Kursverdoppelung bei Actua Corporation (vorm. Internet Capital)
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Also Kaufkurse ausnutzen - und zudem kann man bei momentanen Käufen die Kursgewinne noch steuerfrei im nächsten Dezember realisieren. Bei ausländischen Werten wird das im Gegensatz zu inländischen Werte kein Problem sein, da hier nicht mit Kursdellen zum Jahresende 2006 wegen Steuerverkäufen zu rechnen ist.
Du erinnerst mich sehr stark an hersto bei consors, esla/snag bei w:o und snag bei comdirect. Kann es sein dass du auch hier dein Unwesen treibst!! Mann/Frau mit Erinnerungslücken, der sauer wird, wenn man ihn/sie an frühere Postings erinnert. Schämen!
"ICGE positiv
weit oberhalb der 200er gedreht
stochastik auf kauf gesprungen
macd kurz davor"
Wie Ihr vielleicht schon bemerkt habt, argumentiere ich fundamental und halte nicht sehr viel von der Technischen Analyse. Der Shortseller muss allerdings dieses Ding berücksichtigen, da viele Zocker dran glauben. Für ihn ist ein Kurssprung gefährlich und daher wird er heute weiter leer verkaufen, um erst einmal auf kurze Sicht ein Chartsignal zu verhindern.
"Arnie
19.12.05, 19:31 Uhr (10 Klick(s))
ICGE Stopp Loss hat gegriffen
Verkauf 12.968 Stück zu 7,65 USD"
Das Körnchen Wahrheit am Aberglauben habe ich in meinem letzten Posting beschrieben: Der Shortseller setzt auf Leute wie diesen Arnie.
Um nicht immer nur Einseitiges vom Yahoo-Board hier zitiert zu sehen, eine andere Meinung:
Folks...follow my lead on this one :)
by: agix4life 12/19/05 02:42 pm
Msg: 238750 of 238750
......I posted a short with a cover at 7.43 when ICGE went to $9.00 and am about to cover. We'll go back to around $8.10 and drop like a brick to the low 6's. ICGE is insanely predictable and a great money maker if you're trading it.
Don't even invest in ICGE for the longrun. They absolutely stink. There are enough pumpers and dumb buyers to keep her where she is now. They'll be selling soon :)
Nach nur 3 von 20 Beteiligungen sah die Rechung für Internet Capital schon wie folgt aus:
Nettocash/Wertpapiere = 170 Millionen
ICGCommerce = 135 Millionen
Freeborders = 120 Millionen
Starcite = 115 Millionen
macht zusammen: 640 Millionen.
Das waren nach nur drei von 20 Beteiligungen schon mehr als doppelt so viel als die nur 305 Millionen gegenwärtige Marktkapitalisierung und weitere 17 Beteiligungen warten jetzt noch drauf, dass wir sie in die Berechnung einbeziehen, auch wenn die Werte der restlichen Beteiligungen nicht so hoch sind wie díe der ersten drei.
Zum Beispiel die oben beschrieben Credittrade, die in 2005 auf 40 bis 50 Millionen Umsatz kommen dürfte. Ein Umsatzmultiple von sieben ist vor dem Hintergrund eines Marktes, der sich binnen zwei bis drei Jahren verfünffacht hat, noch extrem niedrig. Aus diesen extrem vorsichtig angenommen Zahlen lässt sich eine Marktkapitalisierung von 315 Millionen ableiten. Die 30% von Internet Capital wären dann 95 Millionen wert - aber das ist sehr vorsichtige Schätzung.
Nach nur 4 von 20 Beteiligungen sieht die Rechung für Internet Capital wie folgt aus:
Nettocash/Wertpapiere = 170 Millionen
ICGCommerce = 135 Millionen
Freeborders = 120 Millionen
Starcite = 115 Millionen
Credittrade = 95 Millionen
macht zusammen: 735 Millionen.
Und noch stehen einige, teilweise auch werthaltige Beteiligungen aus.
Welche das sind, habe ich hier von Internetseite der Consultingfirma d-fine einmal kopiert:
"Der Markt für Strukturierte Transaktionen wächst unaufhaltsam. Während in der Anfangsphase die Reduktion regulatorischen Eigenkapitals im Vordergrund stand, rückt heute die Übertragung von Risiken, die Refinanzierung des originären Geschäftes sowie die Steuerung des ökonomischen Eigenkapitals in den Mittelpunkt des Interesses.
Auch die Investorensicht hat sich im Laufe der Zeit verändert: Ungebrochen ist der Wunsch nach Diversifizierung und Teilhaberschaft an bis dato nur dem Originator zugänglichen Risikoklassen.
Doch zusätzlich rücken die Rolle des Servicers, dessen regelmäßiges Reporting und die Qualität der verfügbaren Informationen zu den Assets immer stärker in den Fokus der Investoren."
Credittrade dürfte in 2005 zwischen 40 und 50 Millionen umsetzen (näher bei 50 Millionen liegend), die sich in 2006 auf ca. 75 Millionen erhöhen dürften (eventuell uch mehr). Ein Wert von 500 Millionen für Credittrade sind vermutlich keine Träumerei. Die 30% von Internet Capital hätten dann einen Wert von 150 Millionen. Ich bin oben in meiner Aufstellung noch von wesentlich niedrigeren Werten ausgegangen.
Beantworten
Dass sich bei der Beschreibung von Credittrade als Datenlieferant und Händler/Broker auf dem Markt für Kreditderivate keine Fantasieszenarien entwickele, könnt Ihr z.B. an nachstehender Passage aus dem folgenden Text erkennen, wenn Ihr einmal darauf achtet, mit wem hier Credittrade in einem Atemzug genannt wird: "Numerous people at Banc of America Securities, Bloomberg, BNP Paribas, CreditTrade, Deutsche Bank, and J.P. Morgan answered our questions and corrected our misunderstandings. They know whom they are and that we are very grateful."
Leider komme ich an den nachstehenden Text ohne eine erheblich Geldzahlung mitttels Kreditkarte nicht ran.
The Journal of Finance
Volume 60 Issue 5 Page 2255 - October 2005
doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2 005.00798.x
Volume 60 Issue 5
An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps
ROBERTO BLANCO, SIMON BRENNAN, and IAN W. MARSH*
ABSTRACT
We test the theoretical equivalence of credit default swap (CDS) prices and credit spreads derived by Duffie (1999), finding support for the parity relation as an equilibrium condition. We also find two forms of deviation from parity. First, for three firms, CDS prices are substantially higher than credit spreads for long periods of time, arising from combinations of imperfections in the contract specification of CDSs and measurement errors in computing the credit spread. Second, we find short-lived deviations from parity for all other companies due to a lead for CDS prices over credit spreads in the price discovery process.
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QuickSearch in:
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Authors:
ROBERTO BLANCO
SIMON BRENNAN
IAN W. MARSH
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Correspondence
*Blanco is at the Banco de España and was on secondment to the Bank of England while this paper was being written, Brennan is at the Bank of England, and Marsh is at Cass Business School, and the Cambridge Endowment for Research in Finance. He was on leave of absence at the Bank of England when this paper was being written. We would like to thank Bill Allen, Eva Catarineu, Gordon Gemmill, Charles Goodhart, Andrew Haldane, Simon Hayes, Kevin James, David Rule, Hyun Shin, Michela Vecchi, Geoffrey Wood, seminar participants at the Bank of England, Banco de España, Western Finance Association 2003, Foro de Finanzas 2003, a referee, and the editor for useful comments. Karen Goff and Andrew Paterson provided very able research assistance. CreditTrade and J.P. Morgan Securities kindly allowed us to use their credit default swap data. Numerous people at Banc of America Securities, Bloomberg, BNP Paribas, CreditTrade, Deutsche Bank, and J.P. Morgan answered our questions and corrected our misunderstandings. They know whom they are and that we are very grateful. This paper represents the views and analysis of the authors and should not be thought to represent those of the Bank of England, Monetary Policy Committee members, or the Banco de España. Any errors and omissions are our own.
To cite this article
BLANCO, ROBERTO, BRENNAN, SIMON & MARSH, IAN W. (2005)
An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Relation between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit Default Swaps.
The Journal of Finance 60 (5), 2255-2281.
doi: 10.1111/
j.1540-6261.2005.00798.x
BIS Quarterly Review - December 2005
5 December 2005
The BIS Quarterly Review released today is divided into two parts. The first presents an overview of recent developments in financial markets, before turning in more detail to financing flows in banking and debt securities markets, and activity in derivatives markets. The second part presents five articles, each having a particular focus on newly developing financial markets: one on risk aversion and risk premia in the CDS market; another on financial sector direct investment in emerging market economies; a third on corporate bond markets in Asia; a fourth on the development of the domestic government bond market in Mexico; and a fifth on international government debt denominated in local currency in Latin America.
Inflation outlook unnerves investors
A deterioration in the outlook for inflation unnerved investors around the world in September and October. Upward pressure on consumer prices, resulting in part from high energy prices, prompted central bankers in the United States and the euro area to signal that monetary policy might need to be tightened to contain inflation expectations. Consequently, investors revised upwards their expectations regarding future policy rates. This led to higher bond yields in the major markets. Nevertheless, long-term yields remained low compared to their 2004 highs.
The prospect of a faster pace of monetary tightening contributed to volatile conditions in equity markets. Equity prices around the world dropped sharply in early October. They then rebounded in November, boosted by signs of still robust growth in the United States as well as announcements of mergers, share buybacks and dividend increases. Japan outperformed most other equity markets throughout this period. There, an incipient recovery in domestic demand heightened the prospect of an end to years of deflation.
While emerging market spreads moved in tandem with equity markets, corporate spreads remained stable. In contrast to equity and emerging markets, corporate bond markets never fully recovered from the sell-off earlier in 2005. This largely reflected concerns about the impact that the growing number of shareholder-friendly actions might have on corporate credit quality.
The international debt securities market
The pace of borrowing activity in the international debt securities market slowed in the third quarter of 2005, with gross issuance of bonds and notes down 19% from the second quarter. However, due to strong issuance earlier in the year, third quarter gross issuance was still up on a year-over-year basis by almost 10%. One region where issuance picked up markedly was the United States, whereas issuance by euro area nationals declined. High-yield entities once again stepped up their borrowing in the international market, shrugging off a weak second quarter that had seen turmoil in the US auto sector.
Borrowing by emerging market countries remained at a high level in the third quarter, as secondary market spreads on emerging market debt fell to a record low. Local currency issuance of international securities by emerging market entities continued to be particularly strong, and 2005 looks set to be a record year for this segment of the market. Latin American borrowers once again accounted for the vast bulk of local currency issuance, the government of Brazil being the main contributor with a $1.5 billion issue in September.
Derivatives markets
Trading on the international derivatives exchanges declined during the third quarter of 2005. Combined turnover in fixed income, equity index and currency contracts fell by 4% quarter-on-quarter to $357 trillion. However, this was mainly due to seasonal factors, which tend to depress activity in the interest rate segment in the third quarter. By contrast, the year-on-year rate of growth increased slightly to 23%, after 21% in the preceding quarter.
Growth was particularly strong in the market for futures and options on stock indices, which expanded by 22% to $34 trillion in the third quarter, after lacklustre activity in the first half of the year. Turnover in contracts on Korean indices surpassed that in US stock index derivatives for the first time. On the currency front, the growth of the domestic bond market in Mexico has spurred the development of an increasingly sophisticated OTC Mexican peso derivatives market.
Growth in the market for credit default swaps in the first half of 2005 weathered the spring sell-off in credit markets. Notional amounts expanded by 60% to $10 trillion, far outpacing growth in the underlying credit contracts, which increases the risk of squeezes. In addition, the assignment of trades without notifying counterparties has contributed to a backlog in trade confirmations. While market participants have promised to improve back office processes, it is still too early to assess the degree of progress.
The international banking market
Interbank activity drove strong growth in BIS reporting banks’ cross-border claims in the second quarter of 2005. Banks channelled funds to other banks in the United States, United Kingdom and offshore centres, with inter-office transactions accounting for roughly one third of the total. Credit to non-bank borrowers also continued to rise, as banks invested in debt securities, primarily issued in the euro area.
Emerging economies as a whole experienced a large net outflow of funds in the second quarter. The rise in oil prices over the past few years has meant that oil-exporting countries have had sharply increased revenues that must be either spent or invested. As a result, deposits placed in BIS reporting banks have been on the rise as these countries have channelled a portion of these outflows into banks abroad. In the second quarter, increased placements by residents in Russia, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela and other oil-exporting countries were behind the relatively large net outflow of funds from emerging economies.
The recycling of petrodollars back into the international financial system, in this most recent cycle, differs in several important respects from the pattern observed during previous periods of rising oil prices. While oil-exporting countries historically placed a significant portion of their petrodollars in bank deposits, they have increasingly channelled these funds elsewhere as of late. This has contributed to a rise in the proportion of petrodollars that cannot be accounted for on the basis of counterparty data. Furthermore, while petrodollar deposits are still significant, the importance of OPEC as a source of funds for BIS reporting banks has diminished over time.
Special features
Risk aversion and risk premia in the CDS market
Credit default swap (CDS) spreads compensate investors for expected loss, but they also contain risk premia because of investors’ aversion to default risk. Based on an analysis of CDS index spreads and default probabilities on the index constituents during 2002–05, Jeffery Amato of the BIS finds that estimated risk premia and risk aversion have undergone wide swings in recent years. Mr Amato presents statistical evidence that risk premia and aversion have been affected not only by fundamental macroeconomic factors, such as the stance of monetary policy, but also by technical market factors, such as the issuance of collateralised debt obligations.
Foreign banks in emerging market economies: changing players, changing issues
Financial sector foreign direct investment (FSFDI) in emerging market economies has surged over the past decade. Drawing extensively on a recent report of the Committee on the Global Financial System, Dietrich Domanski of the BIS analyses FSFDI patterns across different emerging market regions and institution types. While acknowledging the benefits of heightened financial sector efficiency, the author argues that foreign ownership of banks poses challenges for host countries, due to the migration of decision-making, and potential incompatibility of the organisational structures of foreign-owned banks with host country legal and regulatory systems. The author concludes that many of these challenges will be best met by global cooperation on the part of regulators and central banks.
Corporate bond markets in Asia
In recent years, policymakers in Asia have started to turn their attention to the development of corporate or non-government bond markets. Jacob Gyntelberg, Guonan Ma and Eli Remolona of the BIS document that Asia has large as well as small corporate bond markets, and that some primary markets have successfully opened up to foreign issuers while others have relied on quasi-government issuers. The authors argue that secondary markets in Asia may suffer from illiquidity due in varying degrees to narrow investor bases, inadequate microstructures and lack of timely information about issuers. The authors conclude that, in the longer run, diversifying the investor base and improving the flow of credit information could be the most important factors supporting corporate bond market development.
Reducing financial vulnerability: the development of the domestic government bond market in Mexico
Domestic government bond markets denominated in pesos have expanded rapidly in Mexico since the “tequila crisis” of the mid-1990s. Serge Jeanneau of the BIS and Carlos Pérez Verdia of the Bank of Mexico argue that various initiatives undertaken by the Mexican government have helped to spur this development. The authors document the lengthening of the maturity structure of domestic government debt, the improvement of secondary market liquidity, and the growing efficiency of primary market auctions. Notwithstanding these significant advances, the authors caution that vulnerabilities remain.
International government debt denominated in local currency: recent developments in Latin America
Governments in Latin America have traditionally faced significant difficulties in issuing debt denominated in local currency in international markets. Camilo Tovar of the BIS discusses how three countries in the region – Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay – have recently issued this type of debt. The author argues that changes in both structural and cyclical factors have supported the issuance of these bonds. He also notes that the degree to which issuing international debt in local currency complements the development of domestic debt markets remains to be seen.
Further Information
Next press release:
Joint Forum issues consultation paper on high-level business continuity principles (20 Dec)
Previous press release:
FSF meets with the hedge fund community and their counterparties (29 Nov)
List of 2005 press releases
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BIS Quarterly Review December 2005
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Die Anleger in diesem Papier interessiert sicher, was die Federal Reserve Bank von Francisco nachstehend schreibt - und zwar über den Markt der 30%-Beteiligung. Warum ich aber dieses neue Papier für besonders wichtig halte, ist eine Stelle, wo das enorme Wachstum aufgezeigt wird, ebenso die enormen Volumina dieses Marktes "According to estimates by the British Banker's Association, the notional amount of credit derivatives outstanding grew from almost $600 billion in 1999 to approximately $5 trillion in 2004." Von 1999 bis 2004 hat sich der Markt verneunfacht, und zwar von 600 Milliarden auf gigantische fünf Billionen. Und wir Ihr meinem vorherigen Posting entnehmen konntet, geht das Wachtum im gleichen Tempo fort: Im ersten Halbjahr hatten wir schon wieder ein Wachstum von 60% gegenüber der Vorjahresperiode in 2004.
2005-34; December 2, 2005
Recent Policy Issues Regarding Credit Risk Transfer
CRT mechanisms
Supervisory issues
Regulatory concerns
Conclusion
References
Download and Print PDF Version (51KB)
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Over the last decade, a variety of financial tools have been developed for transferring credit risk between financial institutions. Credit risk is defined as the risk that the value of a corporate loan (or debt obligation more generally) will decline due to a change in the borrower's ability to make payments, whether that change is an actual default or a change in the probability of default. Credit risk transfer (CRT) mechanisms range from outright selling of loans to credit derivatives that permit shifting credit risk without necessarily referencing specific loans.
As new varieties of CRT mechanisms have developed, so has the volume of CRT transactions, and this has increased liquidity in the underlying bond and loan markets. In conjunction with this growth, the policy issues surrounding CRT transactions have changed in important ways. For example, if a seller of a credit derivative fails to fulfill its contractual obligations, the purchaser of credit risk protection could unexpectedly find itself exposed again to that risk. In addition, regulatory concerns regarding CRT arise from the potential damage that might be caused by credit risk concentrations within the financial system. This Economic Letter provides a brief description of the common types of CRT mechanisms and reviews the policy issues surrounding their use, especially with respect to credit derivatives.
CRT mechanisms
In originating a commercial loan, the lender acquires much information on the borrower's overall financial condition and prospects of repayment. Two key issues for designing CRT mechanisms emerge from this information-gathering process. The first involves protecting the valuable, ongoing relationship the lender has forged with the borrower; specifically, the lender may want to be careful not to harm that relationship by raising the possibility of reducing its commitment to the borrower with a CRT transaction. The second involves the information advantage that the original lender has over potential counterparties to the CRT transaction; specifically, counterparties may be concerned that the original lender may conceal some relevant risks about the borrower. This issue is known as "adverse selection."
Both issues arise in the simplest CRT mechanism, the loan sale, in which a lender sells all of its obligations and future payments from a commercial loan to a third party. Given the covenants in such loans, borrowers typically must be informed of the sale, which could have an impact on the business relationship. In addition, the adverse selection problem is most clearly visible in this type of transaction. In fact, Dahiya et al. (2003) found that half of the public corporations whose loans were sold from 1995 to 2000 filed for bankruptcy within three years.
Loan syndication, in contrast, addresses these two issues directly. In a typical syndication, the lead bank (or banks) and the borrower agree on the terms of the loan, and the lead bank then assembles a syndicate of lenders. Syndicates can take several forms; for example, in a firm commitment syndicate, the loan amount is set, and the lead bank's share diminishes as more lenders join. Unlike loan sales, syndication allows the lead bank both to reduce its credit exposure to a borrower without damaging its business relationship and to avoid many adverse selection issues. After the syndication is completed, banks may sell their loan shares in the secondary market, either by assignment, which requires the consent of the borrower since the purchaser becomes a direct lender, or through participations in which the seller retains the relationship but passes the payments on to the purchaser.
Securitization is a third kind of CRT mechanism. Although more widely used for retail lending (such as through residential mortgage-backed securities), it is used increasingly for corporate lending. A traditional securitization involves transferring a pool of loans or other debt obligations to a third party, typically a corporate entity established just to own the loan pool, which then issues securities that are claims against the pool's interest and principal payments. Various securities tranches with differing degrees of risk are typically issued; for example, the best rated tranches would be very unlikely to experience payment disruptions regardless of the underlying pool's credit quality, while lower rated or unrated tranches would be more likely to be affected.
Investors in these securities, while not having a direct lending relationship with the underlying borrowers, are protected from the adverse selection problem through a series of contractual obligations placed on the pool's administrator and often through oversight provided by the rating agencies. With respect to the borrowers, the originating banks can, and often do, act as the servicer of the loan pool and hence can easily retain the lending relationship.
The fourth kind of CRT mechanism, and the most recently developed, is credit derivatives, which are financial instruments that transfer some or all of the credit risk of an underlying debt obligation or a borrower (or groups of obligations or borrowers) from one party to another without necessarily transferring the underlying asset; see Lopez (2001). Since their introduction in the mid-1990s, the credit derivatives market has grown dramatically. According to estimates by the British Banker's Association, the notional amount of credit derivatives outstanding grew from almost $600 billion in 1999 to approximately $5 trillion in 2004.
The two main types of credit derivatives are credit default swaps (CDS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). In a CDS transaction, the buyer of credit protection makes regular payments in exchange for a contingent payment in case a defined credit event, such as bankruptcy of the original borrower, occurs. While the contingent payment could be tied explicitly to the value of a specific debt obligation after the credit event, it could also be determined independently; that is, the contingent payment could be tied to the value of a specific loan in case a borrower defaults, or it could be tied simply to whether the borrower defaults. In this sense, CDS transactions are more like standard insurance contracts that protect the purchaser from an adverse event. Some industry estimates suggest that CDS transactions based on individual corporate borrowers make up about 60% of total credit derivatives volume.
Standard CDOs are structured much like debt securitizations: the lender transfers credit exposures to a specialized corporate entity that issues different tranches of securities with differing degrees of risk. The credit risk is then borne by the purchasers of the securities. The riskiest is the "equity" tranche. Investors in these securities are said to be in a "first loss" position, since their securities will be the first to lose value in case of a credit event. Typically, they contractually agree to absorb the first 3% to 7% of losses from the reference portfolio. The originator of the CDO often retains some of this tranche to signal confidence in the transaction and to reduce concerns about adverse selection. The second type of security typically consists of unrated debt securities, whose payments are more directly linked to the underlying loans. The third type consists of debt securities that are commonly over-collateralized to achieve a high credit rating and minimize repayment risk. These securities are referred to as the senior or "super-senior" tranches (i.e., senior to an AAA-rated tranche), because they incur losses only if all tranches subordinate to them have been exhausted. Contractual provisions give additional protection to senior tranches. Mechanically, if defaults cause the loan pool's value or interest proceeds to fall below certain trigger levels, cashflows from the loan payments are diverted to pay down the balances of senior tranches before more junior tranches can receive payments. The contractual terms governing the payout of interest and principal payments on the CDO's reference portfolio are known as the payments "waterfall."
An important recent development in the credit derivatives market is the growing use of "synthetic" CDOs, in which the pooled assets are a collection of CDS transactions that the specialized corporate entity has entered into with one or more lenders. While certainly more complicated than a standard securitization, the underlying economic and financial fundamentals remain the same. According to a report by the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group (CRMPG 2005), synthetic CDOs and related credit derivatives currently account for about 15% of the total market volume.
Credit derivatives need not impact the relationship between a borrower and a lender, since they may be structured so that the borrower is neither a party to the transaction nor aware of it. In fact, a loan need not be removed from the lender's balance sheet. In terms of adverse selection, issues remain, but credit derivatives address certain aspects, such as imposing requirements on the pool of borrowers in the reference portfolio and requiring the originator to retain some of the "first loss" position.
Supervisory issues
The more traditional forms of CRT, such as loan sales and syndication, have been around for some time, and many issues are already addressed by supervisory rules and experience. For example, the Federal Reserve System's Supervisory and Regulatory Letter 01-12 lays out explicit guidelines for accounting for loans held for sale. Securitization of residential and commercial real estate loans is also well established and widely monitored by public rating agencies.
However, the relatively new and rapidly expanding market for credit derivatives does give rise to some pressing supervisory policy issues. One such issue is whether a credit derivatives transaction establishes a complete credit risk transfer. Several factors could undermine these CRT transactions and negate their intended purpose. For example, since the seller of protection might fail to meet its obligations, the buyer must be careful to manage this counterparty risk. In addition, various legal issues, such as whether counterparties actually have the legal authority to enter into a transaction, could undermine a transaction. To address this concern, the Joint Forum (2005) report strongly calls for enhanced counterparty risk management, increased standardization of credit derivatives documentation, and diligent legal analysis of individual transactions.
Another key supervisory issue is the risks related to delays in processing the needed documentation. This issue was on the agenda at a recent meeting of leading participants in the credit derivatives market hosted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to discuss market practices with regard to assignments of trades and operational issues associated with confirmation backlogs. Industry participants have taken several steps to address these concerns (see CRMPG 2005).
Regulatory concerns
Regardless of the supervisory challenges regarding CRT mechanisms, supervisors generally are able to monitor whether undue concentrations of credit risk are building within supervised institutions. The larger regulatory question is how to detect and respond to such concentrations of risk developing in the financial system as a whole. The Joint Forum (2005) report did not find evidence of such "hidden concentrations" of credit risk in specific sectors of the financial system. However, to address this concern more generally, the report made several recommendations for improving the quality of public disclosures by market participants regarding their CRT transactions and the corresponding aggregate distribution of credit risks. While disclosures need to respect the legal frameworks within which individual financial institutions present their risk profiles, market participants should provide clear qualitative descriptions of the nature of their CRT activities. For example, such descriptions could provide summary information and breakdowns of credit exposures and CRT transactions by instrument type, borrower credit quality, industry, or geographic location.
Conclusion
The underlying economic fundamentals of credit risk transfer are clearly strong and should lead to an increased volume of transactions. Given the dual concerns of preserving lending relationships with borrowers and avoiding adverse selection issues, credit derivatives seem to be a promising avenue for development. While supervisory and regulatory concerns will always be present, prudent oversight of this market should be sufficient to avoid disruptions to the wider financial system.
Jose A. Lopez
Senior Economist
References
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1999. "Interagency Guidance on Loans Held for Sale." Supervisory and Regulatory Letter 01-12.
Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group II. 2005. "Toward Greater Financial Stability: A Private Sector Perspective." Manuscript.
Dahiya, S., M. Puri, and A. Saunders. 2003. "Bank Borrowers and Loan Sales: New Evidence on the Uniqueness of Bank Loans." Journal of Business 76, pp. 563-582.
Federal Reserve Bank of New York. 2005. "Statement Regarding Meeting on Credit Derivatives." Press release, September 15.
Lopez, J.A. 2001. "Financial Instruments for Mitigating Credit Risk." FRBSF Economic Letter 2001-34 (November 23).
The Joint Forum. 2005. "Credit Risk Transfer." Manuscript. Bank for International Settlements.
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Opinions expressed in this newsletter do not necessarily reflect the views of the management of the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco or of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Comments? Questions? Contact us via e-mail or write us at:
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
P.O. Box 7702
San Francisco, CA 94120
"Forum: Aktien | USA
Arnie
19.12.05, 19:42 Uhr (59 Klick(s))
ICGE negativ
Bei mir steht ICGE auf Sturm. Ich sehe bei 7,75 alle Dämme gebrochen und habe mit SL bei 7,65 verkauft.
Zuordnungen
Internet Capital Group Inc. Registered Shares DL -,001 US46059C2052 3-Monats-
Chart"
Ist das nur Aberglaube? Ich meine nein, vielmehr spielen die Marketmaker und Shortseller mit den blickenden und furzenden Bildchen, die der eine oder andere mit einem Programm für 39,95 aus dem Wie-werde-ich-Reich-Verlag erzeugt. Immer wenn sie verkaufen, um auch Leute wie den obigen Arnie zum Verkaufen anzuregen, damit sie wieder ihre Leerverkäufe eindecken können, solltet man beinhart kaufen. Ich habe Euch ja dazu in den letzten beiden Tagen in sehr massiver Form geraten. Logischerweise sind die Aktien aber auch jetzt noch sehr billig - seht Euch oben einmal meine Bewertungsversuche an.
Beteiligungen von Internet Capital: Credittrade.
Gigantische Chancen bei Kreditderivaten
werden in dem nachstehenden Tagungsprospekt deutlich, an dem vor allem die Aussage von dem Marktvolumen 8.000 Milliarden (= acht Billionen interessant ist). Das deckt sich von den Zahlen mit mit vorvorletzten Posting wo ich für 2004 ein Marktvolumen von 5 Billionen angeführt hatte (Quelle war die Federal Reserve Bank von San Francisco). Die geben hier jetzt acht Billionen an. Dabei haben sie offensichtlich die 60% Wachstum des ersten Halbjahrs 2005 auf das Gesamtjahr übertragen. Das hat sich aber wohl etwas abeschwächt, auch 7,5 Billionen sind ja schon ein stolze Zahl. Aber das zeigt auch, wie wichtig Credittrade schon für Internet Capital geworden ist, denn diese leichte Abschwächung im 3. Quartal führte bei den Kernbeteiligungen von Internet Capital schon zu einer vorübergehenden Umsatzstagnation. Auf Dauer ist aber Credittrade für Internet Capital ein Umsatztreiber schlechthin.
Bonner Akadamie, Frankfurt am Main, 8.-9. September
Credit Defaut Swaps
Credit Linked Notes
Total Return Swaps
Kreditoptionen
Kreditspread-Optionen
Collaterized Debt Obligations
Synthetische Verbriefungen
Kreditderivate bilden zur Zeit eines der interessantesten und am schnellsten wachsenden Marktsegmente. Ihr Marktvolumen ist im Zeitraum 1995 bis 2005 von nichts auf mehr als 8.000 Milliarden USD gewachsen.
Ziel dieses Seminar ist es, den Teilnehmern eine gründliche Einführung in diese Instrumente zu geben und ein gutes Verständnis für deren Preisbildung, Risiken und Anwendungsmöglichkeiten bei Risikotransfer und Arbitragegeschäften zu vermitteln
Ihr Nutzen: Sie können nach dem Seminar Kreditderivate qualifizierter einsetzen, bewerten, kontrollieren und prüfen.
Methodik: Lehrvorträge, Fallstudien und kleinere Übungen
Seminarleiter: Sören Plesner, CFA
Course Fee: EUR 1.100
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Einer der großen Spieler auf diesem Markt ist Broker und Informationenlieferant Credittrade. Internet Capital hält zwar nur 30% an Credittrade, aber bei einer Marktkapitalisierung von Internet Capital von nur 320 Millionen können die Wertsteigerungen dieser 30% enormen Einfluss haben.
Ich siedele zwar den Jahresumsatz von Credittrade für 2005 zwar "nur" bei 40 bis 50 Millonen an, aber das ist auch noch nicht das Ende der Fahnstange. Denn der Superschub kommt erst dann, wenn Basel II engültig implementiert ist. Angesichts der enormen Chancen halte ich für Credittrade ein Umsatzmultiple von 7 oder etwas mehr für angemessen.
Nettocash/Wertpapiere = 170 Millionen
ICGCommerce = 135 Millionen
Freeborders = 120 Millionen
Starcite = 115 Millionen
Credittrade = 95 Millionen
macht zusammen: 735 Millionen.
Bei der der Nr. 5 handelt es sich um eine Neuerwerbung, allerdings nur um eine bedingte. Denn Internet Capital hat für 42% an Metastorm dort seine Beteiligung Commercequest eingebracht, das reichte aber für diese 42% nicht, sodass auch noch Bargeld floss. Metastrom ist der größte Pure Play im Bereich des Business Process Management, dem im Softwarebereich mit die größten Wachstumschancen eingeräumt werden. in 2005 dürften sie vom Umsatz her irgendwo zwischen 40 und 50 Millionen landen. Wie bei allen Softwarefirmen lasst sich das Multiple nur schwer schätzen, sodass ich hier eher einmal den unteren Rand wähle und auf drei gehe, was einen Unternehmenswert von 135 Millionen bedeuten würde. Die 42% von Internet Capital wären dann 56 Millionen wert.
Nicht schlecht, aber doch schon erheblich weniger als bei den Big Four.
Nach nur 5 von 20 Beteiligungen sieht meine Rechung für Internet Capital wie folgt aus:
Nettocash/Wertpapiere = 170 Millionen
ICGCommerce = 135 Millionen
Freeborders = 120 Millionen
Starcite = 115 Millionen
Credittrade = 95 Millionen
Metastorm = 56 Millionen
macht zusammen: 791 Millionen.
Und noch stehen einige, teilweise auch werthaltige Beteiligungen aus, wenn auch die Einzelwerte der neu hinzugekommenen gegenbüer den ersten vier erheblich abfallen. Aber wir haben ja auch schon die Hausnummer von 791 Millionen.
gamko
20.12.05, 21:58 Uhr (21 Klick(s))
das war ja wiedermal ein toller verkauf
wieder genau im tief. irgendwie hast du es echt drauf. was wolltest du nochmal hier beweisen?
"Visitenkarte von jo
zuletzt Online 20.12.2005
Angaben zu
persönlichen
Interessen Meine Interesse liegen im Bereich der schnelle Geldvermehrung bzw. Kapitalaufbau für später. Dazu habe ich ein Seminar besucht dass Aktien und OS handeln in steigenden sowie fallenden Zeiten gewinne ermöglicht.Und das funktionniert sehr gut.!!! "
Wenn man schon seine Zielgruppe verändern möchte und an Leute mit hohem Know How und dickem Geldbeutel ran will, kann man auf Leute wie Jo nicht verzichten - und daher fliegst Du bald raus. Hast Du wirklich noch nie etwas von zielgruppenbezogener Segmentierung gehört? Kaufe Dir endlich einmal ein Buch oder mach oder Lehrgang wie Jo.
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Piaggio
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Rätsel 2 habe ich ja öfter angesprochen, nämlich den an den letzten Tagen doppelt so hohen Anteil der Institutionals an den Umsätzen, das Fast-Nichtvorhandensein privater Käufer und den dominiernen Anteil von sogenannten Non-I-watch bei Thomson Financial. Dass meine These für die letzten Tage stimmte, dass ein Institutional vom Shortseller kauft, wird nachstehend eindrucksvoll bestätigt. Dass einige Schulbubis das auf einigen deutschen Aktien-Kinder-Boards ins Lächerliche zu ziehen versuchten, hat Euch hoffentlich nicht davon abgehalten in den letzten Tagen zu den noch vorhandenen Sonderpreisen einzusteigen, die momentan aber immer noch sehr günstig ist. Wer der flexible Aufkaufer ist, der allein in der letzten Woche 900.000 Stück gekauft hat, wissen wir jetzt - und dass der Shortseller damit ein weiteres Stück tiefer in der Scheisse sitzt. Zehn Dollar bis zum Jahresende sind somit durchaus drin.
JEFF GENDELL reports 7.2% stake in ICGE
by: kcrw55
Long-Term Sentiment: Strong Buy 12/20/05 05:33 pm
Msg: 238773 of 238781
Source: www.insiderscore.com
12-20-05
Internet Capital Group (ICGE)
FILER: Gendell, Jeffrey - Et Al
New 5% Owner: Former dot-com high-flier Internet Capital Group (ICGE) has a new 5% owner.
Jeffrey Gendell's Tontine Capital disclosed yesterday that it now holds a 2.831 million shares, or 7.2%, stake in ICGE.
Tontine did not disclose when or at what price it purchased ICGE.
However, the firm held 1.658M shares of ICGE at the end of Q3, meaning it has bought a little more than 1.17M shares over the past twelve weeks.
With 39.31M shares outstanding, a 5% ownership stake in ICGE equals 1.965M shares, which Tontine surpassed on December 8th, suggesting the firm has been a fairly aggressive buyer of the stock over the past two weeks.
On December 8th, we highlighted CEO Walter Buckley's purchase of 7,500 ICGE shares at $7.91 to $8.02, and since then, Director Michael Zisman has taken down 13,000 shares at $7.98 to $8.00.
With no news on the tape in recent days, the stock has lost some momentum, falling from a December 8th close of $8.14 to a close of $7.60 yesterday. The stock is getting a little boost today, perhaps due to Tontine's disclosure.
Was spinnst du dir denn da mal wieder zusammen?
Löse doch erstmal das Rätsel, welche der folgenden Faktoren bei dir vorliegen (mindestens vier)
- übertriebene Empfindlichkeit auf Rückschläge und Zurücksetzungen;
- Neigung, dauerhaft Groll zu hegen, d.h. Beleidigungen, Verletzungen, oder Missachtungen werden nicht vergeben;
- Misstrauen und eine anhaltende Tendenz, Erlebtes zu verdrehen, indem neutrale oder freundliche Handlungen anderer als feindlich oder verächtlich missdeutet werden;
- Streitbarkeit und beharrliches, situationsunangemessenes Bestehen auf eigenen Rechten;
- häufiges ungerechtfertigtes Misstrauen gegenüber der sexuellen Treue des Ehe- oder Sexualpartners;
- ständige Selbstbezogenheit, besonders in Verbindung mit starker Überheblichkeit;
- häufige Beschäftigung mit unbegründeten Gedanken an Verschwörungen als Erklärungen für Ereignisse in der näheren oder weiteren Umgebung.
Gute Besserung wünscht gamko
JEFF GENDELL's track record --> WOW !
by: kcrw55
Long-Term Sentiment: Strong Buy 12/20/05 05:37 pm
Msg: 238774 of 238782
Nov-Dec 2005
Tontine Partners - Jeff Gendell
Holdings Report
-----------------------
Gendell has one $400 million position, three $300 million positions, and multiple other $100 million positions.
In 2004, Jeff Gendell's Tontine Partners rose a Herculean 101.4% percent, after jumping 197% percent in 2003.
Gendell has amassed about $3.6 billion in assets, and makes money by investing in overlooked financials: small banks and thrifts.
Last year he cashed in on bets on homebuilders, steel, and cyclicals.
Gendell was a Wharton MBA who spent seven years as a general partner at Leon Levy (the Goldman Sach's legend) and Jack Nash's Odyssey Partners before starting Tontine Associates in January 1997.
LINK:
http://www.hedgeinsider.com/?q=node/...e1eba9b52d1173980eb259662f6956 2
Da hast du aber wirklich Glück, vielleicht ist bei einer derart guten Versorgung noch ein bißchen was zu retten
Lass doch bei deinem nächsten Besuch diese Symptome bitte gleich mit abklären:
"Ein paranoider Mensch glaubt oft, dass andere beabsichtigen, ihn zu schädigen, zu betrügen oder auch zu töten. Oft kann er dafür auch "Beweise" präsentieren, die für ihn völlig überzeugend scheinen, für Außenstehende dagegen überhaupt nichts besagen. Diese Überzeugungen sind wahnhaft. Der Patient ist durch nichts von ihnen abzubringen, rationale Argumente und Überzeugungsversuche von Außenstehenden haben keinen Erfolg."
Das muss dir doch bekannt vorkommen, oder funktioniert die Verdrängung tatsächlich so perfekt? Für Außenstehende ist sowas tatsächlich nur sehr schwer vorstellbar.
1 Nutzer wurde vom Verfasser von der Diskussion ausgeschlossen: Scansoft