WMIH + Cooper Info
Re: WMI's Loan File ~ Some (MBS) Basic Mechanics'
Zitat Bobwatch:
http://foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/?p=469
Article Quote below:
"OUT OF THE MOUTH OF JPMORGAN CHASE: SCHEDULE OF LOANS PURCHASED FROM WAMU DOES NOT EXIST; NO ASSIGNMENTS OF MORTGAGE, NO ALLONGES OR ANY EVIDENCE OF TRANSFERRING OWNERSHIP OF LOANS FROM WAMU TO CHASE
AUGUST 21, 2012
August 21, 2012
Confirming, under oath and in print what we already suspected: there is no schedule of mortgage loans evidencing what JPM allegedly “purchased” from the FDIC in connection with the failure of WaMu. This is from the sworn deposition testimony of Lawrence Nardi, the operations unit manager and a mortgage officer for JPM, who was previously with WaMu and was picked up by JPM after WaMu’s failure. The 330 page deposition was taken by counsel for the homeowner on May 9, 2012 in the matter of JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. as successor in interest to Washington Mutual Bank v. Waisome, Florida 5th Judicial Circuit Case No. 2009-CA-005717.
Here is the question and the answer:
Q: (page 57, beginning at line 19): Okay. The — are you aware of any type of schedule of loans that would have been created to represent the — either the loans that were asset loans or the loans that were serviced by WAMU? Are you — was the — do you know if there is a schedule or database of loans like that?
A: (page 58, beginning at line 1): I know that there was a schedule contemplated in certain documents related to the purchase. That schedule has never materialized in any form. We’ve looked for it in countless other cases. We’ve never been able to produce it in any previous cases. It would certainly be a wonderful thing to have, but it’s — as far as I know, it doesn’t exist, although it was — it was contemplated in the documents.
As we all know, JPM has also stated, in a Federal Court filing, that it is NOT the “successor in interest to WaMu.” However, the deposition testimony gets even better as the day went on:
Q: (beginning at page 260, line 18): Have you ever in your duties of being a loan analyst — a loan operations specialist, have you ever seen an FDIC bill of sale or a receiver’s deed or an assignment of mortgage or an allonge?
A: (page 260, beginning at line 23): For loans, I’m assuming you’re taling about the WaMu loan that was subject to the purchase here.
Q: (page 261, line 1): Right.
A: (page 261, beginning at line 2): No there is no assignments of mortgage. There’s no allonges. There’s no — in the thousands of loans that I have come into contact with that were a part of this purchase, I’ve never once seen an assignment of mortgage. There is simply not — they don’t exist. Or allonges or anything transferring ownership from WAMU to Chase, in other words. Specifically, endorsements and things like that.
So, JPM allegedly “purchased” mortgage loans from the FDIC out of the WaMu failure, but there is no schedule of what loans were purchased, no assignments, no allonges, no endorsements, nothing that transferred ownership of the loans from WaMu to Chase. However, as we all know, JPM goes around the country touting that it is the “successor in interest to WaMu” (which it has admitted in Federal Court that it is not) and relies on the amorphous “FDIC Affidavit” which, as far as what the “Affidavit” is proffered for, is directly contradicted by the sworn deposition testimony of JPM’s authorized representative WHO WAS FORMERLY WITH WAMU AND WAS PICKED UP BY JPM.
Fraud on the courts, anyone?
Jeff Barnes, Esq.,
http://www.foreclosuredefensenationwide.com/
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Trust for WaMu creditors sues former officers and directors
http://seattletimes.com/html/businesstechnology/...amulawsuitxml.html
MfG.L:)
http://investor.shareholder.com/jpmorganchase/...cfm?ReleaseID=875917
Zitat:
JPMorgan Chase Reports Third-Quarter 2014 Net Income of $5.6 Billion, or $1.36 Per Share, on Revenue1 of $25.2 Billion
13% Return on Tangible Common Equity1
The Firm delivered strong underlying performance for the quarter2
Consumer & Community Banking: average Consumer & Business Banking deposits up 9%; credit card sales volume1 up 12%; record client investment assets up 16%; Business Banking loan originations up 27%
Corporate & Investment Bank: maintained #1 ranking for Global Investment Banking fees with 8.0% wallet share YTD; assets under custody up 8%
Commercial Banking: period-end loan balances up 6%, driven by 13% growth in Commercial Real Estate; record YTD gross investment banking revenue with Commercial Banking clients up 22%
Asset Management: twenty-second consecutive quarter of positive net long-term client flows; assets under management up 11%; average loan balances up 16%
Third-quarter results included as a significant item $1.0 billion after-tax Firmwide legal expense3 ($0.26 per share after-tax decrease in earnings; $1.1 billion pretax expense)
Approximately $3.0 billion returned to shareholders in 3Q14
Repurchased $1.5 billion of common equity4
Common stock dividend of $0.40 per share
Maintained fortress balance sheet
Common Equity Tier 11,5 of $163 billion, or ratio of 10.1%, up from 9.8% in 2Q14
Strong liquidity - compliant with final U.S. LCR6 - HQLA7 of $572 billion
Firm Supplementary Leverage Ratio ("SLR")1 of 5.5%
Core loans1 up 7% compared with the prior year
JPMorgan Chase supported consumers, businesses and our communities
$1.6 trillion of credit and capital1 raised for the first nine months of 2014
......
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat doo_dilettante:
JPM penalties and losses so far:
6 Billion London Whale
20 Billion Settlements MBS etc.
1 Billion Forex Manipulation Reserve
XX Billion Libor Manipulation
x Billion Damages from Cyber Security!?
just to name the big hitters...
And this is called a BANK?! For me it is a criminal institution and it is using the WAMU profits to survive. Mr. Obama, please close or nationalize it and give it a good cleaning!
May be something is going on in the background - JPM is dropping like a rock the last few days. Lost already 15 billion in market cap!
----------------------------
Zitat dixdeau:
Due to an unintentional early release of JPMC's 10 filing the simultaneous pre programmed CC that was to obfuscate and/or explain away 'anomalies or minor setbacks' did not occur so investors had to think for themselves. IMO
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
D&O Insurance: Delaware Supreme Court Rules WaMu Liquidating Trust Coverage Suit Not Yet Ripe
Zitat :
By Kevin LaCroix on May 29, 2014
Posted in D & O Insurance
In a May 28, 2014 opinion (here), the Delaware Supreme Court held that an action by the bankrupt Washington Mutual bank holding company’s liquidating trust seeking a judicial declaration of coverage under the bank’s D&O insurance program for claims asserted by the trust against the failed bank’s directors and officers must be dismissed on ripeness grounds. The Court determined that the parties’ dispute “has not yet assumed a concrete or final form” and therefore that “any judicial determination at this stage would necessarily amount to an impermissible advisory opinion.”
Background
In the days just before WaMu’s collapse in September 2008, the bank holding company made a $500 million “downstream” capital contribution in what proved to be a futile attempt to alleviate the bank’s liquidity crisis. The FDIC took control of the bank on September 28, 2008 and the bank holding company filed for bankruptcy. Following the bankruptcy filing, the committee of unsecured creditors sent the holding company’s former directors and officers a demand letter, asserting that the downstream capital contribution was wrongful and had been made in breach of their fiduciary duties and seeking damages.
For the policy period May 1, 2007 to May 1, 2008, WaMu’s bank holding company (hereafter, WaMu) had a $250 million D&O insurance program arranged in twelve layers. For the following period, May 1, 2008 to May 1, 2009, WaMu had a separate $250 million D&O insurance tower also consisting of twelve layers.
The former directors and officers to whom the creditors committee had sent the demand letter submitted it to the D&O insurers. The primary insurer denied coverage for the creditors’ committees claims under its 2008-09 policy; however, the insurer indicated that the claims would be covered under the 2007-08 program. The directors and officers have incurred defense fees in connection with the creditors committees’ claims which have been paid under the 2007-08 program. However, due to the numerous claims arising out of WaMu’s collapse, the 2007-08 program has been significantly depleted.
To date, the trust has not initiated any formal legal action against the former directors and officers to enforce the claims arising from the downstream capital contribution.
In October 2012, the liquidating trust, as successor to the creditors’ committee’s claims, filed an action in Delaware Superior Court disputing the insurers’ denial of coverage under the 2008-09 policies. The trust asserted three claims: one alleging breach of contract and another alleging breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing for the denial of coverage under the 2008-09 policies, and a third claim seeking a judicial declaration that coverage under the 2008-09 policies is available for the claims concerning the downstream capital contribution and that the $50 million retention on the primary policy does not apply.
The insurers moved to dismiss the trust’s lawsuit arguing that the trust lacks standing to assert the first two claims and that the trust’s declaratory judgment claim does not allege an “actual controversy” that is ripe for adjudication. The trial court denied the insurers’ motion to dismiss, based on its determination that the trust has standing and that the declaratory judgment action presents a claim that is ripe for adjudication. The insurers sought leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal, which the trial court granted. The Delaware Supreme Court accepted the interlocutory appeal.
The May 28 Opinion
In a May 28, 2014 opinion by Justice Jack B. Jacobs, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the court below and remanded the case to the trial court to be dismissed without prejudice. The Supreme Court found that the dispute was not yet ripe for resolution because it has “not yet reached a concrete or final form” and therefore “any judicial resolution at this stage would necessarily be based on speculation and hypothetical facts, and ultimately could prove unnecessary.” Because the Court resolved the appeal on the basis of the ripeness issue, the Court did not address the question of whether or not the trust had standing to assert the claims.
The ripeness doctrine under which the Supreme Court dismissed the case is sometimes expressed in the adage that the courts “do not render advisory or hypothetical opinions.” The purpose of the principle is to “conserve limited judicial resources” and to “avoid rendering a legally binding decision that could result in premature and possibly unsound lawmaking.”
To illustrate the point that “any judicial determination at this stage would necessarily amount to an impermissible advisory opinion,” the Court reviewed a series of hypotheticals. It could turn out, for example, that the trust might decide not to initiate a legal action against the directors and officers. Or, if the trust files a lawsuit, the directors and officers might prevail. Even if the trust were to file a lawsuit and ultimately obtain a settlement or judgment, determination in the case could affect the availability of coverage and could even affect the applicability of the retention.
Because the court determined that the parties’ dispute is not yet ripe for resolution, the court determined that the trust’s claims for breach of contract and breach of the implied duties of good faith and fair dealing are also not yet ripe. As the court noted, it would be “logically inconsistent for this Court to rule that a dispute is not sufficiently ripe to warrant entertaining a declaratory judgment claim, yet is sufficiently ripe to warrant entertaining and deciding claims for contractual breach.”
Discussion
WaMu’s collapse was the largest bank failure in U.S. history and its demise led to a flood of litigation. (To see my views about the bank failure at the time it occurred, refer here.) Among other things, the collapse has led to extensive coverage litigation. As discussed here, one of the recurring insurance coverage disputes is whether or not the various lawsuit are all interrelated and therefore trigger only the single tower of D&O insurance that was in force at the time the first claim was made or whether the second tower of insurance was also triggered. The question of whether or not the second tower has been triggered is significant because defense costs and settlement amounts have largely exhausted the first tower.
The coverage lawsuit the liquidating trust filed is another effort to try to get at the second tower of insurance. The creditors’ committee’s and the liquidation trust’s claims against the former WaMu directors and officers over the downstream capital contribution come down to a bid to try to nab some of the insurance money in the second insurance tower. Since the 2007-08 tower of insurance is substantially depleted, the liquidating trust’s claims against the former directors and officers only have value if the liquidating trust can hope to recover against the 2008-09 insurance program. The liquidating trust filed this coverage lawsuit because if it can’t get at the second tower of insurance, its claims aren’t worth bringing.
The Supreme Court recognized that what the trust was really trying to do with its coverage action was to try to find out if it would be worth filing a lawsuit against the individual directors and officers. The Supreme Court observed that “the Trust’s only interest in having its dispute litigated now is apparently to receive judicial guidance about how much coverage would be available to the Ds&Os if the Trust were to initiate litigation against them.”
However, the Court said, while the trust was seeking guidance, it was doing so “not as a contractual counterparty seeking to vindicate the D&Os’ contractual rights, but rather as a potential claimant against the Ds&Os.” The trust’s desire to “receive advice” is “not a cognizable interest that will justify a Delaware court exercising its jurisdiction to decide this dispute.”
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the lower court to have it dismissed — but dismissed without prejudice. In other words, if the liquidating trust manages to get a settlement from or judgment against the former WaMu directors and officers on its claims, the trust would then be free to reinstitute its coverage action. It will only be at that point that the trust will find out whether or not it can get at the second tower. The trust will have to figure out if the costs and effort required to get to that point are worth the effort, especially allowing for the possibility that the trust could go through all of the intervening steps and then find out in the end that there wasn’t any coverage under the second tower any way.
Special thanks to a loyal reader for providing me with a copy of the Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion.
-----------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6350.msg81187#msg81187
Zitat jberg2_99:
Good to see something come of this. For the longest time, I was the only one hammering the Debtors about
this and other similar issues after Judge Walrath declined to release the directors. Eventually, at a later
confirmation hearing, the EC and TPS pounded away at the Debtors for signing agreements with potential
defendants just before that confirmation hearing. It was lots of fun seeing them take the ball and run
with it...
As I remember it, there were two D&O policies, $250M for each relevant year. The insurance companies were
claiming that the seizure and related issues were all one event, so were only responsible for the first $250M.
What the WMILT is attempting with this lawsuit is to show clearly that there are separate grounds for going
after the other $250M of insurance, plus whatever they can get from the defendants themselves.
And yes, Does 1-30 refer to 30 unknown people who may have had access to the relevant information about
WMB's liquidity.
Re: monetary transactions being recoverable: that boat has already sailed as we specifically released that item
in the confirmed plan of reorganization. But while we can't get the money back from JPM, we can and should
try to get it from the directors and that $250M insurance policy.
-----------------------------
Zitat dixdeau:
Aside;
There must be a corollary to the universal theory ' everything happens at the same time' which provides that the same time will the most inopportune one.
Leaving aside;
If WMI released recoverable funds in the interests of a settlement does that remove the half billion dollar injury to WMI for which the D&O could be liable?
Apparently S&G thinks it does not. What will the insurance company and covered parties position be?
----------------------------
ZItat kenwalker:
This will get confusing as LT is the injured third party(?) and who pays the self-insured retention obligation of advance defense costs .............. LT?
Will we be suing ourselves to spend ( waste ) the retention fee in order to collect on the policies as the injured party?
Don't follow this one too close, it will make your head hurt. But ............ it might just be a source of information.
-----------------------------
Zitat jberg2_99:
As I see it, they should have a decent shot at the $250M in insurance...
I don't know the value of claims remaining before equity, but just to come up with a likely maximum,
let's assume that the claims above equity have already been paid and that we recover $250M but
nothing from the directors. We might get lucky there, but I have no idea how likely it could be. Also,
to make it easy, assume they are required to cover attorney's fees so we don't have to account for
them. These aren't necessarily good assumptions, but at least we can get a ballpark number...
So we take $250M, split 75/25 Preferred/Common, giving Preferred (TPS, PQs, KQs) a total of $187.5M
to distribute to approximately $7B of preferred. Dividing the former by the latter and multiplying by
the $1000 liquidation preference works out to $26.78 per PQ. That doesn't sound like a lot, but for
many of us the net result could be significant.
If we use the same assumptions but assume they get the full $500M they're asking for, then that
number would double to $53.57 per PQ.
But all of this ignores the fact that those in Class 18 haven't yet been fully paid, and that they will
greedily fight for whatever they can get, whether deserving or not. So my approach has been to
expect the worst, but hope for the best. They must think they've got a chance to recover at least
something, or they wouldn't have tried in the first place...
----------------------------
Zitat jberg2_99:
Quote from: dixdeau on Yesterday at 11:19:21 PM
If WMI released recoverable funds in the interests of a settlement does that remove the half billion dollar injury to WMI for which the D&O could be liable?
Apparently S&G thinks it does not. What will the insurance company and covered parties position be?
Clearly the insurance company will adopt the position that we've released JPM and so taken blame for some or all of the damage
as a result of accepting a settlement. Of course Susman Godfrey will counter that it was in fact the negligence of the directors
and officers in making the downstream which resulted in the $500M in damages, and that given the particular nature of their
negligence embroiled WMI in years of costly litigation in an attempt to recover even a small fraction of our damages.
They would also argue that this should have been foreseeable, particularly given the highly regulated banking industry and the
nature of FDIC Receiverships where litigation options are strictly limited. WMI would then argue that from a time-value-of-money
perspective, they had actually saved the insurance company money by attempting to mitigate the damages by obtaining a
settlement now rather than years or decades later.
----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
D&O insurance has different ways it can be applied but generally it is for the protection of directors and officers against a third party suit of wrong doing. Damages are obvious, question is were they caused by D&O's wrong doing? The next question is LT a third party ( I think that has been answered as yes ). Then you have a number of questions involving solvency and the self-insured retention that was put back but never used, and the fact that the D&O were never defended in court ( does BK court count? ) which is part of what that insurance is for. Either D&O screwed up or they didn't and they decide / forced to defend their actions.
I see some answers ( and money ) coming. Don't forget the depositions. Now, let's talk about timing ...........
Revision: Settlement, thanks for the artical tdmd99
-----------------------------
Zitat CharlienDude:
Quote from: dixdeau on Yesterday at 11:19:21 PM
Aside;
There must be a corollary to the universal theory ' everything happens at the same time' which provides that the same time will the most inopportune one.
Leaving aside;
If WMI released recoverable funds in the interests of a settlement does that remove the half billion dollar injury to WMI for which the D&O could be liable?
Apparently S&G thinks it does not. What will the insurance company and covered parties position be?
Wouldn't the favorable lawsuit of the FDIC against the D&Os prior to plan confirmation set a precedent since they were also a party to the GSA?
----------------------------
Zitat dixdeau:
Good point.
Isn't that action the cause of depletion of the first tower?
An argument, in addition to jberg's above, that bites of the apple should be allowed to all injured parties not just the government entities?
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
was pssiert hier in letzter Zeit (Wochen, Monate, Jahre) mit dem Fall WAMU
1. Wir durchlaufen ein inzeniertes Chapter 11 ("gezielt gesteuertes Konkursverfahren")
2. Haben es wie durch ein Wunder geschafft mit diversen Escrows beglückt worden zu sein
3. gleichzeitig umgetauschte neue WMIH Anteile (sind nicht der Rede wert, da sie JEDER danach hätte erwerben können!)
4. Konkursverfahren läuft langsam aber sicher den vorgegebenen zeitlichen juristischen Rahmenbedingungen ab und wir erreichen mMn. die nächste Stufe...
5. Offiziell wurde alles wie vorgeschrieben abgearbeitet - man hat sich gegenseitig befragt und beklagt und es wurde NICHTS erwähnenswertes gefunden... also lassen wir die Sache so langsam aber sicher die nächsten Jahre mit kleinen Aufschüben, Miniklagen, Zuständigkeitsgehabe und was weis der Teufel noch auslaufen...
6. Interessant - ist für mich bei der ganzen Sache eines:
SUSMAN und Co. sind Anwälte vom Feinsten!!!
ich sehe aber bis dato nix feines...ausser!!!
man lenkt sich die ganze Sache so wie man sie braucht ! in dem mann: wenn schon nicht offiziell aussage von Seiten GS, FDIC, JPM usw. wird halt hinterher im stillen weitergestöbert incl. den jetzigen Befragungen(Anklagen wia Trust gegen die Herrn Direktoren, wo es mMn. nicht um das Versicherungsgeld der Jungs geht (was hier heute schon wiedre hoch und runter und breit gerechnet/diskutiert wurde sondern ...hier will man lediglich INFO `s haben !!!
Einer nach dem anderen wird meiner Meinung nach "befragt/abgeklopft" von seitens Susman und Co. !
Hier wird mMn. im ganz großen Still die Parteien einzeln nacheinander auseinandergenommen um sie dann anschließend wieder gegenseitig auszuspielen für welches Resultat kann sich jeder denken!!!
(WARUM SOLLTE MAN SICH MIT JEDEM LANGE RUMSTREITEN/KLAGEN ...würde alles nur sinnlos verlängern !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
IMMER daran denken wie es in US und A abläuft ...SCHULDIG darf nicht auf dem Abschlußpapier stehen - also gib dem Gegener Luft zum Atmen und das macht Susman in meinen Augen...
MfG.L:)
"FDIC Purchase and Assumption Agreements
By Daniel Edstrom
DTC Systems, Inc.
Along with the large number of failed banks, there are a large number of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Purchase and Assumption Agreements. The National Consumer Law Center was kind enough to publish many of them at the following web page:
http://www.nclc.org/issues/...purchase-and-assumption-agreements.html
Here is the list of Purchase and Assumption Agreements available, as well as some other information:
Purchase and Assumption Agreements "
See
http://dtc-systems.net/2013/06/fdic-purchase-assumption-agreements/
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat Uncle_Bo:
What is going on is that the reality sets in...IMHO.
The BOD did not promise anything at the shareholder meeting in terms of when M&A can happen and technically the timeframe is by the end of 2016. The impatient ones are bailing out and taking their money elsewhere for the time being. The rest of us sit and watch in frustration as the price drops in. We have, at least theoretically, a tool for recourse at the next meeting, but then the question becomes who do we elect the BOD - suggestions ?
On the business side, I am curious to see the lending facility provided by the creditors expires in mid March 2015 and it is not renewed. This would be an indication the clearly KKR is in the driver's seat. They are really the entity with M&A experience, not Tepper and they have to go shop for a company, but also a management team they can work with (maybe they are doing it already). This would bring more dilution as they need to incentivize this new management team - not a whole lot but some dilution. It may also be beneficial to have another 10K filing for a complete 2014 from a filing / listing requirements perspective - maybe...
I know we all hope for a press release, a hint, something that shows that we are not left out in the cold. However, this is not the goal of this BOD. Whatever is happening, it is interesting in that the current majority holders that we know of are not increasing their holdings - we do not see 13G filings, although they could as long as they are below 50% point increase from their holdings. On the other hand we don't know who if anyone is buying into the stock to the extent it is below 4.5% as provided by the bylaws.
And last, but not lease I do not expect billions to flow from WMILT into WMIH as some posters have suggested.
Added shares at the recent weakness and staying invested, but monitoring the events very carefully. The BOD better takes action before the next shareholder meeting. Yes, they have shares, but they really haven't paid for them.
GLTA
Uncle Bo
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
- clearstream
- citi
betreffend registrierung meiner positionen erhalten.
falls jemand seiner bank mit diesen kontakten auf die sprünge helfen will bitte kontakt per BM.
ich möchte diese kontakte nicht hier im forum breittreten...
so looong *klonk*
/paketix
Historical Short Selling Data For WMIH
DateVolShorted High Low Close ShortVol§ RegularVol
Oct 15 5.25% 2.15 2.07 2.08 11,100 211,355
Oct 14 26.76% 2.20 2.00 2.09 55,400 207,011
Oct 13 10.91% 2.23 2.00 2.05 71,125 651,811
Oct 10 14.00% 2.30 2.13 2.17 37,940 271,070
Oct 09 4.26% 3.31 2.29 2.30 9,217 216,165
Oct 08 4.41% 2.36 2.30 2.35 7,016 159,111
Oct 07 11.99% 2.48 2.32 2.37 19,305 161,032
Oct 06 31.23% 2.50 2.41 2.42 37,384 119,719
Oct 03 29.04% 2.55 2.42 2.50 21,786 75,019
Oct 02 47.15% 2.65 2.30 2.46 75,649 160,459
Oct 01 16.27% 2.66 2.40 2.45 19,065 117,182
Sep 30 8.88% 2.70 2.55 2.67 10,710 120,541
Sep 29 9.64% 2.69 2.55 2.69 6,350 65,885
Sep 26 8.49% 2.75 2.35 2.69 19,756 232,608
Sep 25 34.02% 2.35 2.31 2.35 80,397 236,301
Sep 24 14.79% 2.43 2.25 2.32 83,143 562,075
Sep 23 35.51% 2.55 2.39 2.43 133,278 375,326
Sep 22 26.37% 2.57 2.42 2.54 44,623 169,212
Sep 19 13.20% 2.61 2.53 2.57 38,138 288,984
Sep 18 28.58% 2.64 2.60 2.62 42,756 149,577
Sep 17 27.32% 2.67 2.60 2.64 60,295 220,727
Sep 16 56.45% 2.68 2.63 2.65 235,381 416,944
MfG.L:)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/index.php?topic=6371.msg81469#msg81469
Zitat Kszabo:
It doesn't look much different than the 6/30/14 version.
Failed Bank Information WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK - Receivership Balance Sheet Summary (Unaudited)
Fund Code: 10015
Failure Date: 09/25/2008
For Period Ending September 30, 2014
(in $000's)
Assets Current
Balance
Cash and Investments $ 2,755,160
Due from FDIC Corp and Receivables 0
Assets in Liquidation 0
Estimated Loss on Assets in Liquidation (1) 0
Liabilities Current
Balance
Administrative Liabilities $ 14,528
FDIC Subrogated Deposit Claim 0
Uninsured Deposit Claims 0
Other Claimant Liabilities 13,819,859
Unproven Claims 0
Total Liabilities (2) $ 13,834,387
Net Worth (Deficit) (11,079,227)
Total Assets $ 2,755,160
Total Liabilities and Net Worth $ 2,755,160
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK - Receivership Claims Detail Summary (Unaudited)
Proven Deposit Claims Claim
Balance %
FDIC Subrogated Claim $ 151,150,664 100%
Uninsured Depositors 0 0%
SubTotal - Proven Deposit Claims $ 151,150,664 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 151,150,664 100%
Other Claimants Claim
Balance %
General Creditor $ 19,250 0.14%
Senior Debt Holders 6,077,557 43.98%
Subordinated Debt Holders 7,723,052 55.88%
SubTotal - Other Claimants $ 13,819,859 100%
Less: Dividends Paid to Date 0 0.00%
Total Unpaid Deposit Claims $ 0 0%
Total Unpaid Other Claimants $ 13,819,859 100%
(1) Valuation of Assets/Loss Allowances: Assets of the receivership are shown at values representing cash on deposit or the book value of amounts invested; the principal balance of loans, notes, other debt instruments or receivables (note that interest on these assets is not accrued after failure but is recognized when received); the foreclosed value of real and/or personal property or the book value of assets (cost less depreciation or amortization through date of the institution’s failure); and the historical cost of the net investment in subsidiaries, partnerships or joint ventures, adjusted where appropriate to reflect the receivership’s portion of the underlying net earnings or losses. An Estimated Loss on Assets is provided when anticipated future asset disposition proceeds, including associated expenses, are less than recorded amounts. Future asset disposition proceeds are generally estimated by determining, via sampling or recent disposition activity, the recovery rates for similar assets across all receiverships. However, actual recovery rates for this receivership may differ according to the quality and type of individual asset, as well as over time with changing market conditions. Accordingly, the gains or losses ultimately realized for this receivership will likely vary from amounts estimated.
(2) The Total Liabilities line item reflects those actual and accrued liabilities recorded on the accounting records of this receivership as of the date of this report. The Total Liabilities line item may not include other liabilities arising from Estimated Interest on Claims and Income Taxes, as these liabilities may not be recognized as of the report date, in accordance with current receivership accounting practices.
Back to Failed Bank Page
Back to Failed Bank Information Page
General Disclaimer
Last Updated 10/16/2014 Customer Service
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Quote from: azcowboy on Today at 11:47:28 AM
DISCLAIMER: .... Beware' everyone that gets their DD from, talking points, message boards and luncheons' ... This ... "will" ... actually involve, some' comprehensive study and reading of an actual filed document', ... and procedures'
just sayin'
AZ
So far' .. my favorite ~ Due Dilegence post'
Antwort dazu von User CSNY Zitat:
Here's the definition:
"Settlement Date" means the first Business Day immediately prior to the day which is one hundred eighty (180) days after Bank Closing, or such other date prior thereto as may be agreed upon by the Receiver and the Assuming Bank. The Receiver, in its discretion, may extend the Settlement Date. (Emphasis added.)
Maybe someone would like to file a FOIA request to see it a Settlement Date has occurred. As the WMB receivership is not normal one would not expect matters to be resolved within the normal 180 day window. Finally, and for the removal of doubt, Sections 13.12 and 13.13 contain explicit survival provisions stating that termination has no effect on the duty of either party to make a required payment.
----------------------------
Zitat Kszabo:
If anyone is interested here is 13.12 - 13.13.
13.12 Term of
Agreement.
This Agreement shall continue in full force and effect until
the sixth (6th) anniversar of
Ban Closing; provided, that the provisions of
Section 6.3 and 6.4
shall survive the expiration of
the term ofthis Agreement. Provided, however, the receivership of
the Failed Ban may be terminated prior to the expiration of
the term of
this Agreement; in such
event, the guaranty of
the Corporation, as provided in and in accordance with the provisions of
Section 12.7 shall be in effect for the remainder of
the term. Expiration of
the term of
this
Agreement shall not affect any claim or liability of any pary with respect to any (i) amount
which is owing at the time of
such expiration, regardless of
when such amount becomes payable,
and (ii) breach ofthis Agreement occurrng prior to such expiration, regardless of
when such
breach is discovered.
13.13 Survival of Covenants, Etc. The covenants, representations, and waranties in
this Agreement shall survive the execution of
this Agreement and the consummation of
the
transactions contemplated hereunder.
-----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Still waiting. Tried calling back on another line simultaneously - got answering machine for a Mr. Andrew Gray - whose message said he left FDIC for a position at JPM-- WTF - U all probably knew that - but I didn't! Tried the other number they had listed and was told by answering party it wasn't FDiC but a private cell # - I checked that 2X to make sure I hadn't made a mistake. Mean while Millie still has me on hold. My blood is beginning to boil!
All right everyone - let's keep our fingers crossed. I actually called the main FDIC number and reached the Ombudsman - Robert Brown. After speaking with him for 2 minutes - I realized he had no idea what was going on. Apparently all he knew was that everything was closed - bought and sold by JPM - done deal. I gave him a short synapsis about what was going on - how equity survived per POR 7 and how Sept. 25 2014 was a very important date to thousands of shareholders worldwide who have been sitting in the dark for 6+ years waiting for any information regarding their investments. I told him I'd be happy if he could just tell me if there was an extension for the 9/25 date - or per Distro's question - if he knew anything about the Safe Harbor Assets -- and that I believed, as well as many other shareholders, that their may be other assets - and what was the status with the FDIC or FDIC-R at this time. He told me he was going to look into this - at least find me the correct person who would have info - took my name and number and promised to get back. NOW - I need to know (cause I'm nowhere near as well versed as many of you) what exactly I need to ask if in fact someone calls me back. If someone else would like to follow up with Mr. Brown you can reach him by calling 877-275-3342 and click on the extension for complaints/Ombudsman. Also - called back the other number that supposedly was a cell - spoke to the guy - turns out he did work for the FDIC until just recently (didn't get his name) but he is the one who pointed me in the direction of the Ombudsman.
----------------------------
Zitat noname:
Thanks for your efforts and help for all of us. You can request for the below information if you can.
1. Is the P&A between JPM and FDIC is terminated on 09/25?.
2. Initial payment of 1.89B was made to FDIC, as per P&A final amounts were to be made.Any idea on the final payment?.
3. Is there a list of assets which were sold to JPM and a list of assets reside at FDIC?
4. As per priority, will there be any distribution to equity holders of WMB( or WMI) from FDIC?
-----------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Ob die FDIC (also dieser Robert Brown) ihm allerdings ne Auskunft zur 6-jahres Frist geben wird?
Wenn es möglich ist, bleib da mal dran. Es ist auf alle Fälle wichtig zu sehen, was die FDIC offiziell dazu rausgibt!
LG
Zitat amd4001967:
Any Assets that belonged to WMI taken by mistake by the FDIC in the process of the seizure in 9/2008 must be returned to WMILT as successor in interest to WMI irrespective of the liability that the FDIC has to the WMB Bondholders and the DB litigation. That is why the escrows accounts can see some type of recovery before the Bank Bonds. IMO
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat dmrm57:
Has anyone here spoken with Andrew Siegel - of Joele Frank, et.al? I just got off the phone after an hour's conversation with the Ombudsman at the FDIC that I had called last week. I will post what he said as soon as I can collect my thoughts/notes - but he suggested I call Andrew Siegel.
So I'm guessing nobody knows this name or has spoken to him?? I just called his office - he will be back on Friday. His assistant said I could speak to someone else - but he IS the person I should speak to regarding WMIH.
I'll let you know if I find out anything...
-----------------------------
Zitat hsmhurra:
Well I found following phone number for them from a website
Contact
Andrew Siegel / Aaron Palash
Joele Frank, Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
(212) 355-4449
The website link is as follows
http://imarketreports.com/...ctors-officers-of-washington-mutual.html
-----------------------------
Zitat noname:
Andrew Siegel / Aaron Palash
Joele Frank, Wilkinson Brimmer Katcher
(212) 355-4449
Joele Frank releases press releases for WMILT , i guess its a PR firm for WMILT/WMI.
----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Damn - I literally just wrote like 4 paragraphs - took a work call - and poof - my writing disappeared. Is there a place on here that it might go - like 'drafts' or something - before I start writing it again
----------------------------
Zitat det_sherlock:
The Joele Frank / Brimmer firm, et al, is one A&M has often used in the past.
They're well trained to give no more info than has already released in PRs, and I'm sure they post here or at least monitor this, and all, wmih boards.
-----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Thanks for telling me that - I'm going to re-think some of what I had written.
-----------------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
Did somebody get to you, dmrm57? You've gone quiet ...
-----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
Thinking the same thing, Jay. Wonder how many PM dmrm57 has gotten
-----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Yes - my husband. I sent a PM to ref2370 describing my conversation in a much broader way than I had originally written. I also got a little spooked when I heard that Andrew Siegel et al probably reads this board. I can send anyone who wants a copy of my PM.
For the record - I didn't hear anything specific - either way. Just a long, somewhat unusual conversation. I can also provide this gentlemen's contact info to anyone who wants it. Just PM me.
-----------------------------
Zitat baldeagle1:
Thanks for your effort, as I believe that most here on the board certainly appreciate your effort, regardless of the results! You may find that placing certain people on ignore will enhance your experience here on Boardpost.
-----------------------------
Zitat jgordon789:
Hi dmrm57,
You should not be afraid of disclosing your conversation details, as I am confident no insider information was provided. The only good news I can fathom your information may disclose is that Andrew Siegel is working on an announcement.
----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
Why would he read this board? Interesting, if true.
-----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
CSNY _ someone posted Andrew Siegel reads the board - I have no idea - I just didn't like the idea of my relaying any info - I'm just a small investor and don't want to get into any kind of mess. Plus - being that Andrew Grey left the FDIC (our spokesman) and went to work for JPM - well - these people just leave me uneasy.
Gov - I shouldn't even respond to you - I remember you when you were a nice guy! If you found my post comical it's probably cause you know the ins and outs - and I don't and I'm just don't want any problems.
----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
dmrm57, if nothing else you push the point that "we" are still here and watching. If they are reading well, they already knew that and they should be the ones "uneasy". Each of us have to find our level of comfort, you called ...... so it's your call as to what / how you proceed.
Thanks for doing what you did.
-----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Thanks Ken Walker. I guess the thing that left me the most uneasy was that he did speak with me so long - told me a couple of things - nothing really of importance - but he kept pumping me for info. Just thought it was odd. Usually folks in these institutions want you off the phone asap.
----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
That may mean the FDIC-R hasn't received JPM's audit, and if it has it's been kept under wraps at the agency. There's a lot of money in this and the career bureaucrats are, after all, just political hacks.
-----------------------------
Zitat Kszabo:
Here are the appointees in FDIC according to the 2012 Plum book, of course they usually hire like political underlings when possible.
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
--------------------------------------------------
Level,
Location Position Name of Incumbent Type of Pay Grade, or Tenure Expires
Appt. Plan Pay
--------------------------------------------------
Washington, DC.............. Chairman.............. Vacant............................... PAS EX .......... .......... ................
Do...................... Vice Chairman......... Martin J. Gruenberg.................. PAS EX IV .......... ................
Do...................... Member of the Board of Thomas Hoenig........................ PAS EX IV .......... ................
Directors.
Do...................... ......do.............. Jeremiah Norton...................... PAS EX IV .......... ................
Do...................... Inspector General..... Jon T. Rymer......................... PAS EX IV .......... ................
Do...................... Writer-Editor......... Michele A. Heller.................... SC
From http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-PLUMBOOK-2012/...O-PLUMBOOK-2012.pdf
----------------------------
Zitat jaysenese:
I wonder if 'whistleblower' money is available to FDIC employees who expose the wrongdoings of their bosses, or constituents.
If Andrew is reading this: look at how much the other whistleblowers are making!
"Trinity Industries Whistleblower Awarded $175 Million in Guardrail Suit" October 20, 2014
http://online.wsj.com/articles/...illion-in-guardrail-suit-1413838696
----------------------------
Zitat dmrm57:
Andrew Siegel is with Joele Frank. The Ombudsman I spoke with has a different name. I will send it to you privately - although I think I posted it here last Friday. Andrew Gray - used to be the spokesman for us with the FDIC - he left last month for a position at JPM.
But I like your idea!! That would certainly explain his interest - either that or he's bored to death!
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Notice of Submission of FDIC Final Determination Regarding Application to Make Payments Pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 359
https://www.kccllc.net/wamu/document/0812229141029000000000001
Zitat jaysenese:
This kind-of explains why the WMILT did that press release last Friday saying there would be no distributions on November 1. They figured (correctly, I suppose) that if we saw this FDIC letter before November 1 we would assume that a distribution was immediately forthcoming. The FDIC's letter is dated 10-15-2014, so the WMILT would have seen the letter by 10-24 when they made their pre-emptive announcement.
Now, as to WHY that shouldn't immediately free up money to the WMILT holders, someone else will have to explain that to me.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat Kszabo:
Feds don't give money to whistle blowers, just job protection, if you want to know fed salaries here is a searchable database for 2013.
http://php.app.com/fed_employees13/search.php
A little trick, if you don't know the name you can just select the agency ie Federal Deposit Insurance Corp, and it return all 7482 employees in alpha sequence.
-----------------------------
Zitat vitellom:
This person was listed on an FDIC site. At the upper right side of his webpage is a pull down to submit a compaint. Either a general complaint or a 'Whistleblower' complaint.
About Rich Cordray
Director Richard Cordray. (Hi-res version)
Richard Cordray serves as the first Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. He previously led the Bureau’s Enforcement Division.
Prior to joining the Bureau, Mr. Cordray served on the front lines of consumer protection as Ohio’s Attorney General. Mr. Cordray recovered more than $2 billion for Ohio’s retirees, investors, and business owners and took major steps to help protect its consumers from fraudulent foreclosures and financial predators. In 2010, his office responded to a record number of consumer complaints, but Mr. Cordray went further and opened that process for the first time to small businesses and non-profit organizations to ensure protections for even more Ohioans. To recognize his work on behalf of consumers as Attorney General, the Better Business Bureau presented Mr. Cordray with an award for promoting an ethical marketplace.
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/about-rich-cordray
Is it possible some of the more informed/knowledgeable members can get together and file a 'joint Whistleblower Class Action Complaint'?
That might stir a few to hurry this up?
-----------------------------
Zitat iPrelude:
Whistleblower Retaliation Protection
Any FDIC employee or applicant for a FDIC position is protected against negative employment actions taken in retaliation for making protected disclosures.
Protected whistleblowing is defined as disclosing information which the discloser reasonably believes evidences:
a violation of law, rule, or regulation,
gross mismanagement,
gross waste of funds,
an abuse of authority, or
a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety.
What Can You Do If You Believe Whistleblower Retaliation Has Occurred?
If you believe that you have been subject to retaliation for protected whistleblowing you can file a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC). OSC has the authority to investigate allegations of whistleblower retaliation, and may seek corrective or disciplinary action when warranted.
For more information contact:
U.S. Office Of Special Counsel (http://www.osc.gov/)
1730 M Street, N.W., Suite 201
Washington, Dc 20036-4505
Phone: (202) 653-7188 *
Toll Free: 1-800-872-9855 *
* Hearing and Speech Disabled: Federal Relay Service 1-800-877-8339, see
https://www.fdic.gov/about/jobs/whistleblowerprotection.html
There are 6795 potential wishelblowers / employees at the FDIC ( see attachment)
https://www.boardpost.net/forum/...=dlattach;topic=6399.0;attach=1398
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat kenwalker:
Got to, believe it possible or not there is a provision in the P&A that the FDIC can unwind the whole thing.
We'll have plenty to argue about and over when this over.
IMHO - Everybody seems to think that FDIC is the demonic minion of JPM's evil empire when the reality is FDIC is a quasi governmental agency that provides banking oversight and depositor protection. Back in 2008 hard choices had to be made, not enough lifeboats for everybody, and WaMu being a thrift ( actually in terms of assets WaMu held like 2/3 of ALL thrift assets ) and thrifts / OTS already on the government's chopping block, WaMu was a goner. Fair? Heck no but the point being is why should a not-for-profit quasi governmental agency go beyond what it did in crisis 2008 to help JPM steal more money than was already given to them? It's our own money they are buying us with, most of what they've acquired never made it to their books and now ( with our money ) they'll hand over a questionable FMV ( remember that in 6 years the "V" of FMV has been all over the place ) to purchase our stuff at a bargain price and roll it to their booked assets and be better off for it.
-----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
Excellent post, Ken. My only question is how such a massive payment would be made. In a normal acquisition JPM would pay with stock.
-----------------------------
Zitat govinsider:
Ken...not a chance is HELL! Matter of fact, if the LT wanted to do something of value (assuming the $50 PPill is out of their range), they probably should be scouring over whats happening at the FDIC right now. Maybe someone should ask the "ombudsman" whats currently going on with "the records" right now!
(D) RECORDKEEPING REQUIREMENT.--
(i) IN GENERAL.--Except as provided in clause (ii), after the end of the 6-year period; beginning on the date the Corporation is appointed as receiver of an insured depository institution, the Corporation may destroy any records of such institution which the Corporation, in the Corporation's discretion, determines to be unnecessary unless directed not to do so by a court of competent jurisdiction or governmental agency, or prohibited by law.
(ii) OLD RECORDS.--Notwithstanding clause (i), the Corporation may destroy records of an insured depository institution which are at least 10 years old as of the date on which the Corporation is appointed as the receiver of such depository institution in accordance with clause (i) at any time after such appointment is final, without regard to the 6-year period of limitation contained in clause (i).
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/1000-1220.html
If they remotely think they've seen a unicorn, why not get something filed with "a court of competent jurisdiction" - ASAP
Kinda like the IRS, "whoops, we assumed they were unnecessary"
This is where your buddy Robinson and our VERY unique and brilliantly crafted PAA comes into play (and many will soon learn)....FMV is irrelevant in THIS PAA
----------------------------
Zitat bgriffinokc:
Gov,
I assume that means the records of WMB and not the subs or WMI?
----------------------------
Zitat azcowboy:
What is not being addressed, here, within this MB discussion, is the fact that, JPM's ... "banking sub" ... was the receiver for, WMI's ... "banking sub" ... WMB ...
Their legal and chartered mandated capability is "key" ...
A play on words since the beginning, but ultimately, an important distinction'
-----------------------------
Zitat Scott Fox:
"Massive payment" is right. Stock and cash is also an option. Ken, I think most here wouldn't be so skeptical of the FDIC if Bair had done things in the light of day. It's old hat but there was no reason for her to declare JPM as the winner of the bidding war (there wasn't one, really) except that it would help the largest bank in the States to stay afloat and bail her out of a nasty mess. We have the LT to keep tabs on the FDIC protocols though. We'll see any cash available to us in the markers and the rest could be very creative.
-----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
It's the creative part that interests me. The P&A says the payment must be in cash. JPM won't want to part with any cash.
-----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker zu Scott Fox :
I don't want to be in the position of an apologist for FDIC, I'm not. Even if the entire "value" was returned ( and I don't assume that the entire value will be ) we still would have the time value thing. Lives have been put on hold, some have given up, some are no longer with us and will never realize any return. My thinking was to place yourself in FDIC position and the argument that FDIC totes and fetches for JPM. They're a fool if they don't do their stated job.
-----------------------------
Zitat drkazmd65:
Back when 'we' mostly were thinking that this would get settled in a buyout of some kind -rather than the path we have ended up taking I was predicting that JPM would basically settle this all out with a stock-swap: 10-20 WAMUQ / 1 JPM (possibly with a trading restriction time) and cash up front for the preferred shares,....
I was apparently somewhat naïve back then.
But your point is taken CSNY,.... that doesn't appear to be an easy and straightforward option now that WMIH has gone its separate path and my guess is that the LT Escrows would be hard to convert to that sort of payout at this point.
----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker zu govinsider:
Chance in hell? Unlikely, but the ultimate threat and the FDIC does have that power. Heck, it could be a banking shelf charter is waiting and JPM could be looking at a busting. I don't know, stranger things have happened.
I do agree about the records and things that stink do have a way of getting buried.
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat deekshant:
I know nothing about Andrew Siegel. After briefing reviewing the link, his (Edit: Andrew Segal) past background makes me believe that he was one of the advisors during the crisis. His understanding is rock solid and he pretty much covered all aspects of "To big to Fail", Cross Guarantee, concern that FDIC could cause a healthy bank to fail... Link given for those interested.
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/....cgi?article=2934&context=flr
correction: made a mistake in identifying Andrew Siegel to be the same as David Andrew Segal. I was looking at Andrew Segal and came accross some interesting stuff. It seems that he worked for Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLC. who were at the heart of the financial crisis. Thought will share the given info
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL A. ROSENTHAL,
GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP, NEW YORK, NY
TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE ROLE FOR BANKRUPTCY AND ANTITRUST LAW IN FINANCIAL
REGULATION REFORM (PART II)
==================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COURTS AND
COMPETITION POLICY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2009
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg53639/...RG-111hhrg53639.htm
Dated: Sept 2008
FINANCIAL MARKETS IN CRISIS: OVERVIEW OF FDIC'S
AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO BANK FAILURES
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/files/2008/...y-bankfailures.pdf
"The FDIC is very good at what it was created to do -- administer failing banks -- but they don't have any expertise in managing companies that have financial distress," says Michael Rosenthal, co-chair of the business restructuring and reorganization practice at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, who applauded the FDIC's move to rely on outside help. "When they handle the failure of a bank, their job is making sure depositors are paid and the assets are transferred on an orderly basis. Companies that are not a bank, if they are systemically important, are likely to have many arms and businesses, and it's going to be very, very difficult for the FDIC to come in, displace senior management and seamlessly take over."
http://www.thedeal.com/content/regulatory/...imb-off-capitol-hill.php
Financial Markets in Crisis: Final TLGP Rule
Nov 21, 2008
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/...sisFinalTLGPRule.aspx
--------------------------------------------------
Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat CSNY:
Quote from: drkazmd65 on October 24, 2014, 11:13:53 AM
But your point is taken CSNY,.... that doesn't appear to be an easy and straightforward option now that WMIH has gone its separate path and my guess is that the LT Escrows would be hard to convert to that sort of payout at this point.
The key point is the P&A requires a cash payment. See Section 13.8 @ p. 31 (p. 35 of the PDF).
----------------------------
Zitat kenwalker:
In the end there will be for the most part winners and to a lesser extent losers because 100's of billion of dollars of assets have been parked off book somewhere ( hard to have many losers when that much assets get "found" ). What better argument than for someone to just do their job and return it to the owners. This money has been idling tax free as FDIC don't pay ( just suspends ) taxes, six years is up. Time to reconcile. It has to show up somewhere.
----------------------------
ZItat Scott Fox:
Quote from: kenwalker on October 24, 2014, 11:08:23 AM
I don't want to be in the position of an apologist for FDIC, I'm not. Even if the entire "value" was returned ( and I don't assume that the entire value will be ) we still would have the time value thing. Lives have been put on hold, some have given up, some are no longer with us and will never realize any return. My thinking was to place yourself in FDIC position and the argument that FDIC totes and fetches for JPM. They're a fool if they don't do their stated job.
Ken, you didn't come off that way to me, just stating facts. My point was that Bair jumped the gun. Your last sentence says it all.
----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
Quote from: lastlucidthought on October 24, 2014, 11:23:02 AM
Not to mention that the LT Escrows are not a complete representation of the WMI ownership. They're only stakeholders who have released JPM and FDIC from lawsuits. If the FDIC does have value from the bank that should be returned, it should be returned to all the prior holders, no?
Well, no.
When WMI filed its claim the FDIC became legally obligated to pay WMI for WMB's residual. This obligation was unaffected by the GSA.
WMI became obligated to pay any claim against it that (1) was not discharged in the Chapter 11 and (2) only to the extent specified in the Chapter 11. WMI was reorganized as the LT, and the LT shares are the only mechanism for any former WMI shareholder to benefit from the former WMI's claim on WMB's residual.
If a former shareholders tries to sue the FDIC-R its suit will be dismissed as time barred. If it sues JPM, that's another matter, but I wouldn't hold out a lot of hope for such an action.
----------------------------
Zitat noname:
JPM is not a party directly with WMI/WMILT so expect no payment relation between these parties.
The only way i see it is through 363 asset sale, with the help of FDIC and bankruptcy court JPM could pay back door whatever amount handed over to them by Rosen from PJ Solomon.
-----------------------------
Zitat WAMUCHEN:
I have an issue there bop. If the SNs really believed in the residual, and given to the extent that these WMILT markers were represented by the hard fight between the EC and the Debtors and creditors, why weren't WMI shares in all classes seen as the golden baskets carrying the golden eggs(residual interests in the R)?
Or they had not planned for any survival of equity interests before? Would a same form of WMILT exist if the equity was to be killed in POR6? AZ,this part is for you.
-----------------------------
Zitat noname:
They tried to kill the Equity, they tried to kill the 18 Billion NOLs and hence kill the reorg equity.But what for they tried to get the reorg?.May be hidden assets.
----------------------------
Zitat CSNY:
The SNs originally intended that they would be the sole members of whatever class served as the firewall. Originally that class was to be the Hs. They would have got the equity in WMI at that point and, therefore, the WMB residual.
-----------------------------
Zitat azcowboy:
Well, lets see if I can help make sense out of this .... In their endeavors to get plan 6 approved' ... the snh's attempted two major issues ...
1st; and quite obvious to us all now, was their attempt to exclude equity, from not only the process, but also, exclude equity from future and knowledgeable participation ...
2nd; and a bit more subtle was within plan 6' they (snh's) would have had total control regarding any and all issues'
In my opinion, ... The snh's were calculating on their own knowledge of ... "a future tense potential" ... They, (snh's) knew of the initial zero level assigned by the FDIC at seizure, however, they also knew of the funding potential of "R" back to the estate' ...
Remember, only the banking subs of both parties were involved ... WMI (the parent) and JPMorgan (the parent) were not and neither parent "would not" fall under the FDIC's mandate'
Here, this may help ... read these two separate excerpts, ... and think of the FDIC starting from a zero balance as dictated within their own footnotes' .... pay .. very .. close attention to the words "other than"
==================================================
The Liquidating Trust Assets will consist of all of the assets of the Debtors as of the Effective Date, other than:
� the Company's equity interests in (i) Investment (all the assets of which will be contributed to the WMI Liquidating Trust, including any intercompany claims), (ii) WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc., and (iii) Washington Mutual Bank (the stock of which is worthless and is expected to be abandoned by the Company shortly before the Effective Date);
� cash to be distributed on and from the Effective Date pursuant to the Plan to holders of certain allowed claims against the Debtors;
� cash necessary to pay the fees and expenses owed to certain creditors' professionals;
� cash necessary to reimburse the Debtors for fees and expenses incurred in connection with initial distributions made by the Debtors as disbursing agent under the Plan;
� the economic interest retained by the Debtors in any Litigation Proceeds pursuant to the respective elections of Reorganized Common Stock; and
� Creditor Cash on the Effective Date.
==================================================
Notes to Financial Statements:
"1. Basis of Accounting: The FDI Act authorizes the FDIC, as receiver for a failed insured depository institution (''receivership''), to administer and conclude the affairs of such institution. Financial statement presentations are based on the premise that the assets of the receivership will be liquidated and proceeds distributed to the institution's creditors over time as provided by applicable laws and regulations. While a receivership's average lifespan is three to six years, some may require longer time frames to conclude. At the onset of a receivership, the failed institution's financial records are reviewed and restated to establish a new basis of accounting. The assets and liabilities of the failed institution are adjusted to remove all estimated losses, accruals, and deferrals. These adjustments include loss allowances; partial write downs; prepaid, deferred or accrued expenses having no recovery value; and accrued or deferred income. Restated balances are shown under the Inception Balance heading of the Statement of Assets and Liabilities in Liquidation. After inception, FDIC's liquidation valuation and measurement practices, as described more fully in the paragraphs that follow, are adopted for all assets and liabilities. In general, transactions are recorded when cash is received or disbursed. Accruals may be used when prospective cash flows are probable and reasonably estimated."
und zu User CNSY : Zitat :
Correct' and a VERY important PART of what was attempted to be done' .... This also played an important role in the attempted (plan 6 approval) process' ... a piers security prospectus designation as a "hybrid" ... which allowed a piers security to exceed its face value, without a cap', in the same manner as a common equity' share'
The capping of a 16' security by the court, and the reversal of the Tranche Payout Matrix was "key" to the forward moving issues for equity' ... But we have had that discussion months ago' ...
**************
Now, ....
Everyone; ... Read this again ~ as we' have moved forward in time, and have now researched "R"s procedural responsibilities;
The Liquidating Trust Assets will consist of all of the assets of the Debtors as of the Effective Date, other than:
� the Company's equity interests in (i) Investment (all the assets of which will be contributed to the WMI Liquidating Trust, including any intercompany claims), (ii) WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc., and (iii) Washington Mutual Bank (the stock of which is worthless and is expected to be abandoned by the Company shortly before the Effective Date);
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Zitat jaysenese:
Who is doing the servicing of ex-WAMU mortgages now, post 9-25-2014? Still JPM? Then there must be a contract or final accounting completed, right?
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Zitat Scott Fox zu azcowboy:
Thanks AZ. They'll need a slew of people to unwind the 'Assets and Liabilities' in liquidation on this one. Hope they work diligently on the FMV part. Checks and balances?
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Zitat azcowboy:
Yep, ... this was ... multi-layered ... that's for sure ~ and, as we all say out here in "dumb ass hillbilly land" ... quite slick'
As I have consistently said, since the Harley made it, after plan 6' was denied = "this should work out just fine"
just sayin'
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat:
Quote from: azcowboy on October 24, 2014, 12:47:18 PM
Now, ....
Everyone; ... Read this again ~ as we' have moved forward in time, and have now researched "R"s procedural responsibilities;
The Liquidating Trust Assets will consist of all of the assets of the Debtors as of the Effective Date, other than:
� the Company's equity interests in (i) Investment (all the assets of which will be contributed to the WMI Liquidating Trust, including any intercompany claims), (ii) WM Mortgage Reinsurance Company, Inc., and (iii) Washington Mutual Bank (the stock of which is worthless and is expected to be abandoned by the Company shortly before the Effective Date);
Zitat CSNY dazu:
It was (iii) that worried me for some time, but we discussed that point some time ago.
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Zitat azcowboy:
Yep' it was (i) ...
the Company's equity interests in (i) Investment (all the assets of which will be contributed to the WMI Liquidating Trust, including any intercompany claims),
or' as we say out here in hillbilly country'
~ everythings being returned to the liquidating trust' ... other than; ~ or except for' ...
~ the Company's interests in Investment', which includes, ... all the assets of which will be contributed to the WMI Liquidating Trust ~
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Zitat dixdeau zu Scott Fox: seinem Post :
"...Thanks AZ. They'll need a slew of people to unwind the 'Assets and Liabilities' in liquidation on this one. Hope they work diligently on the FMV part. Checks and balances /b]"
The FDIC-R can be sued for the difference between what they sold for if less than what the SNH could have gotten for the same items.
If FDIC knows their every move is being second guessed,by ongoing FOIA inquiries from SNH for one example, the FDIC might act with more deliberation and diligence.
The SNH can't make a move until FDIC-R has completed their administrative remedies.
The SNH can roll up a couple of field pieces anytime, just for show.
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Zitat dixdeau:
"...The SNH can roll up a couple of field pieces anytime, just for show."
Were FOIA replies to suggest a pattern of FDIC not meeting Federal Accounting Standards then a motion requesting the Court to order FDIC to provide certain/relevant documents would not be out of order.
This is not to say that the lack of such a motion is support that FDIC is not violating FAS, it is more along the lines of "If such a motion was filed then support of recovery to escrows is significantly bolstered."
"ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS
FAS 140 requires a transferor (bank)36 to recognize an immediate gain (or loss) on a transfer of
the receivables that qualifies for sale accounting. As part of this process, the previous carrying
amount of the transferred receivables is allocated between the assets sold and the interests the
seller retains (including any residual interests) based on their relative fair values at the date of the
transfer.
Any residual interests (other than interests that must be accounted for as derivatives in
accordance with FAS 133) that can contractually be prepaid or otherwise settled in such a way
that the seller would not recover substantially all of its recorded investment must be subsequently
measured at fair value like either an available-for-sale debt security or a trading assets.
Consequently, banks must ascertain the fair value of these residual interests on a periodic (at
least quarterly) basis.
Determinations of fair value at the date of transfer and at subsequent measurement dates should
be based on reasonable, conservative assumptions about such factors as yields, discount rates,
projected credit losses, and payment rates. Examiners should expect the estimated value of
residual interests to be supported by verifiable documentation in accordance with GAAP.
36 For the purposes of this chapter, the transferor is assumed to be the bank under examination and the term bank is used
rather than transferor as stated in FAS 140. In addition, this chapter also assumes the bank is the servicer.
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/.../pdf_version/ch8.pdf
http://www.fasb.org/summary/stsum140.shtml
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Quote from: kenwalker on October 24, 2014, 11:08:23 AM
My thinking was to place yourself in FDIC position and the argument that FDIC totes and fetches for JPM. They're a fool if they don't do their stated job.
Zitat govinsider dazu:
Ken - You severely underestimate our enemy...
"What is more disconcerting is that Congress has received false testimony from a senior FDIC official."
"There is no doubt in our minds that FDIC and DOJ officials have abused their authority to advance a political and/or moral agenda."
October 23, 2014
http://www.nraila.org/media/13474497/ocpfdicletter.pdf
p.s. jamie would fall under that "political agenda"
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Zitat kenwalker:
I do tend to underestimate the irrational behavior of a fool(s) pumped up on power but "quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" ( Who watches the watchmen?") can be as simple of an act as Andy limiting Barney to one bullet and making him carry it in his shirt pocket. In my more tin hat moments I do believe that the more we know and expect the more we will receive but that could be me overestimating.
Either way I view this as a David and Goliath situation where David's weakness was his advantage, because he simply refused to play by Goliath's rules. That's probably a bad quote that I should attribute to Malcolm Gladwell.
Tell me what you know about Robinson resolution ( third ).
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ZItat dixdeau:
Whole Bank P&As
The FDIC’s preference for passing assets to acquirers became formal corporate policy on December
30, 1986.12 The FDIC Board of Directors established an order of priority, known as “sequential
bidding,” for six alternative transaction methods based on the amount of assets passed to the
acquirer.13
The whole bank P&A structure emerged as the result of an effort to induce acquirers of failed banks
or thrifts to purchase the maximum amount of a failed institution’s assets. Bidders were asked to bid
on all assets of the failed institution on an “as is,” discounted basis (with no guarantees). This type
12 The policy was called the Robinson Resolution (named after Hoyle Robinson, executive secretary of the FDIC from May
7, 1979, to January 3, 1994). The resolution provided delegations to FDIC staff that allowed prioritizing the types of
resolutions to be considered. The Robinson Resolution was revised and reissued in July 1992 and again in May 1997 to
reflect the changes mandated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991.
13 The six transaction types were, in order of preference, whole bank purchase and assumption, whole bank deposit insurance
transfer and asset purchase, purchase and assumption, deposit insurance transfer and asset purchase, deposit insurance
transfer, and straight deposit payoff.
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch3pas.pdf
FDIC's preference for whole bank transactions did not preclude
potential acquirers from making other types of bids. However, FDIC's
bid evaluation process prior to FDICIA clearly focused on its
preference for whole bank bids. The bid evaluation process was to
separate whole bank bids from all other types of bids received.\4
4 FDIC refers to this process, which established the agency's
priority for evaluating bids, as the "Robinson Resolution."
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/...94-107/html/GAOREPORTS-GGD-94-107.htm
The principle disadvantage to revealing the reserve prices of the asset pools occurs in transactions
with few bidders. When bidders know there is little competition, revealing the reserve price may bias
the bidding toward the reserve prices. For example, if an asset pool has a book value of $1 million
and if the FDIC estimates the fair market value to be only $900,000 and the collection expenses to
be another $50,000, the FDIC’s reserve price will be 85 percent of the book value of the assets. A
potential acquirer, having completed its own due diligence, may have estimated the fair market value
of the assets to be $950,000 and its own collection costs as $30,000. That potential acquirer might
ordinarily have bid up to 92 percent. However, if the FDIC discloses its 85 percent reserve price, the
potential acquirer facing little competition might bid closer to 85 percent than to 92 percent.
Although the FDIC’s acceptance of the bid at 85 percent is less expensive for the FDIC than the cost
of liquidating the assets, the reduced bid results in a loss of income for the receivership estate.
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch2procs.pdf
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ZItat kenwalker:
Thanks dixdeau.
I had found / seen that first link and it did help narrow down which of the 6 whole bank options were used, though it told very little of the Robinson Resolution.
The second link I've never seen, reading the section where your reference footnote was found was interesting.
Could not open the third link ...............
Correct me if I'm wrong but "Robinson" appears to be a group of at least three options "canned" and ready to apply by the FDIC. These options according to issues of the failed bank, simply ( heck, ain't nothing simple about FDIC / banks ) help the FDIC go about its job. As discussed before, that job is to maximum seized assets according to FDIC priority ( depositors, debtors, equity ).
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Zitat dixdeau:
· A purchase and assumption (P&A) transaction is a closed institution1
transaction in which a healthy institution (generally referred to as either the acquirer or the “assuming” bank or
thrift) purchases some or all of the assets of a failed bank or thrift and assumes some or all
of the liabilities, including all insured deposits. Occasionally, an acquirer may receive
assistance from the FDIC as insurer to complete the transaction. As a part of the P&A
transaction, the acquirer usually pays a premium2 to the FDIC for the assumed deposits,
which decreases the total resolution cost.
· In a deposit payoff, as soon as the appropriate chartering authority closes the bank or thrift,
the FDIC is appointed receiver. The FDIC as insurer pays all of the failed institution’s
depositors with insured funds the full amount of their insured deposits.3
Depositors with uninsured funds and other general creditors (such as suppliers and service providers) of the
failed institution do not receive either immediate or full reimbursement; instead, the FDIC as
receiver issues them receivership certificates. A receivership certificate entitles its holder to
a portion of the receiver’s collections on the failed institution’s assets.
· In an open bank assistance (OBA) transaction, the FDIC as insurer provides financial
assistance to an operating insured bank or thrift determined to be in danger of failing. The
FDIC can make loans to, purchase the assets of, or place deposits in a troubled institution.
Where possible, an assisted institution is expected to repay its assistance loan.4
Due to restrictions imposed under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
(FDICIA) of 1991 and under The Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act of 1993,
which amended the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950, OBA is no longer a commonly
used resolution method.
(1
A closed financial institution is one whose charter has been revoked by its chartering authority.
2
The premium is the part of a bid for a failing institution’s franchise value.
3
The FDIC’s insurance limit is $100,000. Any amount over that limit, including interest, is uninsured. The FDIC uses the
term “insured depositor” to refer to any depositor whose deposits are under the insurance limit. Similarly, the term
“uninsured depositor” is used to refer to those depositors whose deposits are over the insurance limit. It is important to note
that customers with uninsured deposits are paid up to the insurance limit; and only that portion of their deposits that is over
$100,000 is uninsured.
4
Generally, an OBA agreement includes provisions for the repayment of the assistance in whole or in part)
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch2procs.pdf
These types of transactions were not part of the Robinson Resolution.The OBA came into existence in the 1950's. The P&A and Deposit Payoff became the preferred methods in the early 1980's. All were prior to the Robinson Resolution(1986). As far as I can tell the original Robinson resolution and its amendments prioritized the preference of the FDIC for types of transactions within the Purchase and Assumption category.
This link will take you to the same information. It has the added bonus of being able to substitute chapter numbers in the link such as 08 or 12 for the 02 in order to pull up other chapters.
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/managing/history1-02.pdf
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)
Zitat CharlienDude:
I'm as ready for this Election stuff to be over as anyone else so I don't want to discuss it but wanted to repeat some market predictions I heard this morning. One market analyst predicted that if the Republicans take the Senate (which is very likely) they expect the stock market to move up even more. Also heard that they felt the Senate will now work on the corporate tax laws that will encourage corporations to move money back to the U.S.
These possibilities make me wonder how this new cash coming back in with these companies will effect WMIH's ability to get a merger deal? Will it be even harder for WMIH to compete with big cash for a merger so does it push them to get something prior to a tax change? Or do our NOLs become more desirable to a company wanting to bring back their cash with the tax laws changed?
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ZItat Devalzadvok8:
We're thinking on the same page. I was hoping that somehow our NOLs could be used by some company division that had made a bundle overseas and was trying to figure out how to bring it back w/o paying tax on it. One of our 'problems' may be that such companies may be waiting for Congress to do a one-time profits transfer at some low tax or another. Consequently, they're just as happy to let WMIH 'sit' until the air clears. I don't think, though, that even if Congress were to try to pass some kind of bill like that [assuming that the Republicans can take over the Senate and still control the House], that Obama would sign same. The only way this would work would be if said bill were incorporated along with something that Obama did want.
The longer this drags along the more dubious I am that we really have such a marketable asset. Given the deteriorating share pricing the market may be thinking along these same lines as well...........
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Zitat deekshant:
I am a minor but do have the right to voice my opinion . I doubt if corporations think like that. How does it help corporations to bring money back. They went out in arms length to not pay taxes and now we are assuming that they will do the opposite without a business case. Money is money, any money they pay IRS is an amount that they can invest elsewhere for profit. They might as well venture in new projects with that money with much higher risk then imo pay IRS. That 10% margin to a business is a big deal and they won't spare a dime as long as it can be avoided. In fact, what we are seeing now is that corporations are stepping up to even move their headquarters abroad to avoid paying taxes if possible.
When IRS gave US citizens a chance to bring foreign funds back, I believe only 10% actually did just that. And, when a law was passed to report your foreign assets, the guys who had the most to loose gave up on their US citizenship.
-----------------------------
Zitat OldJoe.McC:
U.S. Hikes Fee To Renounce Citizenship By 422%
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/08/28/...izenship-by-422/
-----------------------------
Zitat deekshant:
Thanks Joe. So, if most of the funds were already out of the country then does it matter what they have to pay in US to exit. Is Switzerland still going to continue to be the safe haven for the few who matter the most. I believe so. Are corporations any different? World Trade Agreement signed and promoted by Bush has caused more damage to US economy specially in respect of US jobs.
"Now, the State Department interim rule just raised the fee for renunciation of U.S. citizenship to $2,350 from $450. Critics note that it’s more than twenty times the average level in other high-income countries. The State Department says it’s about demand on their services and all the extra workload they have to process people who are on their way out."
-----------------------------
Zitat Devalzadvok8:
Deek,
"I am a minor but do have the right to voice my opinion .
It makes no difference if you are a 'minor', or not. You, as a 'minor', and I as an 'Uber Elder' actually have no "rights". Period........ All we really have are 'privileges' and 'associated obligations' - randomly cancelable, at that. And both these are 'qualified', yet. If we actually did have 'rights', then Myadad's pulpit-pounding, executive-order-thumping fantasy
https://www.committeeforjustice.org/content/...and-his-administration
of a 'rightful' universal health care for all would have us ask, "But what happened to the previous 200 historical years of America's 'rights' in this area? How come they didn't exist?" But I digress.............
"I doubt if corporations think like that. How does it help corporations to bring money back. They went out in arms length to not pay taxes and now we are assuming that they will do the opposite without a business case."
You're assuming that they have no plans/business case. Even Arab sheiks have reason(s) to invest in Beverly Hills. 'America's' not so bad, you know. You may have a lot of profits held up in 'Lower Bunga Bunga', [or wherever], but you may not know which dictator may be running 'Bunga Bunga' tomorrow. Ummmmm! Like 'stocks', sometimes it's best to take the money and run.
NOTE: With Henry Ford's demise his family was able to escape inheritance taxes due to Ford's previous 'folding' of the Ford Motor Co. empire into the [charitable] Ford Foundation - something that couldn't have been done with the money being held overseas. Having said the above...........
Your case may well indeed be a valid one, one that I may not have a ready argument against. But................. if you are correct then that's one more P&A avenue opportunity removed from WMIH's sophisticated development plan. This 'plan' has been in place for some time now. There's a reason(s), more than the one you postulate, that we see no unfolding successful results. Analyses, anyone?
Dev
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Zitat WAMUCHEN:
Item 1.01 Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement.
http://www.secinfo.com/d14D5a.nu4q.htm
Wmi Holdings Corp. 8-K · For 1/30/14
KKR's benefits come with obligations.
For KKR to get the WMIH preferred and warrants, KKR must surrender its weapons. Of the items listed, two major promises were made.
1. Not being hostile to the WMIH board
2. Not Shorting WMIH stocks
The time frame is until December 31, 2016.
Now, let's eye on the Rights Offerings. In accompanying with other benefits, KKR was granted to participating right to buy up-to 50% of the future issuance CAPPED at $1 BB dollars. The term of right is over on January 30, 2017.
Interesting, right? The two dates are just one month away from each other.
Also, for KKR to continue to possess the right to appoint a board seat out of the seven seats, KKR must maintain at least 50% of its 10 MM shares of WMIH Jan 30, 2014 preferred or equivalently the converting WMIH commons.
KKR can't own more than 42.5% of WMIH equity in lump sum fashion.
Quote
Investment Agreement
Pursuant to the terms and conditions of the Investment Agreement, the Company has sold to KKR Fund 1,000,000 shares of the Series A Convertible Preferred Stock (the “Convertible Preferred Stock”) having the terms, rights, obligations and preferences contained in a certificate of designation of the Company (the “Certificate of Designation”) for a purchase price equal to $11,072,192 and has issued to KKR Fund warrants to purchase, in the aggregate, 61.4 million shares of the Company’s common stock (the “Common Stock”), 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.32 per share and 30.7 million of which have an exercise price of $1.43 per share (together, the “Warrants”).
The warrants have been issued to KKR by WMIH.
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ZItat bgriffinokc:
Unless I missed it, only half the warrants have been issued. The remainder of warrants could drag on for more than two years, however that's a long time at my age.
As a betting man, I'm believing it happens long before Jan. 30, 2017 based on the first purchase of warrants. My bet is after March 20, 2014.
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Zitat sillyinvestor:
Do you mind extrapolating a bit more on your thoughts?
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Zitat CharlienDude:
All very good points, Wamuchen, on the date deadlines that have to be met by KKR. Just being a stickler here but want to stress that the warrants have been issued BY WMIH 'FOR PURCHASE' by KKR at some point. At present, KKR only owns the 1MM convertible preferred stock for the $11MM infusion commitment that is to be used for a deal. I would think that the warrants (apprx. $110MM value) won't be purchased until we see a deal in the works.
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Zitatende
MfG.L:)