Wer soll dann die ganzen Dollar nehmen?
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| Eröffnet am: | 21.09.04 10:57 | von: gamblelv | Anzahl Beiträge: | 6 |
| Neuester Beitrag: | 25.04.21 13:07 | von: Ankebtkxa | Leser gesamt: | 1.918 |
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dpa-afx HONGKONG. Die stark gestiegenen Rohstoffkosten erhöhen nach Einschätzung der Credit Suisse First Boston (Csfb) die Wahrscheinlichkeit für eine schrittweisen Freigabe der chinesischen Währung Yuan. Es gebe "Spielraum" für eine Koppelung des Yuan an einen Währungskorb statt die seit 1994 bestehende feste Bindung an die US-Währung, heißt es in einer am Dienstag in Hongkong veröffentlichten Studie der Schweizer Investmentbank.
Die USA fordert bereits seit längerem eine Freigabe des Yuan, damit die chinesischen Importe nicht weiter künstlich verbilligt werden und somit nach Einschätzung von US-Politikern den heimischen Produzenten schaden. China verweist auf das instabile Finanzsystem der stark wachsenden Volkswirtschaft, das eine komplette Yuan-Freigabe nicht verkraften würde. Nach Einschätzung der Csfb würde die chinesische Währung durch eine Bindung an einen Währungskorb "begrenzt" flexibel.
Da die chinesischen Exporteure die stark gestiegenen Rohstoffkosten wegen der unterbewerteten Währung kaum an ihre Abnehmer weitergeben könnten, sinkt der Csfb-Studie zufolge die ohnehin schon niedrige Rentabilität der chinesischen Produzenten weiter. Neben den hohen Rohstoffpreisen leiden die Hersteller zudem unter gestiegenen Arbeitskosten.
Der fest fixierte Wechselkurs gebe den chinesischen Exportunternehmen nur wenig Möglichkeiten zum Feilschen mit Abnehmern wie dem weltweit größten Einzelhändler Wal-Mart, der nach Erhebung der Csfb im vergangenen Jahr chinesische Waren im Wert von rund 14 Mrd. $ gekauft hat. "Wir denken, die Zeit ist reif, dass China ein 'kollektives Feilschen' über den Wechselkurs praktiziert", sagte Csfb-Analyst Dong Tao.
HANDELSBLATT, Dienstag, 21. September 2004, 10:17 Uhr
Sept. 21 (Bloomberg) -- Marc Faber, the Hong Kong-based asset manager who cheerfully wears such gloomy monikers as ``Dr. Doom'' and ``the bear's bear,'' used an unusual ploy to make his point at CLSA Ltd.'s annual investor forum last week.
``I'm Comrade Faber, comrades,'' he began. ``You are now all members of the central committee of the Communist Party that's getting together today for the first time in a year.''
Faber's gambit was timely, as it coincided with a real meeting of the Chinese Communist Party's central committee in Beijing. Although the actual plenary session focused on political transition, with former President Jiang Zemin handing over control of the military to current President Hu Jintao, Faber's make- believe meeting concerned itself with another changeover -- a shift in the world's economic core from the U.S. to China.
An Asian century, with the most-populous nation at its center, is hardly a novel idea. Still, what made Faber's take on the topic interesting was that, unlike many other commentators, Faber's scenario doesn't envision a sell-off in U.S. securities as a starting point for the transition.
In fact, Faber, the managing director of Marc Faber Ltd., and the author of a monthly newsletter called ``The Gloom, Boom and Doom Report,'' argues that Beijing may adopt just the opposite strategy. ``My plan,'' Faber said at the CLSA conference, continuing with his imitation of an imaginary Chinese official, ``is to keep the U.S. dollar very, very strong.''
Current Account Deficit
Faber's ``plan'' may be a big setback for any hope of an orderly reduction in the U.S. current account deficit, which is the biggest risk to the stability of the global financial system.
``A current account deficit of 5 percent of U.S. gross domestic product cannot be reduced,'' Nouriel Roubini of New York University's Stern School of Business and Brad Setser of Oxford University said in a research paper this month, ``if the fastest growing, most dynamic parts of the world economy continue to maintain exchange rates that suppress domestic consumption by keeping the domestic price of imports high.''
And China, which has since 1995 pegged the yuan at 8.3 to the dollar, holds the key to adjustments. ``The rest of Asia will not adjust,'' the authors conclude, ``if China does not adjust.''
Still, there are two compelling reasons for Beijing to keep the dollar overvalued, Faber said.
Overvalued Dollar
First, by propping up the U.S. currency, China, along with the rest of Asia, can make more of U.S. manufacturing and service industries uncompetitive, forcing them to move to Asia.
Second, the People's Bank of China uses a big chunk of its $483 billion of foreign-exchange reserves to buy U.S. assets, helping keep American interest rates low. Continued low rates will keep a ``feel-good factor going in the U.S.,'' Faber said.
``One day disaster will strike, and we we'll lose a lot of money on our bonds and dollar positions,'' said Faber, still play- acting the part of a Chinese official. ``This is a small penalty to pay for the transfer of technology and manufacturing and investments into our country.''
Leave aside issues of morality. Could it be that Faber's ``comrade'' is underestimating the financial burden on China from following a strategy of systematic beggaring of the U.S.?
Burden on China
For any Asian central bank, including the Chinese, ``intervening by purchasing dollars,'' says Barry Eichengreen, an economics professor at University of California at Berkeley, ``means pumping additional credit into the economy, given the limited effectiveness of sterilized intervention.''
Much of the extra credit created by the People's Bank of China is creating an investment bubble. Things have come to such a pass that to drive speculators out of the overheated property markets in Shanghai and Beijing, the central bank may have to raise interest rates -- something it's reluctant to do, out of fear that the move may end up stalling the entire economy.
Thus, the current situation, in which China leads the rest of Asia in propping up the dollar, may be unsustainable, even from the Chinese perspective. And if China desires to have some latitude in developing a monetary policy independent of the U.S. Federal Reserve, it may have no option but to let the yuan trade somewhat more freely against the dollar.
Dollar's Demise
However, Faber's mythical ``comrade'' believes that China will have the power to decide when to cause the demise of the overvalued dollar.
``We'll choose the perfect timing when geopolitical tensions are such that they're very conducive to have an economic crisis in the U.S.,'' said Faber, a former managing director at now-defunct junk-bond firm Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. ``We'll also suffer, but far less than the Western world.''
Let's hope that China's Communist Party officials, who have assured the world of their intention to move toward a more flexible currency regime, aren't privately thinking like the ``comrade.'' Already, the U.S. current account deficit has created tensions that are ``large enough to crack the system in the next three to four years,'' Roubini and Setser say.
If China delays an exchange-rate adjustment only to dump the dollar later in a single shot, Faber's prognosis of gloom and doom could become a reality."
Das Schicksal von dem US-$ liegt in den Händen von China!
Die Deutschen bilden vielleicht eine Ausnahme, sie haben ein zu schleichtes Gewissen. Leider verpassen sie damit eine Menge Chancen und geben dem Ausland einen Vorsprung.
MFG
hXXp://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aBP9cieY3.bI&refer=asia
Auszug:
Marc Faber Speaks: U.S. Economy, Policies, Outlook for Asia
* Keep US $ strong (All of Asia buying $) undermining manufacturing in US
* Transfer of technology, investment, manufacturing
* Recently and quietly buying and accumulating physical gold, (will not be shown on official records as to not to alert markets)
* by keeping US $ strong allows Asia accumulating gold cheaply -
* When Crisis hit - ( when Asia pulls the plug on the US $ or bonds = losses on US $ will be offset by gains on gold positions
Result: Transfer of wealth to Asia
hxxp://media5.bloomberg.com:443/cgi-bin/getavfile.cgi?A=22240505
Großartige Präsentation von Dr. Faber - Sehr empfehlenswert!
hxxp://worldmarket.blogspot.com/2004/09/comrade-faber-speaks-method-in-madness.html
Auszug:
Capital spending in the meantime is still lower in the United States than in the year 2000. And as you can see on the following page nine, the employment gains in America have been very disappointed - disappointing. Had employment increased at the same rate than in post-war recovery employment in the United States would be eight million people higher.
Real wages are, in fact, declining, even with the techniques the government is preparing in the United States. We should actually sue them for infringement of intellectual property rights. And as the average earnings are growing at the lowest rate in the last 40 years. So we can say the vulnerability of the U.S. economy is that growth has come from a debt bubble that stimulates consumption, always consumption, and not growing actual production which they said at the same level than in '99 and from capital spending which has declined over the last four years
..................
You can see on the following page, 14, that until 1987 the United States has a positive net asset balance. But after 1987, as a result of the growing current account deficit, the net asset balance deteriorated and today foreigner's own approximately $9 trillion of assets in the U.S. GDP in the U.S. is $11.2 trillion, and Americans own approximately $6 trillion worth of assets overseas. In other words, the negative net asset balance is over $3 trillion or close to 30 percent of the American GDP.
And now this negative net investment balance is, of course, drawing analysts by the current account deficit of the United States, which in the second quarter was running at approximately $650 billion or close to six percent of the American GDP
...............
Moreover, we have recently, quietly, began to buy gold. Of course, we will never (inaudible) the gold reserves in our Central Bank reserve because we do not wish to alert the international market that we are buying gold. But by keeping the dollar very strong we (inaudible) the gold price and can accumulate it. So when the crisis will hit when we pull the plug on the dollar and on U.S. bonds we will have some losses on our dollar position but we will make it back on our gold positions.
hxxp://worldmarket.blogspot.com/2004/09/comrade-faber-speaks-method-in-madness.html
Dieser Text ist sehr lesenswert!