thought the WMILT sued the FDIC in the Federal Court requesting summary judgement that they be able to settle the employee claims inspite of the FDIC's claim that they were golden parachutes. This suit included both the employees who had agreed to a settlement and those that hadn't.
The FDIC countered stating they had the right to deny payment under the golden parachute rule and also requested summary judgement.
The court denied WMILT request for summary judgement and granted the FDIC's request.
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Zitat Joe513:
Yes, but that is not the question the Delaware action asks. The Delaware action asks the original issue Walrath asked to be litigated and that is whether the FDIC has any jurisdiction over the trust. The DC action was narrow only to whether the FDIC had not properly considered the applications. In fact Judge Walton even mentions in his ruling that he was not asked to decide the bigger issue.
Rosen still has good faith settlements with claimants and he must keep trying to pay them until a court decides that the Trust is a covered company under the regs and the FDIC has the right to enforce its will upon them. That issue is very much up in the air and will make for some interesting positions at trial. Can the FDIC reach into a settled bankruptcy and still wield power over a trust set up to pay creditors. That is the 62 million dollar question and it will be decided in Delaware district court and maybe ultimately in the Supreme Court if the losing party pushes it further.
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Zeitpunkt: 22.04.16 08:51
Aktion: Löschung des Beitrages
Kommentar: Moderation auf Wunsch des Verfassers
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19.png (verkleinert auf 63%)
Dialog zwischen CSNY :( und Azcowboy ;)
Zitat:
Quote from: CSNY on Today at 01:58:23 PM
"What we've done is patched together the link between WMIH and the LT through WMIIC and I don't think it was forecast that the connection would be made. We're not adverse as we're invested in both entities so there's no benefit raising an SEC complaint about the failure to mention in WMIH's filings the looming intercompany obligation."
Zitat azcowboy meint dazu:
"What we've done is patched together the link between WMIH and the LT through WMIIC"
Yep' ... WMIIC's filing made @ 10:15pm on the 26th was the ever critical filing' ... placing WMI Investment under the Courts Protective Custody - First' - ...
The study and research of the complete process is documented and solid' ... and ... has been presented on this MB' ... and' of course ... as far as I'm concerned, ... is now completed ... (The Approved Plan 7 is simply Plan 6, adjusted to accommodate the WMB bondholders and include equity)
Obviously, since the WaMu process study began in mid' 2012 ? .. some' were shown that they made some errors, and some' had their feelings hurt along the way, ... however, ... the Truth' ... can never be stopped' ... GLTA'
again, just sayin'
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ZItat CSNY:
I thank you again for reiterating the point about WMIIC's independence from WMI once it became a Chapter 11 debtor. That is absolutely right. It had the power to transfer the intercompany claims (the disclosure statement slyly doesn't mention this) and that's just what it did; probably for a nominal (even $1 would do) consideration. Those claims are as real as KKR's and Citi's. Wouldn't you just love to see someone argue that Walrath won't enforce them given she confirmed the plan?
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Zitat azcowboy:
~ You' are MOST welcome, and my Thanks to you, for being an active study and research participant' in our endeavors for the TRUTH' ... even though at times, our views were at odds with each other' ...
for anyone, not to' acknowledge the intercompany debt and obligations, is simply a reveal of their lack of actual involvement and knowledge gained' in all that legally encompassed - WaMu- ... The actual documents are quite clear' ... obviously, the individual opinions shared on internet message boards and at private luncheons, fueled the confusion, and many of these people were simply to lazy to actually do any real research' ... actually they became, quite confused on many, many level's ...
Again, the process is completely revealed within the filings for those that are truly interested in what truly occurred' ... I said yesterday on IHUB, ... I could put on quite a power point presentation ... again, ... The Approved Plan 7 is simply Plan 6, adjusted to accommodate the WMB bondholders and include equity ...
My very best to everyone' ... and, I sincerely hope everyone is satisfied within their decisions' ... I'm sure everyone did what they believed was in their own best interest' ... I know I did' ...
One more thought' ... remember, we' have been in class 18 now for quite awhile' ... and ... due to the fact that Judge Walrath APPROVED this Settled Reorganization, ... all issues ultimately finalize on her' desk and with her pen' ...
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Zitat CSNY:
To make things clear to everyone, once WMIIC filed its petition, it received bankruptcy protection from its corporate parent (sounds counter intuitive but it's true). Moreover, its Chapter 11 case was separate from its parent (as you've pointed out) such that its debts against its parent didn't just disappear. It had every right to transfer those debts to a third party. In this case the third party and the original parties are 'family' so to speak which is why I think this will work out very nicely for us.
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Zitat azcowboy:
~ In My Opinion ? ...
... Thanks Astock' ... This message board has been an integral tool, able to be utilized as an international - WaMu - study and research laboratory' ... the main message board always had some 1,000 (ish) members, able to provide not only their own thoughts and opinions, ... but also, any credible "push back" against a presented linked direct text' ... (which was obviously never possible) ...
Then the pm forum allowed the serious people to move up to higher levels without interuption' ...
After a recent revisit to Plan 6' and a renewed look at Tranche 5' ... My Due Diligence is now completed' ... and so, ... We All Wait Together
.. If anyone is interested, ... this is part of the sidebar attached to the recent research which involved a simultaneous sequencing of KKR's arrival back in 2014' ...
Once the approved reorganization, had addressed all of the WMI' creditor classes' ...
From the class 16's and their receipt of the runoff notes' ... through to the WMI-LT notifying everyone that Tranches 1 through Tranche 3, had been completed in the 12/31/2013 WMILT's Quarterly Report' ...
(Docket # 11584 - Filed 01/30/2014 ... footnote 2; CCB Balance excludes the LTI portion allocable to the common stock component of the CCB claim)
Then we witnessed KKR's arrival and WMIH involvement, with their purchase of the A's ... in early 2014' (January) ? ... (again, IMO' to gain inner circle knowledge - a $10 million dollar tip of the toe' - and - BOD involvement')
Then to KKR's additional inclusion with the B's in early 2015' (January) ? ... one year later after the P&AA terminated in Sept 2014' ...
and' ... then of course, all of the events in 2015' ... beginning on Jan 5th, 2015 and forward, all issues needing to be accomplished by July 5th, 2015, ... sequence of 2015's events ...
and now, here we are, still addressing the Tranche 5 Class 18 issues, ... The Tranche 5' ... Class 17'(a&b) and Class 18' - WMB seizure issues ? ... are not an obstacle' ... Tranche 5' (WMB seizure issues', were legally placed after the WMI creditor class issues) as this was a necessary part of the Settled' Reorganizational Plan 7' defined'
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Zitat : chaney76210 on Today at 05:32:57 PM
AZ, I promised you a new truck with a new bike in the bed and I promised Bop a world cruise with a friend of her choice. I fully expect to keep those promises when the escrowed markers spike and I become a millionaire (I grew up with 10 kids in the middle of the depression).
I personally own 3,000 Ps , 1625 Ks and 50,000 Qs (the family owns a lot more). My family and friends own a little over 200,000 WMIH shares. We bought the WMIH shares for about $.50 each. They've already gained a little over 400%.
At 85 I live on borrowed time so a close asap would be appreciated. I intend to live a few years after I become a millionaire. Would it be possible for you hurry the judge a little?
I can't possibly thank you and Bop enough for all that you do and for all the others who contribute in a positive manner to this blog.
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Zitat azcowboy dazu:
Well, ... I surely wish you and your family the very best' ... jokingly, forget about the bike' ... I gave up riding last 12/06/2015, ... when two close friends of mine, a man and his wife on the back of their Harley died instantly in a head on' just outside of Tucson' ... I sold off everything with two wheels with the exception of one that is in a storage locker' ... it's a classic, that I just won't sell' ... but my two wheel' ridin' days are done ... I'm satisfied with four wheels and a mountain of HP' these days' ...
as everyone may have noticed, I have also lost the ol' reference to being a ... "dumb ass hillbilly biker" ... as my kids called me a "dumb ass" for the continued riding' ... and I'm now only a biker at heart, however, maintaining my very bad attitude' of course' ... the hillbilly part' ? I just won't ever shake' ...
I have done some things from behind the scenes, but choose not to discuss openly here on this public message board' ... the reasons I'm sure are obvious, ... what with the, idiots that can't seem to read', to the angry day traders, and racist ass-holes, running around loose' out here in internet message board land' ...
I still say that last Octobers failure was an internal event' ... that's how it has been able to be kept a secret' ... but that's another conversation ...
Take Care'
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16:00:02§$2.28 1,255
16:00:02§$2.28 199
16:00:02§$2.28 100
16:00:02§$2.28 2,893
http://www.nasdaq.com/de/symbol/wmih/real-time
MfG.L:)
https://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/92936P/20160407/AR_281701.PDF
Zitat Bobwatch:
This 10K has a lot of disclaimers contained within. I am trying to understand the following paragraph from page 14 regarding KKR. Seems as if some hands are being tied..
Affiliates of KKR own a substantial amount of equity interests in us, and have other substantial interests in us and agreements with
us, and may have conflicts of interest with us or the other holders of our capital stock.
As of March 1, 2016, affiliates of KKR held approximately 29.4% of WMIH’s common stock (after giving effect to the exercise of
outstanding Warrants and the conversion of each of the Series A Preferred Stock and the Series B Preferred Stock). Affiliates of KKR
are parties to, the Investment Agreement and the Investor Rights Agreement.
As a result, affiliates of KKR may have substantial influence over our decisions to enter into any corporate transaction and may have
the ability to prevent any transaction that requires the approval of stockholders regardless of whether other holders of our capital stock
believe that any such transactions are in their own best interests. For example, affiliates of KKR could potentially cause us to refrain
from making acquisitions in a manner that is not in the best interests of holders of the Series B Preferred Stock. KKR will not provide
oversight of or have control over or be involved with the investment activities or other operations of the Company.
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Zitat azcowboy:
Yep, ... AZ Has a Few Questions for the WMIH BOD's ~ and I will post them publically, ... giving the BOD's roughly a month to consider possible answers to the shareholders' ... Here is the first, ...
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As a WMIH-Corp shareholder,
... Now that WMIH-Corp has exited reorganization, some four years ago, and is currently, a NasDaq publically listed corporation, ...
Would one of the Board of Director members comment on a two part shareholder question ?
Initially, in 2008 Alvarez and Marsal, were Court designated to be the, servicing, management, and restructuring component for the original "debtors in possession", WMI Investment Corp' ... as the actual orginal, "debtors" estate Washington Mutual, Inc. was maintained by attorney group WGM' ... Now, being that WMIH-Corp is the WMI / WMIIC bankruptcy exiting newly reorganized corporation,
First; Can the Board of Directors answer, to the current group of shareholders, a logical reason that WMI Investment Corp, one of WMIH-Corp(s) two SEC disclosed and designated subsidiaries, continues to be serviced and managed by Alvarez and Marsal ?
and, Second; Can the Board of Directors answer to the current shareholders a logical reason, the 2008 Court assigned, WMIIC servicing, managerial, and restructuring component, Alvarez and Marsal' ... continues to have its' ... "debtor" and "debtor in possessions" ... Court assigned functions and responsibilities, continue to be paid for by a third party entity ? ... After four years have passed since the company's reorganization, A&M's services continue to be paid for by the WMI Liquidating Trust, which was not placed into service until March 6, 2012' ... and' obviously as a legally registered "Grantors Trust" is not in need of restructuring'
and as a follow up, ... Why isn't the current WMIH-Corp Board of Directors managing the entire publically traded company, WMIH-Corp along with both of its TWO subsidiaries ?
All WMIH-Corp shareholders are quite aware of the fact that the WMI-LT does not need to be "restructured" and the maintenance and management of the WMIH-Corp subsidiaries, should be the responsibility of the WMIH-Corp Board of Directors' ...
If necessary, ... the associated Federal Judge signed Court Orders are easily available upon request, along with disclosed billing statements of the same'
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Zitat kenwalker:
All good questions, AZ.
At some point the leverage of fiduciary responsibilities will outweigh the reasons we have been told so little. This may have been one of the driving reason on the attempt at WMIH / LT separation.
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Zitat azcowboy:
Or, ...
... Isn't it possible that WMIH-Corp actually entered into a now, viable NasDaq publically traded and reorganized corporation prematurely ? ... after all, after four years since the (settled ?) reorganization, ... there are still issues associated with WMIH-Corp, and other GSA related entities, that remain unresolved ?
Or, ...
... Due the fact that WMIH-Corp is the original WMI / WMIIC "debtors" and "debtors in possession" exiting reorganized company, ... can the shareholders of this NasDaq publically traded company, expect to see a reversal of A&M's role in the managing of the reorganized estate, via; a Federal Judge signed and documented submission ?
Or, ...
as a WMIH-Corp shareholder, ... would a member of the Board of Directors be in a position to comment on the fact that, ... within the settled reorganization, which created WMIH-Corp, ... are the Reorganizational, Plan defined, Attachment H', Tranche 5', class 18', general unsecured, seized bank WMB on going issues, a deterrent to the company's ability to experience forward movement in the open market place ?
Or, ...
--- As the company, WMIH-Corp disclosed in its SEC 10-Q submission on 12/31/2012' ... The company's submission within the R-45 attachment, revealed a possible utilization of an $8.37 Billion Dollar pure possible and pure available Capital Loss Tax Benefit' ... which, as the R-45 also revealed, is able to be utilized within five years of the reorganization' ...
Due to the fact that WMIH-Corp, revealed this information within its own filed, SEC, 12/31/2012 10-Q / attachment R-45, ... is the company under any preparation to utilize this massive tax relief benefit, prior to the five year expiration date as mentioned ? ... Feb' of 2017 ?
++++++++++++
here's another question that I would like answered ...
To the WMIH-Corp BOD's ... Since it's obvious to shareholders, that A&M has actually been running the "debtors" and "debtors in possession", the now reorganized, WMIH Corp show, and' they' (A&M) are being paid for with OUR Liquidating Trust dispersal funding' ... just curious what have all of the BOD's been doing for FOUR YEARS' ?
at roughly $500,000.00 per quarter for four years now, being paid to A&M to manage WMIH-Corp, ... our own WMI-LT could have had some additional $8,000,000.00 (ish)
+++++++++++++
I' have posted these few questions publically, roughly a month in advance' for ALL' to review ... hopefully in notification that it is time for the shareholders to have some semblance of truth and process revealed' ... however, ... if I am correct ?, the questions that will actually be asked at the SHM', will be a bit more detailed, difficult, and quite random' ... - no month in advance for any answer preparation will be allowed ...
again, just sayin'
AZ
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https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...php?topic=9173.msg137082#msg137082
Zitat kylekrol:
Who was/is our target in the failed M/A?
If that question isn't answered, then why can't the target be disclosed?
If there's a confidentiality agreement signed.....When does the CA expire, and will the company release information on who the target company is when it does indeed expire?
Since our price has fallen 40% in 2 years and 25% in the past year, why does the BOD feel that they should be compensated with these results? (A question to each BOD members)
June 1st will be about 7 months since the failed acquisition, what are the odds (%) that a successful acquisition will be made this year?
What are the obstacles in 2016 that can prevent an acquisition?
And to really stir the pot......In early 2014 our stock hit a high of $3.75. Throughout 2014 WMIH was hammered all the way down to $1.70 to $1.75. About 1 month after we hit those lows, a PR was released stating capital that was raised had a floor of $1.75. How is it that certain people, involved in the market, knew this information well before shareholders were notified?
Based on the last question, why is it that shareholders who have been involved with WMI/WMIH since the BK in 2008 have been left in the dark?
And to conclude; We've heard reasons why this stock is risky. But give us reasons why the market should be eager to invest in WMIH?
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Zitat sysintelfin:
"First; Can the Board of Directors answer, to the current group of shareholders, a logical reason that WMI Investment Corp, one of WMIH-Corp(s) two SEC disclosed and designated subsidiaries, continues to be serviced and managed by Alvarez and Marsal ?
and, Second; Can the Board of Directors answer to the current shareholders a logical reason, the 2008 Court assigned, WMIIC servicing, managerial, and restructuring component, Alvarez and Marsal' ... continues to have its' ... "debtor" and "debtor in possessions" ... Court assigned functions and responsibilities, continue to be paid for by a third party entity ? ... After four years have passed since the company's reorganization, A&M's services continue to be paid for by the WMI Liquidating Trust, which was not placed into service until March 6, 2012' ... and' obviously as a legally registered "Grantors Trust" is not in need of restructuring'
and as a follow up, ... Why isn't the current WMIH-Corp Board of Directors managing the entire publically traded company, WMIH-Corp along with both of its TWO subsidiaries ?"
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